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Eelatian of Jiva and Brahman is an Important 
philosopiiical problem. Almost a l l the great 
Acarjras Jaave expressed on tiiis problem, But the 
contribution of Himbarica on this problem is 
unique, and deserves invest igation# Of-course 
a number of modem scholars have touched or 
discussed this problem in their different works, 
Dr, Ucma Bose in the third volume of her thesis 
'»lredaata'-pari4ata--saurabha"5 Dr, Umesh Misra in 
his "Himbarka-School of Vedahta"; and Prof, 
P.N, Srinivasachari In his "Ihe philosophy of 
Bhedabheda'S have tried to give a lucid and 
comprehensive exposition of the complete philosophy 
as well as the historical problems of the Himl)irka, 
But their main aim seems to be, to give the 
historical back-ground of Nimbarka philosophy, 
Ihey did not try to write, in detai l , the relation 
of Jiva and Brahman, USiere are q[uite a number of 
papers, articles, periodicals and booklets written 
to Hindi and English which represent attempts at 
an exposition of the teachings of Nimharka, tout 
these, being devotional or religioua in character, 
are prompted by unquestioning faith more than 
based on an ansD.ytical» rational approach* 
Ihe present work undertakes to present the 
relation of j iva and Brahman of the philosophy of 
Nimbarka, In sc ient i f i c and unbiassed manner. 3?he 
work cbnsists of f ive ch^ters . In Chapter-I^ 
(Ihe Concept of Belation), the nature of relation 
and types of relation are discussed. 3Ihe types of 
relation of difference and non-difference (Hiedabheda) 
are mainly discussed in this chapter, in Chapter-II, 
Origin and ^Development of the Doctrine of IDifference 
and Hon-difference (bhedabheda) is discussed. In 
Chapter-Ill, it is sought to establish that the 
relation of Jiva and Brahman is the natural relation 
of difference and non-diffei-ence (Svabhavika -
bhedabheda) In the philosophy of Himbarka. In 
Chapter - IV, the nature of j lva and Brahman is 
discussed as concerned with their relation of 
difference and non-difference. Olhese two chapters 
supply the philosophical foundations of the doctrine 
of JSIimb^ka. In Ghapter-V, a comparative study of 
the relation of jJva and Brahman is discussed on the 
basis of various-school of vedsoita. 
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Ihis is my hum'ble attempt, this problem 
had been a d i f f i cu l t one, and it is not impossible 
to misunderstand the text of great acaryas. 
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Ihe Concept of .kelation 
U) Befinitlon of relation; 
Every tiling is decided to be true or fa lse 
on the basis of direct experiences alone. Philosophy 
primarily explains different kinds of experiences. 
i/Very experience involves some kind of relation. 
Relation determines cognition vsrhich is of experiences. 
Determinate experiences are made possible by relation. 
M abstract entity, has no relation to anything* 
Relation denotes facts. Hence, relation plays a very 
important role in our Knowledge. 
iivery relation implies two terms viz. 
Pratiyogin (counter-correlative) and anuyogin 
(correlated-substratum). Pratiyogin is that which 
rests on a substratum and anuyogin is substratum. 
2 
perceived. Vatsy^ana (^a^^'thaTT'^^ seen 
i . e*, perceived. S i m i l a r s a y s that the . 2 - —-
oon;}unction is an object of the eye and the perception 3 
of inher^ce is due to the relation of attri"butiveneBs« 
4 
Ke^avamiera defines the relation as follows: 
"Sambandho hi !• sanbandhiljiiy^ lahinnahi 2, ulahay^ri-
ta^i 3« ekakcekf viz* the relation Csambandha) should 
be different from the r e l a " ^ Csambandhibhyam), 
dependent on both, and one* As f o r e^sra^ple, the 
conjunction of a kettle-druffl and the stick* The 
conjunction (saffiyoga-eambandha) is different from the 
kettle-drum and the stick because the kettle-drum and 
the stick are substances Cdravya) and the conjunction 
is a quality (guna), dependent on both, and is one* 
in the Buddhist-philosophy, relations are 
contingent reality, that is to say no ultimate reality 
1 Vatsyiyana-Biasya on Nyajya-Sutra 1*1*6, pp.16, Poona, 
1939* 
2 Karikavali of VisvanSifefe, ia,sarma Srichandrahari 
Singh, verse 64, pp* 97, Barabhanga, 1939* 
3 Ca) Ibid* V* 61, pp. 108* 
(b) iSaattacarya, Tara Sankara "Eelation according to 
J^e lew-school of Ihdia Loj^ Xc Cilifavya-gyayaj""7' 
IToumai. the Ganganath Jia Research Institute, 
Allahabad, Vol. XI, pts* 4, 1946, pp* 392* 
4 (a) Tarka-bhasa of Ke^avamiira, isd* Acarya Visve^wara, 
pp* 122, Benares, 1963* _ 
(b> Sambandhibiiinnattve sati sambandhyi^ritah-Hyaya-
koisa of Jhalkikar £himacarya, pp* 920* Poona, 
1928* 
at all* Ultimate reality is unrelated, it is non -
relative, it is the absolute* Eelations are cons-
tructions o£ our imagination, tiiey are nothing 
actual. 2he Indian realists , however kept to the 
principle that relations are as real as the things 
and that they are perceived throu^ the senses. 
Uddyotak:ara(8^^ "the perception oi the connection 
of an object with i ts mark is the f i r s t act of 
sense-percept ion Xrom which inference proceeds"* 
According to him connection is perceived by the 
senses as well as the connected facts* 
Dharmakirti in the f i r s t stansa of his work — 
"Sambandha - Pariksa" states that conjunction or 
relation necessarily means dependence* Therefore 
"a l l relations in the sense of ultimate (or indepen-
dent) reality do not really exist"* Vinltadeva in 
another subcomiaent, states that the expressions 
"related to another", "dependent on another", 
"supported by another", "sub;Jeot to another's wil l" 
are convertible* Causality^ contact, Inherence and 
opposition are not realit ies by themselves* There 
are no "possessors" of these relations otherwise 
than in imagination* A reality is always one reality, 
!I!his work is with the commaataries of the author 
and two sub-commentaries of Vinltadeva and 
^ankarmanda* 
it cannot ibe single and double at the same time. 
Vacaspatimi^ra quotes a Buddh^ who remarks tJaat 
these relatione considered as objective realit ies 
are, as it were, unfair dealers who buy goods without 
ever paying any equivalent• 2hey indeed pretend to 
squire perceptiveness, but possess no shape o£ their 
own which they could deliver to consciousness as a 
price for the acquisition of that perceptiveness. 
If a thing is a separate unity it must have a separate 
shape which it imparts to conscious en ess in the way 
of producing a representation* But relation has no 
shape apart from the things related. Therefore, says 
Vinitadeva, a relation in the sense of dependence 
cannot be something objectively real. Heither, cai 
— — — - — ~ — - — — " — — 
a relation be partially real, because to be partially 
real means nothing but to be real and non-real at the 
same time," because reality has no parts what has 1 
parts can be real empirically, (but not ultimately). 
Xiike Naiy%iicas, Mimeansakas maintain that 
2 JT" 
relation is perceived. Kumarila Eaatta in his 
"^Slokavartika" in the Interpretation of the words 
"Jnata-sambandhaeya", says that once a peannanent 
1 Ih. St Cher bat sky, Buddhist-Logic", Vol. I , 
pp. 246 - 248. 
2 'Sabara-Biasya 1.1.5 
s 
relation whether i t Tae a case of coexistence (as in 
the case o£ the contiguity o£ the constellation of 
Icrittika with Hohi3;ii, where| by the r ise of the 
former the early rise of the letter may lae inferred), 
or a case of id^itity (as ia the relation between a 
genus and i ts species), or a case of cause and 
effect or otherwise between two things aad a third 
thing which had been apprehended in a large number 
of cases is perceived* Sucarit ami'^ ra in his commen-
tary on • Slokavart ika nawely, "Kasika" says that f or 
this purpose that relation is perceived, it is to be 
said in 4lokavartika '^yadavastu lokah pratipadyatesmin 
dvidhapi tat ^akyat eva vaktumiti* 
In samk^ite Mvaita phij.osophy, a l l 
relations arepurely^coneeptual and superimposed. 
f 
Beeause Sankara admits that the real-existence 
(paramarthikasatta) is one* 2!hat is merely real* 
But the phenomenon world is vyavahao'ika, which is 
illusory. In this sense, a l l relations do not possess 
any reality from the transcendenteJ. standpoint* So, 
1 (a) ^lokavartika on anumaiia. 
(b) Dasgupta, S.U., "History of Indian Philosophy" 
Vol. I , pp» 387, Cambridge, 1922* 
2 MimmsaSilokav^ika of Kumarilabhatta with the 
commentory »Ka^ika' of Sucaritamiira, Part I I I , 
pp. l o o , Trivandrum, 1943* 
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rel9,tions as the cause and the effect etc# are known 
as vivaiija ( i l lusory) . 
According to the entire 
manifestation, whether subjective or objective is 
due to the wil l of the uaivsrsal self* Helation is 
nothing but a special category based on the general 
category-unity in multiplicity - involving two 
external Realities* Because both the material and 
the subject that works on it are the manifestations 
of the ultimate, the relation, therefore, naturally 
does not end with the individual se l f , but ultimately 
depends upon the universal selX. 
Some ved^tj^'^schools such as of jEhaskara, 
Rsttftanuja, Kimbarka etc* • to establish the truth of 
the proposition that relations are real , recognisse 
that each existence has a twofold aspects one i ts 
causal state and the other i ts effected state* As 
1 (a) Ha kevalam ca sambandhamayaikatasparsiparimita'-
m^ apr am at rap ary avas ay i vast upr akas an avy apar ah 
y avad anant c inmay asivat avabhas avisraat aiva 
pratiktesanam vastusamvitkriyVNa ca saitvidah 
kramosti ekaivaikatraiva ksanerthapraka^anat/ 
Ijaiva sambandhafeivataaayameva svarupamaviskaro-
tity^sucyatft// -Sgnijamdhasiddhi of Pietap^adeva, 
pp*9, Srinagar, 1921* 
(b) Pattdey,Dr*K.C.'|Hiaskari "Vol*I,Introduction, 
pp*XXIII, id* by Iyer & Pandey, Allahabad, 1938* 
(c ) Iyer & Pandey,"Saiva Theory of Relation", 
Allahabad, 1938, pp* 17* 
for example, " Hlie pot* aad 'the dish' etc. and the 
claisr» IThe 'pot * is different from dish in nature 
and shape, butthere is also non-difference so far 
as, the clay is concerned. Ihey are thus both 
different and non-different from each other." ia 
this manner, the reality of n on-difference is not the 
least lower than the reality of difference, Thus al l 
relations are real. 
l i i ) a!.yp es of r el at i on t 
Shere is an iadefiuite number q£ relations 
in Indian philosophy. According to Haiyayikas, 
principal relations are conjunction and inherence 
^safiiyoga and samav^a), Saiiyoga is defined as^the 
contact of two things that were f i r s t separate; and 
therefore there can be no samyoga between two a l l -
pervading things which are never apart from each 
2 
other J for exaaple, the tree is perceived throu^ 
con;)unctioa with the eye. Samavaya means an intimate 
1 apraptayostu ya praptih eaiva samyoga iritah/ « 
Hiasa - pariccheda by vi^vansth Pancanana, M. 
and translated by Boer (Bibliotheca Indica) 
pp. 114. 
2 iTarka-samgraha of Mnambhatta,i:d# and translated 
tjy Athalye and M.H. Bodas, pp. 164-165, 
Poona, 1963. 
or iaseparabl© relation* !Phe blue colour cannot be 
separated from the blue lotus* /nnambhatta defines 
the Samav^a as m intimate relation between two 
things which are technically called »ayuta«siddhaU 
•4yuta-Biddha* meaeas; those things which have never 
existed in a separate c^adition without th^eelves 
being destroyed, are »ayuta-siddha% Ihese *ayuta-
siddha' things are limited in nuiaberj such aaj 
2h© compcment parts and composite wholes (avayava 
and avayavjba)| 2» aihe quality and the qualified 
(gunia and g«sln)j 3. Etie motion and the moving 
(kriya and 3i<iriyaviQ.a)| 4* SJhe individual and the 
common characteristic ( j a t i and vyakti)* the lastly 
5. particularity aoad eternal substance (Ti'^esa md 
nityadravya)* 
-SLthou^ in a l l these:, cases here it is a 
question of different aspects of the problem of the 
1 Nitya-sambandhah samaviiyah, ayutasiddhavrattih/ 
yayordvayonaadhye ekamavlnasyadaparasritaiaevavafc i s -
thate tavayutasiddhau/avaya-vavayavinau, gt«iaguQinau, 
kriyakriyavantau, ^ativyakti, Vt^esanityadravya 
cet i / 
iTarlca-Smgraha of innambhatta, Kasi, 
pp. 130-131, 1939. 
oae and multiple, these f i ve typea of Saniav%a do not 
seem to the H^hava to correspond the question on 
the sane order* Some of them aim at the relationship 
betwem substance snd attribute of the dhamin to 
the mxatiple dhama, the others want to give account 
of the plurality of the substances® separated one 
from the others, and yet in relation caie with the 
other* These two orders of th^ problem are considered 
in a distinct way by Madhva; One is contented Jn the 
notion of the Vi^ista, al l concrete and specified, the 
others implicate the imagination of the notion of 
bheda, difference which separates^these r e a l t i e s and 
divides than one from the others. 
1, Siauve Suaanne, Doctrine MADHVA'>pp«173y 
Ihstitut Prancais E'lndologie, Pondichery,1968* 
"Bien gu*il s 'agiss dans tous ces cas 
d 'aspects diff^rents du probl^e de I'un et du multiple, 
ces cinq types de samav^a ae e^blent pas aux m^hva 
correspondre k des questions de m'^e ordre* lies unes 
visent l e rapport de l a substance ^ see attributs, du 
dharmin unique h s^s dhama multiples, l e s , autres 
entendent rendre compte.de l a pluralit4 des substances, 
s^par^es les mes des autres, et cependant en relation 
les unes avec les autres* Ces deux ordaes de pa^oblemes 
sont envisages de faoon distincte par les Madhvaj I'un 
Contd, 
1 0 
in tlie place of SaaavsQraj the ai ittse 
Mimaiasalcas and Aflvaitlaa reeogtiize tlie relation of 
diXfermc© - cum - identity (t^atmya)* The relation 
"oftaa^mya, according to Kiattas, is not absolute 
id ait i t y , as the Na iy^ ik^ take it to be| but it is 
ideatity in a relative sense i*e* identity (alDiheda) 
compatible with di f fereice (bheda-sahi^u). ®hou^ 
difference and identity are ordinary opposed to each 
other, yet they are taken by the Biattas to be compatible 
with each other, on the ground that it is esperietice, 
sUCter a l l , that determines the compatibility or 
incompactibility of two things and that ©3$^erieace 
warrants the recognitioEi of difference, associated 
with iaentity, as forming the relation betweesa 
^B^i md vyakti* In the proposition - *Shis i s a horse' 
(ayam a^vah), for instance, *this' refers to a 
particular vyakti and 'horse' , according to the 
Shattas, primarily refers to horamesa (g^vatva), 
which is a According to this view in a judgement 
embodied in this proposition, a j ^ i is equated with 
est contenu dans l a notion de vi'&ista,tout concret 
et spec i f i c , 1'autre implique I'examen de l a notion 
de bheda, difference qui separe ces realites et les 
divise les unes des autres." 
I J 
a vyaldtis Bui; this equation cannot be absolute as, 
an that case, the two words 'this" and 'horse* would 
turn out to be synonyms, Therefore, the Bhattas 
argue tha^;, on the strength of what is presented in 
co^itidtt j a particular relation consisting la 
difference-cura-identity (liiedabhedau), ^ould be 
X 
reco^ised in the case of Jafei and vyaJcti, 
^ the philosophy of Hlmbarka, the relation 
always presupposes difference md Baa-differaice 
(bhedal::heda). Mien we say t h ^ the universe is 
noa-different from Braiiman, we do not mean thereby 
thfffe non'-difference means' absolute id<aatity ' but 
simply that the universe is absolutely dependent on 
Irahman, which can have ao existence and activity 
independently of him, "Just as the thousand-rayed 
sun, having andependmt existsotice and activity in 
contrast to i ts own rays, is their sotJl and the rays 
2 
are non - different from it*" Ihus, non-difference 
1 Shastri, S. Kuppttswami, 'A primer of Indian 
Logic, pp» 30-31, Madras, 19SI, 
2 "Vedaita-p^ijata-Sauratha and vedanta-kaustultia" 
Bluish 'i'ranslafcion, ^ Homa Bose, Yol .II , pp.786, 
4,1,3 Calcutta, 1943. 
1 2 
here means esseatial dependaice and not al^solute 
identity. 3?he relation of identity i s possible 
between two things when they are non-dif±'erait in 
eome way or other. No identity i s possible between 
a cow and a horee* Again, idaitity is not possible 
in the case of a san^e horse aiao« But there is a 
relation of ideitity between the effect and i ts 
cause, the attribute and i t s substji»gd:um, the power 
and i ts possessor, i#e . , only between two things 
which are both different and non-different, otherwise, 
In accoruance with the texti - " i l l th is , ver i ly , 
is Bratorn", the universe, consisting of the sentient 
and the non-sent imt must be non-different from 
1 
Brahman in nature, which is topossible. Thus, 
non-difference is of this kind which is not iaconflict 
Z 3 with difference, but i s compatible with difference* 
iteid, difference means difference of nature* 2?hus, 
1 "Vedaata-p^ijata-Sauraliia and vedskt a-kausfculha" 
a ^ i s h Translation, by Eoma Bose, Vol#II« pp#786, 
4.1#3 Calcutta, 1943. 
2 Vedmta-iCaustubha 4.1.3 
3 (a) Vedaata-ratna«man^us^pp.91, Benares, 1907. t 
(b) Tatt avapraka^ika of Ke^ava Ka^amiri, commentory 
on Bit a, hlndi translation, Kalika Sjng^i, pp. 102, 
Bardhawan, 1936. 
1 3 
difference and non-difference (1081660141663) relation 
is equally regiL end compatible with each othert 
There is no contradiction laetween difference and 
aon - difference. 
in the woras of io:* iioma Bose, "iSrahmai 
is different from the universe as transceident, non-
different from it as immatient. Iff we mderst and 
difference and n<m-difference in this sense of 
( 
transcendesacy and Immanency, no contradiction will 
be involved .In t-aJciag difference and non - difference 
to be equally real and compatible. Non - d i f fermce 
does not mean here "absolute identity", liJce that 
betweai one pea and another, but it simply mems 
"essential dependence of the universe on Brahiaai 
and the immanence of Krahman in the miverse" , while 
difference means "difference of nature between the 
universe and Rahman and the tratiscendence of Brahman 
1 
over the universe". Hence everything is reconciled. 
M objection may be raised here that there 
is contradiction of co-existoice (sim^adhikaraaiyavya-
^stah) between the difference and non-dii'ference 
1 Bose Eoma, "Vedaata-p^i^ata - saurabha and 
vedanta kasistubha", Vol» I I I , pp» 277, C^cutta, 
1943, 
1 4 
(BiedalSkiecla)* Haiyayikas maintain that, non -
difference amomts to a negation of difference, 
and (iifference invariably involves total exclusion 
of identityt It is clear tiiat there is contradic-
tion of co-*exiatmce between difference and non -
difference l ike the case of a ^ar gaad the negation 
of at ;)ar ( ^ a t a and ^atal3hava)| Tsecause in the 
absolute - negatim (afcyantalSiava), there is 
contrast with i t s pratiyogln (correlative). And 
again, they say that non - di f feraice (alaheda) is 
merely identity and identity is a relative sense, 
compatible with difference (bhedasahimuatJaeda)* 
Thus, to esplain the difference and non - difference 
(bhedaliieda), the non • difference (abheda) i s 
tenable but the difference (bheda) is futi le» 
lo remove this objection liiabirlca school 
hold that, In the difference and non - difference 
(taiedatheda), difference as the total exclusion of 
1 t ^ atmy asaaabrndhavachhton aprat iyogit akonyoay abhavah/ 
larkasangrah of Amalnlhatta, pp* 133, Kaai, 1939. 
2 t raikaLikasansargavachhlnnaprat iyogit akotyant abhavah/ 
-Tarkasangr^ of Amantiiafcta, pp. 133, Kasi, 1939. 
23 
M ^ t i t y is not ttaxable on accomt ot the all things 
having Bratoan for tlxeir souls Cbralimataalcsfcvib) « 
So J the difference (Mieda) is that j which is non -
contraSictoxy of having Brahman f o r their souls 
(l3ra3iKi5fcmaks£tYat}s i s coispletiaa of d i f f sro i t knowledge 
of different things mc. different caused to be done 
(tattadavastugatavailal£saayas>ratltah - vHate^aaa 
k^yakarit'iya^ca alrv"Shal£ah)j and i s mer^y position 
Cbh^a) or negation (abha^a). Again they say about 
the Kon - difference (abheda) that non - difference 
is untenable, as defined that Hon - difference (abheda) 
i s merely absolute negation of that di f feraice j which 
invariably involves total exclusion of identity, 
because non - difference (atoeda) i s the relation of 
identity to Brahmm only md, which i s not contradic-
tory of the difference (Iheda) but compatible v/ith 
difference J as it has been shown* Thus, non-differexce 
Cabheda) i s the r^aticm of identity of brahman, bat 
i t i s compatible with difference also. As for example, 
i t i s true that the ear-ring i s non-different from 
the bracelet as the gold, but there i s also difference 
1 Yedait a-k^adhanu of ^inimbirkicirya, 
verse 
16 
SO faa: as, in name and sh^e simply on account of 
Icundalafctva aid kafc akacbtva* It i s true that there 
iG non-<3iffer©ice between the sun and i t s rag^ s so 
far asjhri^tness i s concerned^ "but actually there 
i s si so difference between the sun and i t s rays* 
Ihus, there i s no contradiction of co-exist^ice in 
the relation of differcsace aid non-difference 
(Biedibhedasaabaidha), both are equally real and 
compatilaLe* 
OChe conc^t of relation of Bhedabheda may 
be illustrated ty the wellknown exasaple of "the 
serpent and i t s co i l " • She serpent i s the msEfeerial 
cause (upadmafc^ana) of the coil* ®he serpent 
i s indepoident while the co i l i s d^endent* On one 
side, this shows the difference betwem the serpmt 
md i t s c o i l . On the other the existence md 
activity of co i l i s impossible in the absence of the 
serpent, i t proves the non - difference of the two. 
It may be asked whether the difference i s 
taiable as the total exclusion of identity or in 
other sense In the above example. 
1 Ted^ta - parijata - saurabha and Kaustubha 
3. 2.27. 
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Slie m&vim i s as followai limbarka^* 
solxooX Hold that di f fermee i s merely taial)le in 
the different sense from the Haiy^lJcas's difference, 
or. it cainot be ssdd that seamentness (earpattva) 
Is not preeent in c o i l , laut atrai#.tnes© (ir^uttva) 
ia present in co i l , in al3ov0 example* Becanse 
strai#itn€ss (^^uttva) i s present in the ^at© of 
eo i l (KtrndsilOT-astha) and coilness (KmdalaEfetva) i s 
present in tli© state of atrai^t 
Otherwise, there wil l not he any change in i t s 
Heace, both are^ladeedi present in "both the 
0tat@s as suMle and gross* Bat, serpentnese 
CBWpafetva) i s , also, present in the stafce of co i l 
a0 well as in the state of otrai#it» 2!hus, the 
difference i s not tenatae as the total eficlneion of 
i dmt i ty , tout i t i s nm * contradictory of the 
non-diff erenc e* 
In this manner there i s no contradiotion 
of d i f fers ice (lAieda) with the negative 'kruti of 
1 anys^ha tasya tatratSiave ptanaravirlahavo na syat;/ 
Kauertutjhapratih^rtti of Kesavakasmiritiiatta, 
the coraiaentary on Tedmt - Sutra, pp» 210, 
Delhi, 193S» 
is 
difference (Ihedanisedhakai&ruti) aa well as there 
i s no contratiiotion of co-existenoe (a iaa i^M -
karmyavirodha) of differaace with noa-differectce 
Catiieda)* Because, there i s purpose of the negative 
^ u t i of differaice (hheda) i s the establishment of 
having Brahman for their souls (hrajmifcmalcsfljvasiddhi) 
of the thing only. Thus, Uaiy^ikas difference i s 
to he finished from negation only. It i s pointed 
out in the Parapak§iagiriba^ra of MaahavamuiOMida 
also thafc there i s no ccaatradiction of difference 
with the negdJive sruti of difference* in f a c t , 
on account of the ins^arahLe union (apracfeh^asiddh"^ 
i t v ^ ) , there i s no negation of thing but the 
negation of difference which i s defined as the total 
exclusion of ind^end^nt reality, There i s no 
contradiction of difference with non-difference 
(altieda) also. Because i t i s desireless 7/ith the 
iQiowledge of the relation of identity to Bcahman in 
things, fhere is no doubt of impossibility of 
co-existence ( s ^ m a dhikaranya) in the mutually 
contradictory relation of difference and non -
difference (thedabheda) md they are not contradictory 
with each other also, on account of the different 
sub;ject. It has been said that difference i s 
desir<^es3 with the laiowledge of nature etc*, of 
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different things* It i s merely tiie subject of 
difference* Jfoa-difference i s satisfied with the 
kiowiefige of the relscbion of identity to Brahmaa* 
The r^ation of identity i s merely the subject of 
non-difference* Aid thus, there i s no opportunity 
of above-mmtioned ISLame in the mutually contradic-
tory relECfcion of difference md non-difference 
Cliiedatiieda) and they are not contradicted as well 
1 
as coMttradictiag with each other. 
1 (a) Ha ca Tiiedaaigedhavakyaeyaiva tadabafihakafcva-
ditivicyam, tasya svafcmtrasattvsrachhinna-
"bhed ami ^ edhapar at yen vastusvarupani gedhs© ara^ -
valiiafca/ ^rathafcasidhat^a^cestvat/ H^ya-
lihedOTaJcayan® tadabadhafcatv^, te^ib bacahma-
taditmyasambandhavidh^akatvena nairakpksy^a/ 
H^y an ay orit aret arabirodhit ven a a^ ia idhikar-
anyasambhassankaniyo, Ihinnavi^ayatvS;/ 
t athSai-thed avakyin padirthasvarup^ividha-
ne^aratvena nairak^eyagilia eva tepam viBayah/ 
atfcedavalgrffliani tu padarthakadambaeya Irahs'^aital/--
myasaabmdhavidh^aJcatvena lorfeirthatvaitt sarabandha 
eva tesain vigyah/ evaaca net aret arabaahyabidha-
lcbhava0fe asm^okt ado^avakasah/ 
Parapak^Jlrlbajra of Madhavaraukunda-
pp* 37, Mathura, Smwt 1993. 
W Jha,Ft.Haagirsbha, "DvoltSdv^tvivek^" pp. 6-10, 
Vrinda9"an,1945. 
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In western philosophical literature those 
/^lotion^are aald to "be eastemal which_teing-the 
relata together without taiifying them, aad latemal 
relation are said to be rooted in the very natiire 
of things and serve to traiasfoni! stid to unify 
though in varying degress* in Indian philosophy, 
the relation of difference-cum-identity (tadifemya) 
i s esseitially an internal r^at ion , according to 
the S^lchya, Biatta md Mvaita ^sterns* Xn these 
syateas, where difference i s not wholly incompsdJilxLe 
with identity where causation i s not new creation, 
Tsat transform^ion to some extsit snd where 
relations may "be said to involve difference and 
identity in some seise and no relation can be 
recognised in cases of absolute difference, i t can 
be easily seen that no relation i s str ict ly external 
aid nothing which does not m i f y , tn some sense cm 
be considered a relation. In the Hy^a-vais^ika 
systems, difference i s uncompromising and amounts 
to a t o t ^ negatim of tadatmya i s the sense of 
I complete Identity, i t i s external reality and not 
a mere cone<^tuaL product,^it i s presupposed l^ r every 
rels£tion i s thus external* At this stage, we mser 
1 Sastri, S#Kuppuswami, "A Primer of Indian Logic", 
pp. 4S-50, Madras, Second , 19SL. 
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s ^ that the relation of difference aad non-differeaoe 
i s essentially m internal relation in the philosophy 
of Himbaclca. jfecauee in this sy0tes| difference i s 
compatilaLe with non-difference, the causation i s not 
new creation> tout; transfoaaaaticai to some extent l ike 
the SaaMiya-view, and all r^s^ions may ho said to 
involve difference and non-difference in some sense* 
Alsove-discussed r ^ at ion of difference and 
aon*differ©ice (HiedalSheda) may however exit between 
several types of things, as indicated Tsy some 
illustrations^ siach as "the serpent md i t s c o i l " , 
2 
"the sun and i t s lustre" , md "M ocean consists the 
water, wa^res, Ibufchle etc* etc»" Fow types of relation 
of difference md nbn difference (ISaedlli^eda) are 
_ ^ 3 
mentioned "by *Sure^waribarya in t: his Jthadaranyako-
panisadahhasyav^ikat 2hese are followingj • 
1 Brahma • Sutra 3.2,27 
2 Ibid, 3»2.28 
3 Ik'had^aayakopaaisadalfe^yavartikaB of 
Sure^waracirya, pp, 623-624, St* 948-50, 
Manda r^attt Saaskrit Series, Bombay, 1893. 
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( i ) Smmya md viseseu 
<i i ) Avastiiivail; md asrastlia. 
( i i i ) Koarya md Karaaa» 
Civ) Bx^a md Ihagln. 
( i ) Smmva, and yiseeat 
She miversal and the corresponding 
partionlarsi as for example, *hors©nes8» and the 
several individuals 'horses*. It revere to horse-
ness (aivatva), which i s the nnivers^ (sSamya), 
aid to individuals 'horses', which are partiooLars* 
According to this view parahrahman would he the 
basic or in most principal revealing i t se l f in 
existmt things the particulars and the apara-Birahaian 
these existent things themselves* 
( i i ) MM^PMMt sjy.^ ijftSii 
Substance and i t s modes: as for instance, 
the waveless ocem msciifests i t se l f as waves, and 
bubbles and yet maintains i t s self - identity, la the 
1 Hiriyana, Ptof#M., "jaiayty^rap^ca-An Old Vedmti", 
Proceedingsaad transactions of Oriental Conference 
I I I , Madras, 1924, 
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same way, the paralarahiaati Involves i t se l f into the 
^arateahman and yet i s identiesO. with i t s e l f . 
Cii i ) Kirya md Karana : 
a?he cause and the effect^ as for instance^ 
•threads' and 'cloth» (pata and taatu), threads are 
cause of cloth and cloth i s the e f fect . Similarly, 
arahmaa i s the material cause of the universe, and 
the unwerse i s the e f fec t . The universe arises from 
the Brahman and retuisis to the Sc^toaa, so that two 
are neither ^together differesit nor the absolute 
non-differeat but hoth are different and non-^different. 
2?hus, i t i s established that there i s the relscbion 
of differeace and non-difference between the cms© 
and the effects 
( iv ) lhaga and Bhagini 
The whole and the part J as for example, a 
•chariot-wheel' and 'the nave of the chariot-wheel 
•the circumference of awheel ' etc» 3!he chariot-
wheel i s bhagin (the whole) and i t s nave, the 
circumference etc*, are the bhagas (the parts). In 
the same wso^ , the Brahman i s the bhagin (the whole) 
of the Jiva, aid the Jiva i s bhaga (part) of the 
Brahmai* 
2 4 
PraJcasatman maintains f ive types of relation 
of difference and n on-difference Cbhedaljhieda) in his 
"panc^adikasrivarsaiaja", instead of these aliove 
discussed four types# These are followings 
i* Jafci and vyalcti. 
i i » Guna aa<i Gujjin. 
i i i « Karya aad Karajia. 
iv* Visi^asvarupa» 
Jka^ a and Miin* 
Ci) Jabi gnd vyakti< 
fhe general and particulars as for example, 
ISlue md yellow etc. things are naturally different 
in colour, "but are non-different so far as, substmce 
i s concerned. The same i s between jTiia and Bjahman. 
( i i ) Guna and Gunint 
She attribute and i t s substratumj as for 
instance,"the table and the shape, colour etc^ of 
the table". Similarly, Brahman is substratum of 
the universe md the sentiant and non-sentient 
universe i s attribute of thi Lord. (Hhere i s 
1 M Ha t a ^ ^ jativyalctigunaguciikiryak^anavi 
varupamsaiiuBinlaiiav-a nibandhan^ 
Panc^adikavivaranata of PraJci^atman, Vo l . I l l , 
Part I I , pp. 259, Viaiaaagram Sanslcrit sertes, 
1692. 
2S 
relation of dil'fereace and non-difference "between 
the Lord and his attributes. 
( i i l ) 
The catttse and the e f fect : as f o r example 
'»the clay and the pot'% Similarly, Jiva i s e f fect 
o£ "Ecciiaiian aa,a "Br^man la cmse ot 'tViB 
So, Sir a i s d i f fera i t and non-different from Bcahmaa, 
as the cause and the e f f ec t . 
( iv ) yjiistasvaru-pa; 
2he s p e c i f fomt ^ ^or, example, *the 
clay and the pot dii^es etc# • 3?he c l ^ takes a 
f e c ia l - f o rm (vi^i^asvarupa) such as the pot , 
dishes e t c . , in this sense th^ clay ia different 
from the pot, dishes etc» But on the otherhand, 
the clay i s non-different froid the pot, dishes etc» , 
because these forms are after all nothing but the 
clay. Ihe saiae i s betweai jJva md Srahman. 
Brahman takes a special form (visi^asvarupa ) , when 
He becomes many, as Jivas, in this sense 2cahman i s 
different from Jivas. But on the other haad, the 
Brahman i s non-different from Jivas,because Jivas are 
affeer al l nothing but the Bralimain. 
2G 
(v) Maia ana .Msini 
aJhe whiole md tlie part; as for example, 
•the tree aaa the brmches, leaves etc* ^^  Jiie same, 
Ecaiuaan i s whole aid Jiva i s Hie part* Ihere i s 
r^ation of d i f f ermce aad aoa-differeace Isetwem 
Jiva and B r ^ m , as the whole aad the part* 
Has-lng thus discussed the concept of 
relation, in 3rd chapter>we wil l see thaJi which 
type of relafeion of difference ^ d non*4iffer@ice 
(ttiedallheda) i s to he adopted 'Scinimharkacarya 
to estatiilii^i M s doctrine of l a t u r ^ difference aad 
non-differeace (Srahharika - HiedalJheda)*. 
Him 
C H A P S j; H |I 
QRiGiH MB D-mmommT og a^HD socgRiHa og 
BIFmMCE mi> HpH^DIgmMCJE) 
She doctrine of difference and non -
difference i s not quite new* So far known &aratliya 
» 
and laidulomin were old ea^onents of the doctrine 
fof difference and non-difference» Th this K»C« 
Pandey soys that the tradition of duaOULan^ nm-Monism 
goes back to the vedic^ime, pre -H^ar^ena 
thinJcere like Asmarathya aid "Sidulomin offered the 
dualistic-cum-monistic interpretation of the 
ijpanisadic passages and ace referred to as such 
28 
- ^ , 
in the Bratima-'Sutrgu Ka^tsna , wiio i s interpreted 
ty 'Saaicara as m easjoneat of lion-duaLiSw). But 
^InivaS| m imaediafce dlacipXe of Hiiabarka> 
md &Ipati panditac^ya tiiiak that lEalslqrfema was, 
SI o£ the doctrine o£ difxerence and 
non-differmc©» It showe that Kaskrtlaa was also 
m old e:^oneiit of the doctrine of difference end 
non-difference. Brai in later age Iialculi^a , 
Bxartr^rapmoe^f Biaekara, ettid yadavaprakash were 
the supporters of this doctrine. And after that 
the doctrine of difference aad non-differ®ice i s 
eloborafced in the philosophy of HimbarJca, 
'^itomacaitanya and §ripati« " 3?hou^, the doctrine 
of difference and non-difference of Isiaarathya, 
ludulomin aad i s toown from references 
onlyj and the same doctrine of the philosophers from 
1 Ci) Pandej:. 'J^ r* t^ Daalism-ciMa-Mtmism 
(Shed ached av ad a) »• Journal of the Ganganafcha 
Jha He search JaaBtitute, Allahabad* Vol. JO-
n i f pts. 1 -4 , Nov., 1963, Augu^, 1966, 
pp. 246 
( i i ) '^Hiedalhedavaao vaidik^arampar%saa|>yupalaliaiysfte/ 
Vaidllialihedaljhedavaainoh' Asmarathya*, 'ludulomin ' 
mat^orb^arayaanena eviyabrahma^re krafca 
evopmyaeah/" - "i^aivadarsanacrindu" of Pandey, 
Dr.K. C., pp. 64, Benares, Samvscfc 2021. 
2 9 
Itakiilil^a to has almost lost ; 
yet the doctrine of d l f fermce end non-difference 
of the Himbarka, Ir ikr^acaitmya and 'Sripati i s 
l iving to this (iafir, Jhusj the developmmt of the 
doctrine of difference and nan-aifference may be 
diacussed in three stages for convenience* i l rst 
i s that, which i s taiown from references only, as 
the doctrine of Ismarafchya, Aadulomin and Ka^krt&ia, 
second i s that which has heen almost lost as the 
doctrine of the philosophers from the ialculisa 
to I^av^ralcash and| third i s that which i s l iving 
to this day as the doctrine of difference aad 
non-difference of limbarka, ^i-Krmacaitaaya aad 
ir ipat i . 
Urst Sfcaget 
1 
( 1 ) The Boctrina'3 of Asmarathva s 
As the sparks being the ef fects of the 
f i re» are not absolutely differaat from the f i r e , 
because they paxticipate in the nature of the f i r e , 
and, on the otherhaad, are not absolutely non-different 
from the f i r e , because in that case they could be 
1 Bcahma-i^tra 1.4.20. 
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distinguished neither from the f i r e nor from each 
other* So, Jivas are neither different from Bcahmm 
for thafc would mean they are not of the nafcxire of 
intelligence, nor absolutely non--differQit from 
i t , since then, they would not be different from 
each other# Hence the Jivas are differ&it and 
1 
non-different from Brahman, ind again, ;5ust as in 
the case of the pot and the clay, being the effect 
and cause, there i s undoubtedly primary difference 
between them md cai t he otherhand, there i s non-
difference between them, because the word 'pot' 2 
refers to the clay as well* So, according to 
Asmarathya, the Jiva i s ^ s o the effect of 
Brahmm, who i s the cause of a l l , as the "feruti 
- - - 3 
s ^ s , "Yiscbovaim^fcil bhutmi ;Ji3crante*' from whom, 
al l these dements arise* Shus, these two are 
related as cause and e f fec t . Being the effect and 
the cause there i s undoubtedly primary difference 
between them. Being bom from i t and so on, there 
1 Biinati on iaiJcara-Bii^ya on Brahma-S^-tra. 
pp. 415-16, m, Hiranayasagar, Bombay, 1938. 
2 Yediita-Xaustutiia pp. 141, 1.4.20, Benares,1932. 
3 SPaittiriya-Opaiisad I I I . l 
o l 
i s n on-difference between them* There i s natfcxiraOL 
relation of difference and non-difference between 
Jiva and Bcaham, according to Aamarafcliya* 
ghe liQCtrine of jtudulomint 
ludiilGniin looks upon difference md 
non-difference of the Jiva from Brahman as due to 
different conditions* 3!he Jiva bound biy the 
limiting adjuncts of body, senses, and mind, i s 
d i f fermt from Bcahman, through laiowledge and 
oe<litafcicai, it passes out of the body and becomes 
one with the Hi^est self* ^dulomin admits the 
absolute difference between Jiva and Bcahman but 
2 
asserts their unity vftien the Jiva abtains mukti, 
in accordmce with two texts from the Upmisads* 
Ihe f i rst of these iss '•esa samprasadosm^hharira-
tasamuth^a param jyotirupasamp'^ya evenrupena-3 
bhiniSampadystfce" this Jiva after going out of this 
body, realises i t s own nature, attains higher l i ^ t 
that i s Brahman* fhe second ist "As the flowing 
1 Br^a-Sutra 1*4*21 
2 &lcara-l4iasya 1*4*20 
3 (Jhmdo^opatiissBJ ?III.12*3 
s 2 
rivers disappear in the sea, liaving lost their 
naae and form thus, a wise man. freed from name 
aid form goes to the divine person, h i^er thm 
1 
h i ^ . " Shis shows that as the rivers losing 
the names md forms aMding in them diss®>pear in 
the sea, so the Jiva also losing the name and form 
aMding in i t tecoffies lanited with the Hi^est 
Perscoi, On this view, there i s relation of 
difference between Jiva and BrisiimsEi during the 
state of bondage (Imddhiyaetha) of Jiva, aad aon-
differenee diiring i t s staefee of salvation (muktoirastha)* 
Thus, there i s relation of difference and non* 
difference "between Jiva and Brahman. Yacaspatimisra 
in his 'fiiamati' m. ^^ankara - "bhasya md Biaskara 
in hie d» ^tra l i i^ya quote to compace 
the sgj^ing of P^critriJcas; -
"a mulcter liieda eva sya^j^ivasyao^arasyaca / 
mulct asya ca na iJhedosfci hhedhetor alSiavatah//" 
1 «Isd;ha naflyah syandammah samudre astam gachhati 
namarupa vih^ya tathavidvm punyap^^ vifculctdi 
paratparam purusam upaiti divyam." 
• Mund» Up, I I I . I I , 8 
2 Vedaita - KaustulSia pp. 140, 1»4»21 
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(up to tiie moment of liberation being reached 
the Jiva and Bcahmaa are different! But liberated 
Jlva i s no longer different from Brahman since 
there i s no further cause of difference). 
She technical aaiae of the doctrine 
advocated iudulomin i s Sabyabhedasrada. 
2 
i3) She doctrine of Kaitkyt^at, 
Here i s a controversy over this question 
that whether Ka^lqrt^a was an exponent of the 
difference and non-difference or aon»dualism« He 
i s interpreted Tcy i^ aakara as an ej^onent of non-
dualist i c , i s Interpreted by aia-skara ihatt as an 
upholder of "identity in difference" (Hiedabheda) view 
in this regard* In fact he has been interpreted by 
almost all commentators as supporting their different 
views md reg^ding him as Monistic, Dualistic, 
dualistio-cum-monistic or qualified monistic as i s 
1 VedSata - Sutra (George Thibaut) Vol. Bi^ish 
Transliafcion of SiaJcara - bh^y^, pp# 278, 1»4.20 l^ elilotfe 
2 Brahma Sutra 1*4»22 ^ 
u 
clear from the commentaries o£ ^ankara, Madlivai 
Hiaolcara, ^rilcmtha, Eanmu^a etc. Bat i t 
spears that E^kzt^ia was sex exponent of the 
doctrine of difference and non-diffex'sace. as 
i s clearly from the ooomiientarj of ^rinivasa 
namely - "Vedmtakaastubha" K^tet^ia, i s 
of opinion thafc ae the Parmafcman dwells in the 
JivB;maa| who 16 his niyataya (that i s , controlled bv 
iKfctt. him)* Ihus, there i s a relation of difference 
and non-difference Ijetween Jiva and Icahman^ as the 
ob^ject controlled as well as the controller. As 
declared by 'ferutis "He who dwelling in the soul i s 
other than the soul whom the soul does not Imow, 
whose body i s the Atman* He wJswi rules into the 
soul, He i s your soul, the inner controller of 
me^  the soul of al l" etc. etc. The controller 
1 ( i ) i>andey, Er. K.C., "Dualism-cum-Monism 
(Bhadamedavada)" Journal of the Ganganatha 
Jha fieeearch Institute, Allahabad Tol. XX -
m , pts# 1 -4 , HoVt, 1963, August, 1966* 
2 "tadevam munitr^aoatadvarajjrasangafe 
Bhedabtiedaprakaro ^bhagasrta darisatah -
VedSnta'-kaustubha, 1.4.22, pp. 141 
3 Jii4ra, Uaesh • "limbarka - school of 
Vedinta" pp# 63, Allahabad, 1963. 
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Viz* Lord i s daioted "ty a laiower of the object 
- 3. / - 2 
controlled lay Him viz* Jiva • JSnfi again, Sripati 
interpretes that, Ka^krt^ia abides by the doctrine 
of bhedabheda which i s declared by the ^ruti texts 
which, without contradictory each other, enunciate 
in 'dvasupama' etc» aad other texts the bheda 
doctrine and the abheda doctrine in 'tattvaoiasi' 
etc* and other texts* In order to point out clearly 
the existence of bheda and abheda between the Jiva 
snd J^ahmaa, Ka^krt^ia here declares that al l ^ruti 
texts purport to propound the underlying doctrine 
of Hiedabheda* Therefore, the third doctrine of 
Ihedabheda i s the h i^est essential truth declared 
by all the irut i texts; md so i t must be understood* 
Hundreds of ^ruti texts declare that during the 
samsaravaatha Jiva and Sc^an are quite distinct 
from each other and separate} and that during the 
Moksadasa abheda i s declared to be the established 
1 Vedmta - Kaustubha, pp. 141, 1*4*22. 
2 (a) '^ikara-Biaaya, Vol* I . Introduction, 
pp* 427, iijd* C* He^avadana Heo, Bandore, 
1936* 
(b) ^cikara - HiaeiyajVol. I I , pp* 174, Bandore, 
1936. 
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truth, 4ruti teacts like the fol lowing!-
a ^ a sampraeadortha afcma 4arirat samuthiiya paraajoti 
rupam sampaflya svena xupeaabhinis^aiiyate** etc. etc* 
Second Sfeaget 
U ) h^-e doctrine of (Lalgali^ ait 
The laJmlls^asupata a well known 
dualistic-cum-monietic system, propounded by 
Lakuliia in the f i rst h ^ f of the second century 
A.I3., accordtag to the incripitional evidence of 
Mathura pi l lar aid of stone slab of eomanatha,^is 
based upon the f ive vedic Mantras "Sadyo^itam" etc«, 
Lakuli^a wrote a "pasupata-^tra"* Pisupata-sutra 
with the commentary of kaundinya namely "piacarthibh-
asya" i s available at present. Pasupata-Sutra 
i s divided into f ive chaptersi which i s based on the 
1 Pandey, Dr. K.C. "Lualistic - cum - Monistic 
(Biedabhedavada)" Journal of Ganganatha Jha, 
fiesearch Institute, Allahabad, Vol. JEX - XXL, 
Pts. 1 -4 , Nov., 1963 - Auguefc 1966, pp. 245 
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f ive Vedic Mantras of Talttiriy^anyaka* Five 
Vedic Mantra© are following; 
"Saayo^B;aDs pragpaflyacai" 
"Vaaadev^a aamah** 
" AgTiOre^iyoth ^oreMiya" 
"latpuxlia'^a vidm^e" 
"Ismail sarvavidymam.'* 
It meaas, these f i ve iSnuvakas of the 
^aittiriyaranyaka are the basis of the IiakaLisa 
pasupata system. S%ana in his interpretation of 
th is text agrees that they refer to feaivism in 
general, "both as a religion and as a philosophy* 
Before discussing the doctrine of difference 
and n on-difference of Lakulisa, i t may, therefore, 
be usefial to discuss the doctrine of difference and 
non-difference of Taittiriyaranyaka, which i s similar 
to the XialcuXi^^upata system* 
CD The difference and non-difference of 
(Caittiriyaranyaka i s based on the following 
grounds which are similar to the Lakuli^a 
pasupata systems 
(a) Brahman i s the cause of the material world* He 
i s macl;eri^ cause through his maya^akti* So, He 
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i s called "Msiyln aad M'^airi^^ta." 
(Ij) Just as He is the very nature of the Nirguija-
Brgtoan to be the oneness o£ Saceidmanda, so He i s 
that of sag»?ia BEfahman to be creator, maintainer 
and destroyer of the world* 
( c ) l4wara i s not effected the f rui ts of the 
3 
deeds hut He i s giver of the f rui ts of the deeds* 
(d) Bcahraaa i s eil-pervading and Ihdless "because the 
effect i s not out of the cause^ 
4 
(e) Brahman i s £eal: He creates the world and then 
enters into him* !Che Brctoan hecomes everything 
perceptil^Le and imperceptible) determinate and 




( f ) Brahmaa i s virtuous, liecause He creates every-
thing independently. 
1 Taittiriyaranyaka, 664, 666 
2 Saittiriy^enyaka, 571 
3 Ibid. S71 
4 Taittiriyaranyaka, 622» 
5 3Jaittiriyaranyaka, 641 




(g) The salvation consists in the Jiva's hawing 
pratistha in the Brahman who i s imperceptible, 
(h) 2?he person who knows the identity of the 
liancla that i s the individual with thscb which i s 
the Brahman I dlowly gets mion with the Bcahmaci, 
the laaada (upasankrisiati)* IDhe word "Saakramana" 
implies strong mioni similar to that which a 
leech has with a l iving orgsnism from which the 
passes into i t , 
( i ) She f i n ^ emm^Qipatim i s attained throu^ 
various stages aad that in the f inal stage the 
liberated attaihst he greatness (mahima) of the 
3 
}^ ahman» 
(J) Thus there i s no fundamental contradiction 
4 
between difference and non-difference. The 
non-difference refers to the essence, the Brahram, 
and the difference to the form (Ikmra) 
(Brahraakarena advaitam, BhoktrolhogyScarena dvaitam)# 
1 Taittiriyaranyaka, 644 
2 Taittiriyaranyaka, 652 
3 Taittiriyaranyaka, 734-736 
4 Taittiriy^aayaka, S76 
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Tilus, the taittlriyaraayaka presents 
the ifibJ£fexence non-difference (ihedabhedav^a)* 
^IIJ Hieaalahecia of Iiakullsat 
AocordiJig to the Lakuliia pasupata 
there are the f ive primary categories vi25», 
( i ) Karaaa or pati ( i i ) K^ya or pa^u ( i i i ) yoga 
( iv ) Viahi (v) Duldimta. 
Here, it mayj therefore, "be useful to 
discuss briefly the concept of the Karana or pati 
aad the concept of the karya or palu, to understend 
the doctrine of difference aad non-difference, as 
propounded hy Lakulilsa. 
Ca) fhe word pati , Kar^a and Brahman are synonymous. 
Pati i s the cause of all effect (K^ya) viz , ?idya, 
IcSla and pa^« He i s both the material cause and. 
the effiwjbat cause of the universe* The universe 
springs up (lahavodhavah) from the Brahmm, as does 
a i^rout from a ix seed* He i s the cause of both 
the creation and dissolution of the world. He 
2 
bestows grace* He transcends al l . He i s playful. 
1 Pasupatasutra, 55 
2 P asup at asut r a, 56 
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X 
He 16 higiier thesi the liberated* He has perfect 
powers o£ JsnowXeage action* ^hey constitute 
his essential nature exactly as heat does that o£ 
fire* He inspires fear of the Iromortal deeds In 
the twund Jlvas and unites them with the merit and 
2 
demerit of the deeds* 
Cb) Ihe karya or pa^ iu i s controlled ty the lord 
_ „ ^ 3 
or pe^i (p^anst pasun)* The karya i s that which 
i s dependent on something ulteriorj i t i s 
threefold, sentiency, the insentient, and the 
the seat lent* 
(c ) Eelation Isetween the cause (pati or karana) 
and the effect (karya): 
There has been a great controvercy over 
the question of the doctrine of causality, in Indian 
Philosophy* Accoraing to Nyi^a-V<»'sesika philosophy, 
the e f fec t , i s non-eternal (asat) but the effect 
1 P^upatsutra, 57 
2 Ibid* 67 
3 P^upatasutra, 5 
4 Sarvadarsana-Sangrah, Big* Translation \!y JS.B»Cowell 
and A. is. Gou^*, pp* 106, Benares, 1961* 
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according to Laballsa pasupata i s e t e m ^ (sat;)* 
Nor i s the effect mere i l lusion, as the veclmtin 
asserts, i^or, the Lakuli^a pasupafca i s not 
Monism, but Bualism-cum hi on-dualism. It aflmits 
that the reality i s not pure unity l3ut unity in 
multiplicity ana, therefore the multiplicity 
according to i t , eadst© in unity just as do the 
stars in heanren. 27he creation i s nothing more 
than the arrangement of what exists in a creation 
form (vr^sti'laliha). She traid abides in His power, 
which constitutes His very being, the most essential 
nature, the principal attribute the chief characteris* 
t i c , lharma* Xhere i s no confused ejkistence 
{ . j (Y^itti^ankara) between the cause and the effect 
lilce Water in milk. On the other hand, there i s 
different existence between the cause and the e f f e c t , 
l ike the l i ^ t of the eyes and that of the sun or 
of lamp, which illumines the object at the time of 
perception. He i s all-pervading. But the 
pervadingnees of the different dependent categories 
of the "ef fect" i s of limited nature. Each h i # e r 
1 P^upat a-Sutra, 60 
2 Pasupata-Sutra, 58 
3 P^up at Sut r a, 69 
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Cfirtjegory pervaflee the lower. So, in the IiaJadlsa 
pasupata system, different e f fects tio not have 
their ejcistence in isolation from each other, 
l ike cellB in a honeycomls, The pervaded aid the 
pervading are to be seemed, differently as water 
i s grasped differently from the colour that colours 
i t , 
Shus, the cause attd the effect exist 
together, Tsut maintain their respective entities 
•because of different nature, though both of them 
are pervasive. Ihe effect i s as eternal as the 
cause, i'or, the cause cmnot be. logically represented 
to be the cause without the e f f e c t , nor cm pati be 
spoken of as pati without something to I»ord over. 
The effect has i t s existence in the cause as does 
a seed in the earth* She cause ie free (sv at antra) 
and the effect i s "not-free" (asv at antra). Ihe former 
i s the pati aad the latter i s pasu. She one stands 
for the cit and the other for both c it and acit. 
Shus, liakuliiia pasupata system i s 
dependent on "Satakaryavada". In creation the 
Lord i s free . It has already been observed according 
to Iiakulisa that there i s essential difference between 
the individual self end the highest se l f , the cause 
aad the effect and the sentient and non-sentient• 
Thought the cause Cpafci) and the effect (pa4u) 
are mutually different, the ef fect (pa^u) viz* 
vidya, ksiai inipa, has neither free 'being out 
of pati , nor equal superiority with the pati . 
yet the effect i s depaadent and "not-free" 
Casv at antra), because of to he carried on, t o be 
created and to he effected* So, liaJculisa pasupata 
i s the follower of the doctrine of difference and 
non-difference* Because, it thinks that there is 
essentially difference between the cause and the 
effect tout there is non-uifferea<)€ silso, the effect 
merely exists in the cause. Md again, the cause 
and the effect are nan-different because the 
unmanifest state of the effect i s known as K^ma 
and the menifest state of the cause i s known as karya* 
2Phus, there i s relation of difference and non-differ©ice 
between the cause and the e f f ec t . 
Thus, i t i s established thsct similar to 
the doctrine of difference and n on-difference of the 
1 Pandey, Dr. K.C*, *Saivadar&anavindu" pp* 36-36, 
39-41, 68, Benares, Samvt* 2021, and"Hiaskari" 
Vol. I l l , '•in out l ine of ^Saiva philosophy", 
pp* c:(x-xxm,cxtll4asri, Lucknow, 1954* 
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!DaittlriyaraayaJca, Lakulisa pasup at a presents 
Ms doctrine o£ difference and non-differaice« 
(2) "Ihe Doctrine o£ Bhartraprapmea 
Saa^rapragmoa ie Imown from references 
.only* . His aay work i s noiiiat present, available. 
He wrote a oosunentary on the Brliadarmyaka Upanisad* 
As '^enkara did, md that B< a cosMent ary was even 
aore voluminous than SaaJcara*s» Aid that he was 
an old Vedaatin anterior even to Sankara. 
lo understand his doctriJie of ShedaTaheda, 
i t iasgr» therefore, be useful to discuss the concept 
of Brahmm, Jiva and the world, 
Bia^ys^^ap^ca reco@ai2ed l ike Sankara that 
Brahman i s para (higher) aad g^ara (lower)• Brahman 
i s both one and many* Just as a cow ie one as a 
substance, but i t s features, the dewlag? etc. ,are 
2 
many* Thus, Brahman i s d i f fermt and non-different* 
1 Hiriyana, Prof* M* , "iBaartrfi^r^mca • Aa old 
Vedaatin" - proceedingsand transactions of 
All India Oriental Conference, Session I I I , 
Madras, 1924, and Indian Antiquary,Vol.iXII,1924* 
2 Brhadaranyakopanisad, 'Smkara-Bia^a, 4.3*30* 
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He does not eaplain l ike Satikara that Jiva 
or lower Brahman i s v iva^a of the higher Bcahman* 
Md He does not es^lain like Biaskara thatb diversity 
of ^ahmaa i s adventitious* But he eai^ s that para 
(h i^er ) and apara (lower) or unity and diversity 
of Brahman, "both are real* Jtiat ae an ocean has 
unity as cause of wavesi foam and taxblales etc#| 
and has diversity as e f fects viz, waves, foam and 
IsublSLes etOf ind therefore, "both are real# 
£haxtr^r£|>^ca admits the Brahm^arinamv^a, 
Imt he does not admit the vivairtavada of ^mkara. 
According to him Brahraaa traasfonas i t se l f Igr i t s 
own creative urge into l i ^ t form of world and 
Jiva« Which are thuss 1. ^tary'^in 2»Sa!ki^ 
3« Avyakrta 4. Sifcra 5* Viraj 6. Devata 7. J i t i 
2 q 
aid 8» Pinda. Prof* Hiriyaaa^ refers to that 
these eight forms together with Ifeahman according 
to Btia^ra{)rap^a, may he divided into three rasis , 
in which'We have the three fold subject matter of 
811 religion and philosophy via* Qod, soul and 
matter* 
1 '^mkara-Hiasya on Brahma-^tra 2.1*14,pp*466 Bombsor, 
1938 
2 Erhad aranyakop ani sad abhasyavart ikam 2* 3 
3 Hiriyana, Prof. M. "aiartrapr^aica-An old Vedanti,»' 
)rocei ' ' - • - - - -
L924. 






It Brahmafl i s antaray^i or inner-ruler 
of alU So this rasiJps,absolute Brahmm* 
2. fh is i s knovm as six material forms 
of the world* Which are thusi Avyak^a-M elementary 
substance from which all things were created, 
Sutra • the adjunct of the logos, Vira^ - the 
visible universe, Devata - an organ of sense, Jafci -
a class, and Pinda • the body* 
3» in this rasi , Jivas or the Saksia 
are real trmsfomation of Brahman* Bia^rapr^anTca 
already counts i t as a third rasi* 
Hxairtys^rapmca e^iplains Rahman, Jiva 
md the world relation thus, there i s not absolutely 
difference between these three md there i s not 
absolutely non-difference l ike ^ankara* But the 
relation of difference and non-difference (Hiedabheda) 
between these three i s obvious*^ To make it c lear, 
1 Bpahadarstayakopaai sad avoctikam p*876, St* 46, 
ASS, 1815, 1893* 
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in his BiaEQra, at Brhadaraayakopmisad 5»1«1», 
'km.)SLe3:& t e l l s U0 that the one Brahmaa has got a 
dualietic as well as a non«-dualistic aspect 
(dvaitadvaitatamafcam)* Por example, the ocean 
consists of water, waves, foami bubbles etc* As 
the water i s real and w^es appear and disappear, 
but ate a part of the ocean i t s e l f , are absolutely 
real, in the same way dualistic world i s absolutely 
real, i t corresponds to the wasres etc», on the 
water while the supreme Brahman stands for the 
ocean water i s absolutely real* 
2 Prof. Hiriyana says that, It i s 
d i f f i cu l t to determine which of these view was 
3 
in the mind of Ehecctrs^rapsncaf Otto strauss 
says that the types bhaga-ltiasin md avasthavat-
avastha appear to be the most usual. Kejcya-Karana 
has to be taken in the sense of parinima, and 
saraaaya-visesa cmnot beemployed directly on 
account of Brahman not being a Saiaiaya in the 
1 Jehadaranyakopanisad with the commentary of 
sankara and the ^ossary of Aiandgiri. Bi. by 
Dr« K fioer,, pp» 961-952. 
2 Hiriyana, Prof. M., "Bhartr^rap^a-Ai old 
Vedanti", Proceedings and "Iran sact ions, A.I.O.C. 
I I I , Madras, 1924, 
3 Otto Strauss, "Jiva aid Paramatmsn", D.fi.Bhandarkar vuou cKioo ux ci tiliu XiureuueitoUieKj, 
Volume, PP. 148, 160, C^cutta 1940. 
l o g i c ^ sense of the world. On the other hsnd, 
prof. P»U» Srinlv s^aMarL says that according to 
ihartjpe^^aaea the Sutras teing out this truth 
tgr means of the olasaxcal analogy of the make 
and i t s co i l a and the sun end i t s radiance. 2?he 
cause i s , logically speaking. iay®anent in the 
ef fect . The whole pervades the part aid the 
universe i s revised in and through the particu* 
lars. But the most adequate Category of Eeeility 
i s the relation of eubstmce and modes (avasthavaS; 
and avaethi) in which there i s a pervaling identity 
that transfigures the parts. 
3. She Doctrine of Bhaskarm 
Bhaskara wrote a commentary on the Brhama^ " 
^ t r a , in regard of the doctrine of difference and 
non-difference. His commentary on Bcahma-^tra i s 
axrailahle, afc present, who belonged to the close of 
2 
the loth and the beginning of the 11th Century A.I). 
1 Srinivasachari, Prof. P.H., «5;he Philosophy of 
Btxedabheda", pp .162 , $he Myara library, 
1960. 
2 (a) Haaskara-Hhasya, p . 7 
(b) Pandey, Dr. K.C., "DualiBm-cum-non-dualism"t6hedabh. 
edavidi^ J^ouinal of (Jangaaafch Jha fiesearch Institute, 
Allahabad, Vol, XX-XM, Nov. 1963, August 1966, 
pp. 246 ' 
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To make clear his doctrine of difference 
and noQHaifference, Bhaekara accepts the three 
xaltimate iiealities viz#, Br^man or liwarai Jiva, 
and the world, 
( i ) Bhaskara hold the Brahman to be the 
cause of the world, i t s , creastor, supporter, and 
deatroyer* Brahma i s the hoth material cause 
2 
and the eff icient cause of the world# He i s known 
only lay the Scriptural authority* 
In fact for Biaskara, the world i s a 
transformation (parinma) of Brahman, l3ut he does 
not accept the tradition of Sankhya^yoga which 
i s thus, the world i s transformation or p aria ana 
of the praiccti, jusft as ©urd i s the transformsbion 
of milk» The Brahman possessesinfinite power or 
energy (salcti) and makes this power undergo 
4 
transformation, so that he can remain what he is« 
1 Ibaskara-bhasya 1*1*2, 1*1*11* 
2 Hiaskara-hh^ya 1*1*2, 1*4* 22* 
3 2haskara-lh^ya 1*1.1, 1*1*3 
4 Bhaskara-tiiaeya pp* 97, Kasi 
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Parinama i s for Biaskara the throwing out of eneror 
C'saJctivik^epa) • According to Siaslcara, a^ ahman 
has power of two kinds v i a . , subjective md objective. 
Brahman i s both one amd many* As cause 
he i s one stid as e f fec ts he i s many* Just as gold 
i s one as msrtjeriai cause and many as bracelet 
ear-rings etc* Thus, Brahman i s different • 
2 
non-different. Nbn-differeit state i s natural and 
3 
different gfcate i s adventitious. 
Brahman i s true being, sentient endless, 
4 
bl issful , omnipotent md omniscient, 
( i i ) The f in i te self or Jiva i s not a v i k ^ a 
of the ^-ahman, for vikara i s m. actual transforma-
tion, jusfc as the world i s a vikara of prakrti 
according to the Sankhya. It i s essentially identical 
with the Brahman such as sparks are with f i r e . 
1 (a) Hiaskara-bhasya pp. 85 
(b) W^tair. P.T.Ha;)u, "Identity in difference in 
some veuSitio systems", Hew Indian Antiquary, 
Vol. XI, 1939-40, pp. 105, Bombay. 
2 Shaskara-lSiasya pp. 18 
3 "Sa CalMnnabhinnasvarupothinn^upa sv'^avikamo-
pMhikam tu ISiinnarupam," Bhaskara-Bxasya pp.141, 
2.3*43, 
4 Shaskara-bhasya pp.24. 
6 (a) Hi^kara-lhasya pp. 134, 
(b) Waltair.P.T. Ka;)u,"Identity in difference in 
some Vedaatic systems'*, New India Antiquary, 
Vol. II,pp.319,1939-40. 
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The Jlva Is s^omio in size and i s 
innumeratiile. Jiva, i s the part (amsa) o£ 
2he term am a^ ia employed ty Hiaakara in three 
senses. It m^ connote ( i ) the reXsibion of the 
cause to i t s effect as whm thread i s e^lained 
as an a&sa or component of cloth^Ciij a share 
in property to be divided, or , as In this context, 
( i i i ) The principal of self-differentiation throu^ 
upalhi* She Jfva as a part i s adventitious. It 
i s not absolut^y different from Brahman, and i s 
not ahsoliifcely non-differaxt from iJrahman, hut i s 
related to S^stoim feoth as different and non-diffcrsnt, 
^ust as the sparks ^ e to the f i r e , as the f ive • 
fold prmas to air and as the aesthetic (kaaa) 
2 
to the mind. 
It i s agent of all deeds, but only so 
long as i t i s conditioned^ It i s enjoyer of all 
fruits of deeds, pleasure and pain. 
( i i i ) The world i s the effect of the Breihmaa. 
It i s admited ty Bhaskara, Brahmaa i s both the 
material cause and the efficient cause of the world. 
1 (a) Bhaskara-TSiagya 2.3.43 
(b) Srinivasachari P.N.,-Beadwgr "'^ lie philosophy 
of Bhedablieda'» pp. 73-74. 
2 Hiaskara-thasya 2.3.43, pp. 140-141. 
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Like Wkara , Blaaskara does not accept the world 
as illttsian# According to Mm, i t i s real aad 
e t e m ^ . As tlie cause and the e f f e c t , the world 
18 different and non-different from Brahmsn during 
the effected state, aid i s non-different from 
Brahmam during the causal state, 
( I t ) Aupjihika^Bied abhed av'^at 
Ehaskara adopts the doctrine of difference 
md non-difference (BiedaWtieda) > as the central 
truth of vedmta and th is i s the fundaments note 
1 
of hie doctrine- It cannot be obiected that 
difference and non-difference are mutually contra-
dictory, Hor caanot be said that two cannot do 
co-exist, l o avoid this ob;}ection Bhaskara says 
that everything i s d^end on direct e:^erience, what 
i s true and what i s wrong in the world, so everything 
must be decided on the basis of direct experimoe* 
Because, nothing i s seen absolutely d i f f e rmt or 
absolutely non-different in the world of eaperience, 
Srerything i s different and non-different, For 
example, a cow i s different from another cow as 
individual cow, but non-different from i t as belonging 
1 Biaskara*l3h^ya, pp* 18, 1«1,4, 
5 4 
to the same gmus *oow'. Again, a cow i s different 
from a horse as a cow, Imt non-different from i t 
being m existent subgitance l ike i t and so on* 
Similarly a gold ear-ring i s different from a 
gold bracelet but non-differ©at from i t as gold» 
So, direct experience i s only source, which guarantees 
in regarding that difference and non-difference are 
not mutually contradictory aad do co-eJdEst» 
Bhaskara says that there i s no contradic-
tion between unity and diversity of Brahman as 
cold and hot, because the relation of cold md hot 
i s not that of cause and effect• But the relation 
between unity-Brahman and diversity - the world i s 
that of cause aad e f f e c t , so Brahman i s both different 
2 
end non-different from the world. 
It has already been observed that Jiva 
i s the transformation (parinaaa) of B r ^ m throu^ 
his power. It i s natural that which i s the effect 
of Brahman, that wi l l be non-different from the 
Brahmai because one effect arises from a cause and 
abides in a cause. Ihus, Jiva i s non-different from 
Brahman. Jiva i s different and non-different fro-m 
Brahman during the effected state of Brahman 
(kary avast ha) 
1 (a) Bh^skara-bhasya pp.16-17,1.1.4 ' 
ibj^iJ^ma "Vedmta-p^ijlta-Saurabha" Vol. I l l* 
pp. 193, Calcutta, 1943, 
2 Bhaskara-^iiai^a, p. 17. 
0 
Tims I i t i s eat ablished that Jiva-Jagat 
i s non-different from Brahmai during the destructicoi 
and ealvafciott* It i s natural, Brahman laeing the 
cause I said the Jiva-»Jagat must "be Brahman in 
nature and essence. It meaas that non - difference 
(abheda) of Srahmaa and Jiva-Jagat i s natural 
(svabhiyiJta)* But, Jiva-Jagat i s different and 
non-different from l^ ahman during the state of 
creation and sansira (touddh^rastha)* Here, 
difference i s adventitious (aapaahika)i because 
^ the beginning of the Creation the Jiva becomes 
associated with the upaihis. 
!i?o conclu<£[ethis aupadhika-bhedattieda 
of Biaskara J3r. Boma CSiauduri refers to that 
Biaskaca explains Braliman-Jiva-Jagat relation thus -
( i ) During the Kacanavastha of Brahman, i « e « , 
when Brahman i s a pure, undifferentiated 
unity, prior to creation or srst i , 
Jiva-Jagat, too , remain absolutely merged 
in him, without aiy distinction from Him at 
all* 
1 caiaudury,J)r»Boina, Brahman*Jiva-Jagat relation-A 
unique theory of aup^hikabhedSbhedairaaa, " 
proceedings and transactions of the All India 
Oriental Conference, 22nd Session, Gauhati Assam, 
January 1965, Vol» II . pp. 234. 
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( l i ) $hen, during the karyavaetha of araiiman, 
when Brahman creates so to speak, Jiva-
Jagat out of Himself, Jiva-Jagat laecome 
different from Him# So, then, they 
are lihinnathinnaa from Him« '-Phis i s the 
gtage of srstisthiti* 
( i i i ) Shen during the stage of p3?al£Qra, too , 
jrXva»Jaga£fc, again "become identic^ with 
jarahman* 
(iv) During ISoksa also Jiva tecomes identical 
with Brahman, 
ffii this way, according to Hiaskara the 
ahheda between Brahman and Jlva-Jagat i s SvalDhavika, 
i . e » , s^ya md nitya, while the hheda between 
a^ ahman and J2Va-Jagat is aup^hika, i .e» jiguntuka 
due to upidhis, md so anitya, yet sectya. 
4# The doctrine of Y^ayaprakasjH^^ 
Xadav.aprakasnAis known from references 
only. Nothing much about the yadav^rakash 
md his philosophy. According to trMition,Iailava-
prakash was the supporter of the doctrine of 
1 "J iv^ar^osca svatiiavikotiieda aup^hikastu 
bhedah"- Biaskara-thasya pp.243, 4.4.4. 
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difference aad naa-di:r£erence. Xo establish his 
doctrine of lEiedaliieda, there i s no clear evidence, 
Isecause, tliough| he wrote Ms connaentary on 
ii^ahma-l^ra, yet his coiamentary i s not, at 
present, availatjle^ His doctrine has generally 
been established on the basis of some crit ical 
references of works of Eaniju^B and Vedmta«I>eikka* 
fiSttiiuJa cr i t i c ises the doctrine of ladav^raka^ 
in his Vedarthasangrah. Vedaata-Beiika devoted a 
brief ch^ter in his paramatabhaaga to the cr i t ical 
examinacfcionof the tenant of Biaskara and Tadava. 
ik^eording to "Srutiprakashika" the 
glossary on the '^ibhasya of Hananuja, n^iich i s 
written Sudarsanabhatta, there i s relation of 
difference and n on-difference between Jiva and 
Brahman as the cause and the e f f e c t , as e:^lained 
by Asmarathya, do such i s the view of laianraprakash, 
which i s called as "svabh^rika-Biedabheda" 
1 Vedarthasangrah, pp. 16, t r i Biagavad i&muja 
grmthamala, Granthamala o f f i c e , Kanchipuram, 
1966, 
2 Srinivasachari, Prof. P#H., "OJhe philosophy 
of Bhedatheda", pp* 144. 
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1 (Natural <lifference and noa-differeace). laiava 
t r ies to overcome the discrepancy by the concept 
of Brdm^aria^a or the theory of transformation, 
by which the absolute which i s the sat without a 
second 'qy i t s own immmeat sakti or potential 
energy becomes God and the universe of the cit 
2 
snd acit like the waires and ripples of the ocean* 
It proves that the Bratoan i s the cause of the c it 
and acit* a!he c it and acit are the ef fects of ^ 
Srahman. In the view of laiasr^rak^^ thus, 
there i s relation of difference and n on-difference 
between these three uitimaKe-resaities as the cause 
aid the e f f ec t , w i^ich relation i s nafcural 
( SvaUiavilca) • 
mim) ^AGM 
1. The doctrine of '^iaimbarkac^yat 
In Nimbarka's view, there are three « 
ultimate real it ies viz. Brahmm| Jiva and acit(Jagat), 
1 Aym Yadavapraka^apaksosmin sutra upmyastida./ 
tatra hi karyatmana karanatmana ca Jivabrahinanobhe-
dabhedau gvabhitikaa matm/ 
^Srutipraka^^ka on the ''Sri^Hiasya of jS,ajnaiu;)a, 
1»4.20, pp,a48, Vol. IJ, 1967. M.lry Govt. 
India, New Delhi. 
2 Srinivasachari, Prof.P.H., "The philo^phy of 
medabheda", pp. 144. 
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md the relaticsi between these tharee realitlee 
i e difference and non-difference# 
lo mderstand his doctrine of difference 
aad non-difference, it mayi therefore, "be useful 
to Bs^  a few words about the concept of Jiva-the 
enjoyer (ihoJcta), the Br^an (aiyanta) and the 
acit (|>hogya), as propounded ^iaiiabarkacarya* 
( i ) ^iva i s Jaiowledge "by nature, dependent 
on Hari, as in a condition to be conjugated with, 
or subgtracted from, a body i s afcoMic, different 
in different bodies, and i s a knower ss:id inf inite . 
2 
Jiva i s laiowledge by nature* It i s a 
peculiar <iuality of Jiva, which d e l i s t s the entire 
body, 3u0t as the odour of the flower. It proves 
that Jiva is different from non->sentient# 
3 
The Jiva, being a ]aiowledge| ijs knowar 
as well as* Here i s no contradiction between 
Icnowledge aad imower, and i s not identity with 
eaohother. In many cases, we see, the substratum 
1 Vedmta-lcamdhaau verse. 1 
2 Vedait a-pirij^; a-Sauralha. 2» 3* 26 
3 VeilBata-pffiid^a-Sattral3ha 1.2»12, 1.3.6, 2»3fl8. 
4 Vedmta-rafcna-maajus^i PP*4 
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md the attribute are very resembling, but thst 
does not mem that they are identical* Just as 
a gem md i t s rays are equally luminous, yet there 
i s no identity, i s difference md they stand in 




The Jiva, being a toiower, i s aa ego or, 
•I* C^affi)*, A loiower always fee ls ' I toow', 
*I want •, do' etc. 
The Jiva, being m ago, i s a doer, enjoyer, 
under the control of i&ahmsr* sad a part of the 
]&rahmaa, all these being true of in bondage as 
3 
well as in liberation* 
Jiva i s atomic in size. According to 
the Svetasvabara Upanisad, the individual soul 
(Jiva) i s as subtle as a hairpoint divided and 
sub-divided hundreds of times, JTva i s atomic in 
size, in bondage as well as in liberation. 
JXva i s inf inite in number. In this 
evidence, Efccahma-Sutra states that Jiva i s many, 
Ecahman i s one, i t proves the difference between 
Jiva and Iltahman. 
1 VedShta-ratna-mmjusa pp.4 
2 Vedrntaopaz^jata-SauraMia 2.3.18 
3 Vedoita-parijSia-Sauratha 2.3.32 - 40, 1 .3 .7 . , 2.3.43, 
4 Vedmta-pSriiSja-Sauratha 2.3.19. 
6 taaedavys«>adefea^canyah/ Brahma-^ra 1.1.22 
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Ihe Jiva i s of two - kinds* 
1* Buddha-jXva» 
ISukfca-Jlva. 
( i i ) 'stl-Nimbarakacarya has given the following 
characteristics of the Brahmaa in his vedaata -
kaaadhanut "We meditate on the supreme ficahmati 
vl2« Erpna, Hari, who has eyee l ike the lotus, 
who natur^ly has destroyed s l l the defects, i s 
the store of all auspicious eefctrilDutes, his body 
i s represented by the vyuha md who i s attended by 
alljf 
Ihus, according to Nimbarka, the absolute 
ultimate reality i s "^ikrsna iKLmself* H© i s denoted 
the term BcaJaman" who i s greatest of all because 
of his inf ini te , incomprehensilOLe, inherent nature, 
2 
attributes, powers md so on. He i s the cause of 
3 
the I%iiverse» Brehman ^one i s the cause of the 
creation and destruction of the universe. KLl naaes 
4 
and forms arise from him md return to Him. Brahman 
i s the both the material cause and the ef f ic ient 
1 Ved mt a-kaaaihanu. Verse 4* 
2 Vedaata*p^ijata«*Saura1iia 1.1.1 
3 Ted mt a-p ari ^  at a-Saur ablia 1.1.10-12. 
4 Vedant-P^ij^a-Saurabha 1^3.42 
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1 
cause ot the universe. He i s lord of all causes. 
2 
he i s controller of a l l , He i s lord of al l . 
( i i i ) 2fhe acit or Jagart: i s of three kinds viz. 
1. apaatota- not deMved from pralciti. 
2. Prakarta - derived from prakrti. 
3» eS.® - the time* 
Jn the things of prSsrta we hsve the ordinary 
material objects, i t consists of the three 
gun as vi2» sattva, raJaS| md tamas. 
She process of creation and destruction i s 
3 
as follows. In cresfcion f i r s t the eather originafces 
from the lord, from the earth air , from air f i r e , 
from f i r e water, and from water earth. But, in 
every case, Lord i s real creator. In destruction 
the process i e just reverse of the process of 
creation viz. f i rst the earth merged in waiter, water 
in f i r e , f i r e in air , air in eakher and the e«sther 
in the Lord* Just like salt merged in water. 
fit process that the acit or Jagat i s the 
effect of Brahman* It arises from Brahman and abides 
in Brahman* 
1 Vedmta-p^'ijata-SauraliLa 1*4,23 
2 %hddarsnyalcopanisad 3*4*22* 
3 Tedmta-parijata-Saoratha 2*3*1 "14* 
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( iv) Syabtollta « alliedsgrala s 
aio explain the relation laetween above 
discussed these three ultimate r e a l t i e s , 
'tlrliiimbarlcic^ya ^opt his doctrine of natural 
difXerssice aau non-diix'erence (svalJh'Svilca-aiedabheda). 
She jaatual difference in the nature md 
Qoncept of Brahman, JTva and the world i s obvious* 
It has alreaiy been observed that; Brahman i s the 
cause Jiva his effect aid there i s a obviously 
difference between the casise and i t s e f f e c t , just bs 
1 
the ocean and i t s waves* the aim and i t s lustre* 
fhere i s difference between Jlva and Brahman 
as the part and the whole* Jiva i s the part of 
Bcahman* Brahman i s the whole. 
Kcahaaa i s as the object to be obtained, 
2 
while the Jiva i s as the obfcainer* Brahman i s the 
3 4 
object to be known and the object to be worshipped, 
— S 6 
While Jiva i s Isnower md worship^Bir* The mutu^ 
difference i s obvious between them. 
1 . Vedaita-parijata-Saurabha 2*1*13 
2 Vedanta-parijata-Sanrabha 1*1*18 
3 Ved§ita»p^ij§ta-Saurabha 1*2*12 
4 Vedanta-parijata'-Saurabha 1*2*12 
6 Vedmt a-p^^ijsft; a«Saurabha 1*2* 12 
6 Vedoita-parijaia-'Saurabha 1*2,12 
64 
fliere i s difference laetween JXva end 
Ibraiuaaaj thafe BE'aimm i s ever-free from sins, 
while Jiva i s m enjoyer of the f ru i t s of deeds 
doae 1:5'- himself* 
AgaXn^  ft^ahmaa i s inner-controller, while 
Jiva i s not inner-controller because iDoth the kmvas 
as well as the Madhyssidiaas depict Jiva as different 
. . 2 
froa the innercontroller viz* Brahman* 
Thus, the mutual difference between Jiva 
and ]^ ahmaa i s natural aad eternal* 
Oa the other hand, the mutual difference 
between Jags^ md Brahmaa i s also obvious. Brahman 
i s the caise, the Jagat i s the e f f ec t . Both csnnot 
be identical* Br^mm i s omniscient and unlimited 
by time, space, and unit, while Jagat i s inmimate, 
and gross* Shus, the mutual difference of the 
three i s distinctly established, which i s natural 
and etemsPL* 
In reality, there i s non-difference between 
these three which i s established by the scripturaOL 
authority* And, i t has slready been observed that 
Brahma i s cause, and Jiva aid Jagat are effects* 
1 Ved mt a-p j at a-Saur abha 1*2*8 
2 Ted ant a-parijB;a-Saur abha 1*2*21 
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On the one hmd, there i s difference "between cause 
ai<3 effect I on the other, there i s non-differeace 
"between two. Because, the ef fect i s dependent 
on the cstuse for i t s activitiee and extstence, 
^ust l ike , the ear-ring i s different from the 
bracelet in name and shape aimply on accoimt of 
kundalabtva aad kattakattva, Imt i s non--different 
so far as, the gold i s concerned, fhe ear-ring 
md bracelet are dependent on the gold for their 
existence and activit ies, in the absence of gold 
the ear-ring and bracelet are impossible for their 
activities aad existence. In the same wajr', Jlva 
aad Jagat are non-different from the Brahman as 
cause and the e f fec t . 
Ihere i s difference and non-difference 
Tsetween Jiva md Brahman in Isondage sfcate of Jiva, 
on the other haid, there i s difference and non-
difference between Jiva and Brahman in the liberated 
state of Jiva also, liberated Jiva (mukta-Jiva) 
i s non-different from Icahman being existence, 
consciousness, H iss in essence, but i t , too , i s 
different from Brahman, because Jiva i s s^omic in 
size in bondage as well as in liberation and even 
a liberated Jiva lacks the powers of Brahman. 
1 Vedmta-iCaufitubha 1#4*21, 140-141. 
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In the very same msnner, Jagat i s different 
md non-different from the Brahman during creation 
as well as during destruction* 
In fact there i s neither absolutely 
difference gnd nor absolutely non-difference between 
these three v i z » , l^ahman, Jiva and Jagat. But 
the relation between these thx-ee i s both difference 
sad non^iifference. Just lilce the sun md i t e 
1 
lusfcre# It i s true that there i s difference 
between the sun and i t s lustre, but there i s 
non-difference so far as the brightness i s concerned. 
aio laake clear the doctrine of ndiuraL 
difference and non-difference, as propounded by 
Himbarlcaearya, this evidence i s f inal . Ihiich i s 
as follows; "But on account of the designation 
2 
of both, liice the case of eerpaat and i t s c o i l . " 
In this example, "l ike the case of serpent md 
i t s c o i l " , the serpent i s the material cswse of the 
coil* On the one hand, this shows the difference 
between the serpent aid i t s coil* On the other, the 
existence aid activity of co i l i s impossible in the 
absence of the serpent. It shows the non-difference 
between the serpent and i t s coil* Likewise, Jltva 
and Jagat are the ef fects of the Brahman. 3Jhe 
1 Vedmta«pari;j^a-Saurabha 3*2.28 
«• mt mm 
2 Vedanta-parij^arSauraliha aid Ksustubha 3*2*27. 
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relation of the Jiya and Jagat the e f fects , with 
Brahman the caxee^ i s natural difference and 
non-difference (evahhiyilcalihedaTSieda). Ihus, i t i s 
eetablii^ed that there i s relation of natural 
difference and non-difference (sv^ahlisBrikalihedaTsheda) 
Isetween these three viz# | Jiva - Jagafc aad JBrahman, 
as propounded ty Himbark^^ya, there i s no any 
contradiction. 
Hairing thus hriefly observed the doctrine 
of Nimbarka, we will see in detail in further 
chapters, on the basis of relation of Jiva and 
Brahman« 
'i?he doctrine of "^rltesQacaitanyat 
^iIq?enaoaitaaya was bom in 1486 A,D., 
in Havadvipa in Bengal, To e:i©lain his philosophy, 
he adopts the doctrine of "Acintyabhedabheda", 
but did not write any commentary an Bcahmasutra* 
He accepted the ^imadliiagvafc ^saS/ the commentary on 
"Ihe religious condition, of Bengal was far from 
satisfactory at the time (A.2). 1485) when ^inaitanya 
C'Srigauranga) was bom'* - fiadhs^ovindnath, "A survey 
of the Caitaaya movement"* !Che cultural heritage 
of India, Vol. IV, Calcutta, 19S6, 
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1 
Brahmasutra* His any woric i s not avail aisle* His 
philosopMcal views w6re elal)orated only lay his 
disciples in their works. One ot them, Jivagoewani 
was his follower, who has done a famous work namely 
2 
"Satasandharbha'^. Inspite of these sources, one 
commentary on Brahmasutra was necessary to prove the 
doctrine of "Acintya-lahedatoeda" of ^rikr^nacaitanya* 
In the nineteenth century, Baldevavidyabhu^ana wrote 
a commentary on Brahmasutra namely '*Gfovinda1^aeya'* 
in support of the doctrine of "Acintya bhedatjheda". 
Here, the doctrine of ^rikrmacaitanya i s elaborated 
mainly on the basis of Govindabhasya. 
B^adeva admits of f ive tattvas, namely 
Ifewara, Jiva, prakrti, Kala, Karma. It may, there-
fore , be useful to discuss briefly the concept of 
the Jiva, Iswara, and the prakrti, to understand the 
doctrine of " Acintya-bhedabheda", as propounded by 
'^ ikr ^ ac ai t any a. 
1 '^Brahmasutranamarthasatesamakrtrimbhasyabhuta 
ityarth^'Sattva-Soidharbha, 11 onuchheda. 
2 Satasandarbha-Iattvasandharva, p*4, ^loka 3-6» 
3 Vidyarupam bhusanam me pradaya khyatim ninyeten 
yo ^rijgovindah Svapnanirddistabhasyo radhabandhur-^ 
bandhuragah da Jiyat/ - Govindabhg'sya - avataranika, 
pp. 5 . , Mathura, Samvt-2011. 
4 latha hi Iswara-Jiva-prak^;rti-Kala-karmiii pancatattvmi 
^ari^ante-Govinda-bhasya. pp.2. 
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(1> "2)lie nacfcure of Jiva i e thafc it i s an 
eternal servant of krgaa. Jiva i s the marginal 
potency of kr^a , and i s a-msnifestation of a 
' ' 1 
distinct-non-distinct relation ^7ith Icr^a." Tiiis 
quotation in short gives the conception of the 
Jiva, But i t require to explain further. 
Jiva i s by nature eternal. Material 
objects are only destroyed and are created, these 
are only transitory, while Jiva i s never created 
2 
nor can i t have any destruction, fiefers also in 
Kafchopanisad 1/2/18. , "^ Che soul has neither any 
birth, nor aiy death} i t does not spring from any 
other thing, none spring from i t . " Again, Svetasvatara 
"Iwo unborn ones, the Jtnower and non-knower, the lord 
and nan-lord, ilirtherj JStem^ among eternal, 
conscious among conscious etc. 
Jiva i s by nature Jmowledge as well as 
3 
knower. "Who i s dwelling in knowledge", and »I 
elept happily, but I could know nothing". Ihese 
two kinds of iruti prove that Jiva i s knowledge as 
well as knower. 
1 "Jiver flvari^ haya-krsner nitya dasa, krsner 
tatastha feakti-bhed^eda prakSs." - 'Finite^self ' , 
M. by B,H. Bon Mahara ,^ pp. 70, Institute of 
OrientaL Philosophy, Vrindavan, 1963. 
2 Govinda-bhSsya, 2.3.16. 
3 Govinda-bhasya, 2.3.17. 
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1 
Jiva i s an active agent. Being an active 
2 _ 
agent Jlva i s en3oyer. Jiva i s the part and the 
3 
potency of the In this connection Jiva i s 
both different snd non-different from Brahman* Jiva 
4 
i s atomic in size. 
Jiva i s plural in number, "padosyasarva-
Ihutmi" in this sentence of 'sruti, " Sarvabhutmi" 
shows the plurality of Jiva. Again, though all 
Jivas are same in nature, yet,there i s difference 
6 
owing to their deeds. 
Jiva i s of two kinds: 
1. She bound (Baidha Jiva) 
2» The liberated (mukta-Jiva) 
( i i ) "^rikraiiia i s himself ultimate reality* He 
i s nirguna, free from the three gun as of prakrti viz^ 
sattva, rajas and tamas, md i s saguna Brahman, being 
7 
a store house of all auspicious attributes. He has 
aa infinity of auspicious attritaites aid inconceivable 
8 
powers. 
1 Grovinda-bhasya, 2.3.31 
2 Govinda-bhasya, 2.3.31-38 
3 Govinda-lihasya, 2.3. 41 
4 Govinda-bhasya, 2.3.18-30 
6 Govinda-ljhasyai 2.3.42 
6 Govinda-bhSsya, 2.3.49 
7 Govinda-bhasya, 1.1.11 
8 Govinda-bhasya, 1«1.2 
71 
Bcaliman has three powers v lz» , parasaicti, 
^arasakti aad anridya-s^i* The para^akti i s 
called Vishnu^aicti or svarupa-sakti, the sypara-
k^etrajna aad avidyak^ma or ma^yasakti. Shrou^ 
the apara aad meiya - sakti, he congtitutes the 
tmiverse of c it and acit aad throu^ his para-iakti 
which i s three fold viz. samvit or ^naia-sakti, 
saadhini or bala-fe^ti aad hiladini or Icriya-^akti, 
he has knowledge, existence md tCLiss. She power and 
attribute of Brahman are identical with Erahman owing 
to the identity of substance and attributes. Just 
3 
as the serpent and i t s co i l , and the sun and i ts 
4 
lustre. 
Brahman i s both the material cause and the 
eff icient cause of the universe. He i s ef f ic ient 
cause throu^ his para-sakti, and he i s material cause 
throu^ his apara-4akti. As the ef f ic ient cause, the 
Brahman i s unchangeable or kutastha, as the materia 
cause he i s subject to modification or parin^in. 
It means Bremen i s cause as well as the ef fect with 
his powers. Brahman i s the subtle powerfiil in causal 
state; and he i s the gross-powerful in the effected 
6 
state. a ? h u e , there i s relation of difference and « 
1 Govinda-biia9ya,^4.26 _ 
2 "Vishnu -feafctipara prokta ksetrainabhaya tathapara/ 
Avidya-karma-samjnanyatritiya saktirisyate." 
8 Govinda-bhlisya, 3,2,28 
4 Oovinda-bhSsya, 3.2.29 
6 Oovind a-bhSsy a, 1,4,26 
6 Govind a-bh'^ sy a, 1. 4,26 
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non-difference between the cause and the effect as 
the power snd the powerful* 
( i l l ) The worl<^ sn ef fect end power of the 
Brahman, Brahman constitutes the world through 
his avidya o r m ^ a ^akti. His m%a-^akti i s 
also called tamas* It mesnB the world i s a 
combination of three gunas viz» sattva, rajas, 
tamas* 
( i V) Apint ya-bhed ateied as 
Here i s a question what i s relation betwe^ 
above discussed these three ultimate realit ies? 
The mutual difference in the nature md 
concept of Brahman, Jiva and world i s obvious. It 
has already been observed that Brahman i s all-lsnowing, 
all-powerful and omniscient, while the Jiva i s 
Jmowing l i t t l e and has limited power. Brahman i s 
absolute, while Jiva i s atomic. Brahman i s creator, 
supporter, destroyer, while Jiva i s created, supported 
end controlled by I^ahman. The world i s inanimate 
and gross. Thus, the mutual difference of the three 
i s distinctly established. 
1 Govinda-bhasya, 1,4.26 
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In reeiLity, there i s mutual non-difference, 
in the three aspects of knowledge, existence, and 
laLiss viz. sat, c i t , and aaanda of Bc^imaa, these 
three Mrahmaa, Jlva aaid world are identicsil» 
Ihus, tiiere i s relation of both difference 
aid non-difference between them* !Phere i s no 
contradiction. There i s a hidden harmony behind the 
agjparent contradiction of difference and n on-difference, 
fhen '^ricaitanya establishes the relation between 
Brahman and JiVa as Hiedatflieda-prakasha, he meaas to 
say that i t i s true that there caxnot be both difference 
aad non-difference in the same aspect. But there can 
be identity in certain a^ects and difference in 
certain other a^ects of the same objects* Such 
difference and non-difference are not necessarily 
self-contradictory* Eegarding this theory, and being 
a follower of the school of "Acint^a - bhedabheda" 
Jivagoswami says that, there i s no f inal ity about 
awami, B.H. Bon Maharaj, "Pinite-self'» pp.82, 
Vrindaban, 1963. 
"^are tu" tax'k^ratishthaaat" CBrahma-SStra 2.1.11) 
Ishedepy abhedepi nirmy^ a^i ad o sasant at id ar senen a 
bhinnatayl cintayitumas^yat vadhbhedam sidhyantah 
t ad av ad abhinn at y sypi cint s^ y^ i turn s aky atvad bhed am ap^i 
siShayatttocintyabhedaliiedavadaffi svikurvanti"/ 
Sarva-Samvidini of Jivagoswami,pp. 145-146 
Haihakunda (Mathura), Samvt. 2022. 
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reasoning, so there la impossible the absolute 
difference in Jl-va and Brahmm, seeing unlimited 
defects in difference like the non-difference. 
I'herefox-e, as difference i s impossible, in the 
same manner non-difference i s , too , impossible* 
We accept "the inconceivable difference and non-
„ - 1 
difference Acintyabhedabhedavada). -A a^in says, 
there i s relation of difference and non-difference 
as the power and powerful. There i s non-difference 
in essence between the power and powerful, ssad yet 
differenee as Biaiifestation as a aspect of the 
same substance. As for es^smple, "the musk and 
i t s odour" and, "the f i r e and i t s burning power". 
The musk i s identical with i t s odour, The f i re 
i s identical with i t s burning power. We cannot 
remove the odour and the burning-power from the 
musk md the f i r e . It meais, there i s identity 
between the power and powerful, yet there i s 
difference also, because the odour and the ^ m i n g 
power are manifestations of the musk and the f i r e . 
Thus, there i s neither absolute difference nor the 
absolute non-difference, between the power aad 
1 "tasmat svarup^bhinnatvena cintyitumasakySt-
vaibiiedatoliMnnatvena cint ayitumasakyatv"§dabhedasca 
pratiyi^e eti . ^akti-iiaktimatorbhedabhedavevmgikrt au 
tau ca acmtyau e t i / . Sarva-Samvadini of Jivagosw^i, 
pp. 33, H^hakunda (Mathura), Samvt, 2022. 
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powerful; We accept the both difference and 
non-differencei the entire system of relation i s 
1 
a great inconceivalaLe mysrery. 
2iiS concept of "acintya" i s not similar 
to ^ankara's 'anirwacaaiya. * Because, i f i t i s 
accepted that the maya i s the power of Bcahman, 
there will not lie esftablishment of non-duali^; 
and again i f the miya of 'Sankara, i s not accepted, 
t h ^ i s also impossible. So, the term of 
"anirvacaniya" of ^ankara i s not similar to the 
term of 'acintya' of Srikap^ac ait my a. 
^idharasw"5aie3!plains the *acintya' as a 
follows; "^ He has inconceivable nature on account 
3 
of unlimited magaanimity*" Again Jivagoswarai aays 
in Sti^avatsandarbhaj "which makes the impossible 4 
possible that i s called "Inconceivable" (aointya)." 
!I?hU8, i t i s established, that, according to 
'SrXkrmaoaitanya, there i s relation of difference and 
non-difference between these three ultimate rea l i t ies , 
which i s inconceivable* 
1 Sundranmdavidyavinoda, "'^rioaitsBayadeva" (in Hindi), 
pp« 395, Calcutta, 1953* 
2 Sundranandavidyavinoda, "Acintyabhedabhedanr^a" 
(in Bengali Imguage}, pp* 9, Caiicutta, 19SL* 
3 "s^arimitamahimatv^aointyarupamV 
4 "durghataghatakatvam hyacintyatvam"./ Biagvata -
Sdndarbha anuchheda«>l6* 
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The doctrine o£ ^Srigatit 
''Sripati wrote a commentary on tlie vedrnta-
sutra- namely "'^Ikara^Jiiasya", in the X2tii Century 
A.2. Mis doctrine i s referred to by various names, 
• - ^ 
such ae, 'Biedali^heda, Dvait aivaitai and vi'sesadvaita* 
and again, ( i ) Dvaitaivaita, ( i i ) Vlsegiaavaita, 
( i i i ) Sesvar"^vaita, ( iv ) ^vadvaita, (v)Sarva^rutisa-2 rmata md (vi) Shedal3heda» 
It may, therefore, tse necessary to s ^ , 
a few words about the concept of Ecahmao. or ^iva 
and the concept of Jiva or paiu, to make clear his 
doctrine of difference and non-difference, as 
propounded by 'Sripati, 
£he words, ^^mm. para, ^ v a and pati , 
are used Igr '^rlpati as synonyms. Brahmaa i s 
. 3 
*Savise^a* but not ' l irvi^esa' . Brahman i s both 
the material cause and the e f f i c ient c^se* She 
universe i s the transformation of the Brahman. 
When He himself remains only i t s ef f ic ient cause and 
He tr^psfoims into world his energy or maya^akti i t s 
4 
material oause« 
1 Srikara-thasya, Vol*II, pp«2, M. C.H£(yavadana Heo, 
Banglore* ^ 3 6 . 
2 'Sraara-masya, Vol. IX, pp.196. 
3 ''Srikara-bhaiBya, Vol. I I , pp. 15. 
4 ^rikara-tiiaEya, pp. 179-180. 
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3. -Jiva i s not bom lut eternal* Jiva i s 
different from the form of the creation of the 
2 _ 3 ^ 
physical world* Jiva i s a part of Brahman. Jiva 
i s of two kinds viz . Baddha and mukta. In li"bera£tian, 
the Jiva Isecomes i d e n t i c w i t h Brahmen, Isit i t 
cannot possess the power of creation and remains 
4 _ 5 
secondary to Bcahman. Jiva i s atomic in size, 
and not all pervasive. 
• Xt has ^ready been observed that Brahman 
is different Category from the Jiva. iicahmaa i s the 
object of worship, -pervasive and omniscient, 
while Jiva i s worship^cj^has spatial limitation 
end possesses limited knowledge. But at the 
liberation there i s union of the two. He admits that 
the aforesaid limitation of the Jiva are beginain^ess 
snd natural* he asserts that Jiva ^ e t s freedom 
from these natural differences aad becomes identical 
with the Br^an* As ^ruti says "2he rivers flowing 
when go to the ocean disappear into the ocean leaving 
name snd forms, so a Wiseman losing his name and 
form attains the divine person, higher than high" 
(chmdogyopanisad 8.3.4) . In arguing for the difference 
1 Srlkara-bhasya pp. 29. 
2 ^Ikara-bhasya pp. 261 
3 Srikara-bhS^sya pp. 48 
4 '^pcara-bh^sya IV«V.17 
5 "Srikara-btiasya pp. 263. 
T'^oS 
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and non-difference, '^ Sripati seeks invariaKLy 
the help of ny'i^as, l ike "Mxramar^itaeuktisaila-disu", 
It me an 8 that we find a f l y of natural birth 
changes i t s inborn nature and becomes a bee* md 
rain water, getting into a mother-of-pearl becomes 
pearl. Shus, ^ i p a t i concludes that there i s 
beginningless difference between Jiva and Brahaoif 
Iwt at litKsrated state of Jiva, there i s nan difference, 
of the two* This identity i s natural as well as of 
formb ^ emphasizes this point again and again. 
I f i t i s asked how can both identity and 
difference hold i f identity as of form also, ''SrTpati*s 
possible mswer Jba that difference hold only in 
bondage and identity in mukti so that idmtity and 
difference are not to be found .simultaneously but at 
different times. 
His doctrine of difference end nrai-difference 
S 
i s natural l ike the case of the ferpent and i t s c o i l . 
1 ^ ikara -bhWa, Vol. I I , pp. 71, 261, 273 , 478. 
2 (a) Srikara-bhasya, Vol. I I , pp.338. 
(b) Walt air, P.T. Haju," Identity in difference-
in some vedsntic schools". New Mtlquary, 
Vol. I I , Bombay, pp. 330. 
3 Srikara-bhai^a, Vol. I I , pp. 6. 
''Sripafci follows the Ica^lqrt&a, "because 
he i s aaa exponent of the Biedatjhedav^a, takes 
slLI the aruti texts into account and represented 
1 
in central view of the ved^ta. But his doctrine 
i s clearly similar to the doctrine of difference 
2 
aid non-difference, as propounded ly ludulomin. 
ti i : 
7 9 
1 Pendey, K.C^ «Bhaslcari«Vol. I l l , pp. XD?III. 
2 Pandey, Dr# K.C. ""Saivadar^sna^rindu" 
c H A?, g £ H m 
ghe Bootrlne of Hatural l?ifference atid Non*Dif£erenoe 
(1) Blfferenoe in Jiva aad Bcahmant 
(A) In the philosophy of Himb^ka, the mutual 
difference in the nature and concept of Jiva and 
Brahman i s oWioust Bcahman is the cause and Jiva 
his effect or transformation* Shere i s a difference 
between the cause and i t s e f f e c t , as between the clay 
and the pots, dishes etc»j between the gold md 
the bracelets, ear-rings etc. ; batween the tree 
md the leaves, f ruits etc»; between the sea and 
the foams, waves etc«; md between the sun and i t s 
rays, similarly, there i s a difference between the 
Jiva (the enjoyer) md the Brahmm (controller)* 
1 Vedmt a-parijat a-sauralha and ?edmt a-lcaustubha 
2.1.13 
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Md again, Himbarlca points out thaib 
there i s difference laetween Jiva and Brahmm 
as "between the cause md the effect? He saors 
that the creator of the world viz* Srahmaa i s 
something more than the emtodied soul, the 
en;Joyer of pleasure and pain, "on aecoimt q£ 
the indication of difference" , As in passage: 
n t 0 the soul, indeed, should be seen*, 'the 
Jcnower of Brahman attains the highest,* 'who 
2 
controls the soul within 
Moreover, jusfc as in ordinai-y l i f e , 
the diamond the l ^ i s lazul i , the ru)3y and the 
rest, which are modificsS:ion of the earth, are 
different from the earth, md the leaf aad so on, 
which are modification of the tree, are different 
from treej the ray of diamond i s different from 
the diamond. So, the Jiva which i s modification 
3 
of the Brahmm, i s different from Brahmai. 
1 Mhikam tu hhedanirdes^/ Srahma-sutra, 2,1»21 
2 Vedinta-parijata-saurabha and vedmta-^kaustubha 
2»U2X 
3 Vedmta^p^i^ita- sauraMia and vedait a-kaustubha 
2.1.22 
There i s a difference between Jiva and 
Icahmsn as tietween. the part and the whole. Jlva 
i s the part of Erahmaa. Brahman i s the wholes 
As declared by 4rutij "i'or i t i s a part of the 
highest." A 'part* means a 'power', i t i s clear 
from 4?utij "Ihis Jiva, a power of hi»^esfc, i s 
aoall in power and not independent." 
She vedic mantra ^ s o confirms the part 
idea comes from the Purusaeuktai quoted in Qiaidoara 
Upanisai (3.12*6) "palo'sya viWathut mi tripsd 
asyamrtam divi" (a l l the being are Hie foot , 
immortal in the heaven i s His three feet ) . A 
2 
*feet ' meais a'part.' 
3Ihe sairti also corroborates the concept 
of part, thus "in this world of l i f e the Jiva 
i s my own part, in the form of eternal part," 
- _ 3 
(Gita 16.7)* 
3!he relation of part and whole declare as 
that there i s a difference between Jiva md Brahman, 
1 Vedmt-kaustubha, 2.3.42. 
2 Ved mt a-kausfc ubha, 2. 3. 43 
3 Vedmt a-kaustulha, 2.3.44 
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"On accomt of the desi^ation of variety" 
i . e . , on account of tiie designation of difference* 
2he Jiva i s , nature, a part, and the subject 
to bondage end eaXvation, while iirahmm i s , tijr 
nature, whole end the ocean of a mass of attributes 
l ike omniscience and the rest» She following 
^ e designations of difference: **Who rules 
the soul within; having entered within, the ruler 
of mm^ the soul indeed i s supreme, self-dependent, 
possessing superior qualities, the Jiva i s less 
powerful, dependent, lowest, the two unborn selves, 
the knower and the non-icnower, the lord aid the 
X 
non-lord, 
The statement of difference (bheda) 
i s expressed by Himb^k^arya in Brahma-sutra 
1«1,18, the Jiva i s different from Irahman, 'on 
2 
account of the desiRation of difference, • Just 
as the vedicmantras "He i s indeed, the essence; 
i'or indeed on attaining the essence, he becomes 
blissful*" It designates a difference between 
Br^ imaa as the object to be obtained aid the Jiva 
1 Vedmta-p^ijBsa-saurabha and Vedaata-kaustubha 
2.3,42 
2 bhedavyapades^ca/ Brahma»-sutra 1.1,18 
ae the obtaineri the obtainer cannot be the object 
to be obtained, " Thus, there i s a difference of 
n^ure between Jiva aid Brahmsni otherwise, 
X 
m intermixture of attributes will result. 2o 
prove this statement of difference, Nimbarkacarya 
says that the Jiva i s not blissful but only B r ^ m , 2 
becau^ Brahman i s the cause of the bLiss of Jiv^ 
and the bliss of the Jiva i s momentary, while the 
bliss of Brahman i s endless* 
Here a doubt arises that when Jiva and 
Brahman, both are conscious, both must be blissful . 
As 4rutl says "may my consisting of food, consisting 
of the vital « breath, consisting of the mind, 
consisting of tanderstaiding.end consisting of bl iss , 
3 
be purified." It proves that what consists of 
blissful i s something to be purified; aid as it i s 
impossible for the ever«-pure Supreme So\il to be 
something to be purified, so that which consists 
of blissful i s the Jiva# 
1 Vedmta-p^ijata-saurabha and Vediata-kaustubha 
1,1.18 
2 Vedmta-pari^ata-sauratiha 1.1.16 
3 Mahmar. 20.21, 24i^ish Translation of Vedaita-
Kaustubha, fioma Bose, 1.1.13. 
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l o this answer is as follows! that 
IsilissfuL i s Brstoan alone, on accomt of repetition 
viz. I the wo3?d 'l?liss' has laeen repeated many 
times in scripture in reference to Brahmaa alone. 
S0| i t i s estalJlished that Jiva i s different from 
Brahman, Ijecause on attaining whom the Jiva comes 
2 
to 136 mited with tOliss* 
Who i s within the sun, within the eye, 
said i s to l3e worshipped lay desirous of salvationt 
He i s Breimm ^one, not Jiva» To prove this 
Nimbaclcac^ya ej^lains "antast addharmopade'sB;'* 
vi2s., there i s difference of Brahman with Jiva, 
because Brahman has specisl qu^i t ies such asi 
3 
free from sins, the soul of all and so on, 
She statement of difference (laheda) i s 
further ea$)ressed by Nimbarica in his commentary 
on Btrahma«>sutra I*lt22 ^bhedavyapadesaoomyah*". 
It means, by nature, Brahmaa i s different from the 
individual souls of the sun aid the rest , within 
vdiich He dwells, "on account of the designation of 
difference*" Again, i t means that Brahman in Jiva, 
1 Vedanta-Jcaustul^a 1,1,13 
2 Vedanta-parij^ia-saurabha 1.1.20 
3 Ved ait a -p^ i j i t a-saur abha 1.1, 21 
SG 
Who i s '^sarlralsiilia^ln, i s different by nature. 
It i s ^ s o mentioned in the 'srutis "who dwelling 
into the sun, i s other than the sun, the sun does 
not know him, of whom the sun i s the body, who 
controls the smi from within, He i s your soul, the 
inner controller, immortal* "Ihus, it i s established 
that there Is difference of ^ahioaa with Jiva.B'ithin 
1 
which He dwells. 
"Sarvam Ichalvidaia brahma t aj^Slmitl 
u p ^ t " viz. "ALl th is , indeed, i s Brahman, rising 
from him, diappearing into him and breathing in 
2 
him; - calm, one should medifeate on him." For 
the purpose of meditation i t i s to be said that 
•manomaya prma ^arira* means Brahman has 
spiritual body and vitsOL-breath body. Here, i t i s 
to be understood, that for the purpose of meditation 
as the spiritual body i s Brahman alone, not Jiva, 
Because Brahman alone, celetrafced in all the 
ved^tas, i s taught in these above words." 3 
"sarvam khalvidani brahma." Xt meaas that there 
i s difference of Brahman with Jiva. 
1 Vedmta-p^ijata-saurabha and vedaata-kaustubha 
1.1.22 
2 Chmdogyopanisad, 3.14.1 
3 ?ed mt a~p ari j at a- saur abh a, 1.2.1 
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l o make clear this SiiabOTka give© the 
evidences o£ -^utl aad siar§ti# i 'irst of all He 
gives the evidences oi Brahmai-sutra"irivaksi"fc 
gu^op^ate^ca" and "anup^attestu na''sarirah". 
Both ditras declare that iSrahman i s different from 
Jivai '*l)eCause of the ^propriateness of the 
1 
attrilsutes intended to be started", md "on account 
2 
of infi^propriateness, not the embodied (soul)"* 
It me me Brahman has the spiritual (manomsiya) 
and Vital-breath body, the form of l ightj He has 
true vol i t ion, has the eather as the soul, has 
dearies, has all odours, has all testes etc«, 
while Jiva has no s^piritual body, and has not the 
above mentioned attributes such as; having all « 
desires, having all odours etc* "Kanaakartavya-
pade-^aca" and "^abdsBri^esat"*' both sutras of 
Brahma-sutra, too, declare, that Brahman i s different 
from Jiva" Bscause of the designation of object 
8 
and agent " and "on account of the difference 
4 
of Words" « It means Bralaman i s ob;)ect and the 
Jiva i s agent* i'or instancei "Having departed 
6 
from here, I shall attain him," in this sentence 
li Vedant a^p^i"Jat a-sauratiia, l»2t2* 
2 Vedmta-parijata-saurabha, 1.2.3 
3 Vedffiita-parij^a-saurabha, 1*2#4 
4 Yedaita-parij^a-saurabha, 1»2*5 
6 Chindogyopanisad 3*ia»4 
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Srahmaa i s o^b^ect, while Jiva i s an agent. And 
on account of difference wordsi i t groves also 
t h ^ Jiva and are denoted by different 
words viz. the genitive md the nominative 
re^ect ively . As in 4rutit "This my soxiXd i s 
into my .heart," In this sentence the mutual 
difference in jTva and Srahm^ i s olArious. 
To concltifllethis statement of difference 
Claheda) Kim baric a further gives the evidences of 
smrtij *0 Ar;juna the lord dwells in the heart 
2 
of all beings. ' *He who sees me everywhere 
and sees everything in me, of him I will never 3 
lose hold, aid he shall never loss hold of me; ' 
'He, who established in unity worships me abiding 
within all beings,' 'that yogin rests in me 4 whatever be his mode of l iv ing ' , *There i s 
nothing h i ^ e r than I , 0 Dhaaanjaya .*aLl this i s 
5 
threaded in me as rows of gems in a string. * 
•Since I excel the perishable, and am more good 
than the imperishable, I am renowned in the world, 
1 C^mdogyopanisad 3.14.3* 
a (3ita, 18,61 
a Git a, 6,30 
4 Git a, 6,31 
6 Git a, 7.7 
8 9 
1 
and in the vefla as the supreme person (purusott am) 
ja.1 these alsove evidences establish the mutual 
difference in Jiva and Bcahmm, 
Tiiere i s difference cetween diva aad 
Brahjnan, that, Brahman i s ever-free from all sins, 
while Jiva i s an enjoyer of the f rui ts of the 
2 
deeds done by i t s e l f . Scripture i s the sole 
proof. Such ass "Of these, He who i s the supreme 
self i s called to he eternal and devoid of all 
properties of matter*" "He i s not smeared even 
Ijjf the f ru i t , as a lotus-leaf i s not touched ly 
water, the active se l f , on the other hand, i s another, 3 
who i s liable to release and bondage* "Thus, i t 
i s established Jiva i s an en;joyer of the fruits of 
the deeds, while Brahman i s ever-free from all 
sins. 
Brahman i s an eater who i s destroyer of 
world, while the movable and the immovable are food 
which has death for their condiment. It declares 
that B r ^ m i s different from Jiva. As ^utit 
"He to whom both Brahmaia and ksatriya are the food 
•8 
aid death the condiment, #io thus knows where He is?" 
1 Sita, 16.18 
2 Vedaita-parijata-saurabha, 1.2.8 
3 M ah a.12.137 64-13755, Ihg. Translation of Vedihta-XO/ OO, -KUiS* •^ •LcttJlOXabiOil 
p§rij§fca-saurabha, itoma Bose, 1*2.8. 
4 VedSxta-parijata-saurabha JSiglish Translation 
"biy Moma ibse. 
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- X "rat am pibantau sukratasya loke guha 
Here i t i s to lae understood tliat 
there i s two sentient being viz*, Jiva and aipreme-
self into the cave, where the mutu^ difference i s 
otavious, between Jiva and 3irahnian# Brahman i s 
d i f f i cu l t to see, who i s hidden by yoga-m%a, 
Tsftio i s air-pervasive, who i s entered into the 
oavei while Jiva, who arises with the vital-breath, 
who i s aditi who i s made of the deties, who was 
manifested throiigh the elements, who i s intern^ 
X — into the caw e^. f o prove this Himbarka points out 
3 
that Brahman i s the object to be worshipped and 
4 _ S 
the object to be known; while Jiva i s worshipper 
6 
and knower. The mutual difference i s obvious 
between them* 
Brahman i s inner-controller, while Jiva 
i s not inner-controller because both the kmvas 
as well as Madhyandinas depict Jiva as different 
from the inner-controller viz» Jfeahman* As "srutis 
"He who i s dwelling in intelligence", and "He 
7 
who i s dwelling in the soul* 
1 Kathopanis^ad, 3.1*3, 2*1*7, 1.2; 12* 
2 Vedaata-parijita-saurabha, 1*2*11 
3,4,5,6 Vedrnta-parijlfca-saurabha, 1*2*12 
7 vMaita-pari jaba-saurabha, 1*2*21 
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Brahmaa i s imperishattle and the souroe 
of beings while Jiva i s not denoted Igr the word© 
'imperishable md the source of beings, • So, 
there i s diXferi^oe between Jiva and Brahman, 
on account of attributes and difference, Aa 
^ u t i .says, the designation of attributes i s 
"All-pervMing" and the designation of difference 
i s "Higher than high imperishable*'* 
The statement of difference (bheda) i s 
e:^ressed t^ r Himb^cka in Sraimasutra 1,3#5, 
'•bhedavysy^adefeacca'** It means, Jiva cannot be 
the heaven, the earth aad the rest , on accoimt of 
the designation of difference viz# *there i s t 
difference between the Jiva, which has l i t t l e 
jlcnowledge, and i s sub;]ect to bondage and salvation 
through the lord ' s M%a consisting of the three 
gunas, and the Brahman, who i s omniscient lord. 
It establishes that there i s difference between 
Jiva and Brahman as the Icnower and the object to 
2 
be known. 
Regarding the relation of difference 
between Jiva and Brahman, i t i s to be explained 
* 
1 Vedmt a-pari^^a-saurabha, 1.2,23, 
2 Vedanta-p^i^ata-saurabha md vedaht a-lcaustul±ia 
1.3.5, 
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that, Brahmati i s non*eater, while Jiva i s an 
eater. As declared iDy 6ruti» "Of these two, 
one testes the sweet Taerry, the other looks on 
with-out eatingt" 
Jiva and are different from each 
other, Brahman i s the omniscient, while Jiva i s 
3 
non-knower iii deep As iii iruti ; "Sataaced 
ty the intelligent soul, he does not know mything 
4 
eternal, nor aaything internal*" 
Ufhere i s indeed difference between, Jiva 
and Brahman, on account of words l ike ' lord ' and 
5 
the rest. On accotant of sruti like|««He i s lord of 
all*, 'the controller of a l l ' , 'I'he ruler of a l l ' ; 
«He rules all thisj •iThe lord of a l l ' " etc. 
Jiva i s sione that i s suls^ect to deeds 
and participacbes in imperfections, "but Brahman who i s 
not sub;)ect to deeds. It i s to be said in srutis 
"The two birds of handsome plumage, close friends, 
cling to the same treej One of them eats the sweet 
berry, while the other, without eating looks on". 
1 Vedmta-parijBja-saurabha, 1.3.7* 
2 Mundakopanissd, 1.1.3 
3 Vedaata-p^ijafa-saurabha and vedant a-kaustubha 
4 Brhadaraiyakopanisad, 4.3.21 
6 Jeda^ta-pari^ata-saurabha and vedanta-kaustubha. 
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It means, Jiva i s aa enjoyer on account of i t s 
imperfections, while licahmaa i s not touched even 
aa odour of imperfect ions, and He i s not the 
enjoyer of the names and the forms to be created 
1 
iDy aiffiself* 
$hus, Baddha Jiva i s entirely different 
from Brahman, being imperfect, sinful, impure 
sold so on* 
(B) fhere i s difference between Jiva and 
Brahman in bondage as well as in salvation. Mulct a 
Jiva i s different from ftrahman in two rei^ects* In 
the f i r s t place, the freed^soul i s atomic in size, 
wliile Brahman i s all-pervading* Atomic Jiva cannot 
become all-pervasive in salvation. But i t can take 
place in several bodies through i t s attributes of 
knowledge, as the case of a lamp, though placed in one 
2 
place, pervades me places through i t s rays • As 
scripture ^owsj "The individual soul i s as subtle 
as a hair point divided and subdivided hundreds of 
times. He i s potentially inf inite . He has to be 
3 
Jfliom," 
1 Vedanta-parijata-sawrabha, 3,2#13»14 
2 Ved^t a-kaustubha 4#4.1& 
3 Svet^atara up mi sad 
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In the second place, the freed eotal| 
however, though similar to the Eldest B r ^ a n , 
yet caanot possilale be the lord of all the 
sentient and the non-sentient, their controller, 
their supporter, • pervasive and so onj and 
hence i t s lordship i s exclusive of the activities in 
connection with the miverse* 
aJhus, t t i s established that Jiva i s 
not absolutely different from Brahman like the 
M^hva-philosophy, but the mutual difference between 
Jiva and Brahman i s equally e tern^ , natural, and 
undenialSLe, in bondage as well as in saLvat;ion# 
(C) "lEHe ob^jections levelled by ^ankarites 
against the aamigsion of "duality" or "difference" 
as a oactegory are, f i r s t l y , that the category of 
difference (l:iieda) being by nature a relation 
involves two poles and hence i t cannot be ident i c^ 
in nature with i t s locus in which i t i s supposed 
to subsist (bhedasyana adhikarana-svarupatvam). 
Secondly, that i f "difference" i s different in 
nature from i t s locus, then a second grade of 
"difference" has to be introduced and this woxad 
imply aaother grade of difference and so on ad 
1 Ved^ta- kausfcubha, 4*4*20« Hi^ieh translation 
Boma Bose* 
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infinitum* liaus, we have a vicious infinite* To 
the f i rst objection, the reply i s thatfc "difference'* 
i8 not relational in nature with this or that 
individu^ loous Mt with the concept of the locus 
as such (tiiutalartjvadina nirapeksatve» pi 
adhikaranatmakafevena s'^eksatve Kaster alalisvat), 
Jhe charge'of vicious inf inite Igr the introduction 
of difference of differences ia invalid, for all 
differences are identical in nature with their 
locus. So in the case of a series of differences the 
nature of each difference becomes well defined and thia 
viciouaness of the infinite series vaaishes* la 
the instance "there i s a jug on the ground", the 
nature of the difference of the Jug i s ju^iess, 
whereas ixi the ease of the difference of the difference, 
the second order of difference has a separate spec i f i -
cation as a special order of differences. Moreover, 
since difference reveals only the particular modes 
of the ob;|ects, these d i f f i cu l t i es cainot arise* In 
perceiving difference we do not perceive difference 
as entity different from the two object between 




whioh i t i s supposed to suteist# (^e might 
equally well find such a fault of mutu^ dependence 
on the identification of Brahman with Jiva, since 
it depends upon the identification of the Jiva 
with the Brahman. 
A further discussion of the subject shows 
that there cannot Ise any objections against 
"differences" on the score of their being produced, 
for they merely subsist and are not producedj or 
on the possibility of their being toiom, for i f 
differences were never perceived the ^ankarites 
would not have been so anxious to remove the so--
called illusicms or mis-perception of differences^ 
or to mis-^end their energies in trying to 
demonstrate that Brahman was different from sOLl 
that was false , material and the l ike; md the 
saint also would not be able to distinguish between 
uriiat was e t e m ^ and transitory. Again, i t i s 
held that there i s a knowledge which contradicts 
the notion of difference. But i f this knowledge 
1 na'pjut anyonya-srayah Itieda pratyakse pratiyogita-
vacchedakastambhatvadi-prak^aka - jnmasyai'va 
hetutvat na tavad bheda-pratyakse ttied^sray^ 
bhinnatvena pratiyogijnanam hetuh, 
Para-paksa-giri-bajra of Madhavsanukunda pp.l7» 
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i t se l f involves difference i t cannot contradict i t . 
Whatever may signify mytiiing must do so ty restr i c t -
ing i t s signification to i t , and all such restriction 
involves difference. JBven the comprehension that 
demonstrates the illusoriness of "difference" 
(e»g», this i s not difference, or there i s no 
difference here etc* ) proves the existence of 
"difference"* Moreover, a question may te raised 
as to whether the notion that contradicts difference 
i s i t se l f comprehended as different from difference 
or not. In the former case the validity of the 
notion lea^res "difference" unmolested aid in the 
second case; i . e . , i f i t i s not comprehended as 
different from "difference'*, i t tecomes identical 
1 
with i t and cannot contradict i t . " 
( i i ) Hon-difference in Jiva and Brahman? 
In reality, there i s mutueOL non-difference 
between Jiva and Brahman as tetween the cause and the 
e f fect . Because, Brahmaa i s the cause of the Jiva 
and Jiva i s the effect or transformation of the 
Brahman. Uimharlcacarya points out that there i s 
1 Dasgupta, S.N. , "Histoid of Indian Philosophy" 
pp.417-418, Vol. I l l , Cambridge, 1962. 
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Hon-difference feet ween the cause and the e f f e c t , 
and not abaolute difference; on accoiant of the 
texts of the 'tea.ti, the smrti and the eutras. 
In teatsj "The e f f e c t , having i t e Tseginning in 
speech, i s a name, the reality i s just the c lay ' , 
'the existent alone, my dear, was this in the 
^ginning one, without a second', 'He thought, 
may I be maiy, may I procreate', 'He created the 
light; ' iai thart; has this for i t s soul ' , 'that 
i s true ' , 'that i s soul ' , 'thou art that ' , 'All 
this , vacily, i s Brahman, emanating from Him, 
disappearing into him and breathing in him', 'that 
was mmanifest them', ' i t laecame manifest by name 
2 
and fo i^ ' md so on". 
i'or this reason also, says Himb^ka, 
there i s non-difference between the cause and the 
e f fec t , because the effect i s perceived, only when 
3 
the cause i s existentu 
Again He says, the effect-which belongs 
to a posterior time; i s present in the cause. So 
1 Ved^ta-pari;jita-saurabha, 2»1,14 
2 Vedoita-lcaustubha, 2.1,14, ^ g l i s h 'J)raaelation 
by Boma Bose* 
3 Vedmta-parijata - saurabha, 2.1»15. 
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the effect i s aon-different from the cause. As 
declared by fecutis •'Brahman, indeed, was this 
in beginning". 
jb'urther, he makes i t clear, that i t catmot 
be said that the effect does not exist prior to 
creation, on accomt of the dosigtiation of what 
i s non-eadstent, as in text "The non-existent, 
indeed, was this in the beginning". Because, the 
pre-existence of the ef fect i s to be toiom from 
2 
the complementary passage, viz. "!3?hat was eaastenf*, 
Md again ssers, the pre-existenoe of the effect i s to 
be known from reasoning. He admits that the 
names, forms, kaowabOLe by leesns of the evidence 
of direct perception and the rest , all are r e ^ , on 
account of being perceived. Ai agent, v iz . a 
potter, makes a pot out of a lump of clay, that 
i s existent, Jffiere, like the lump of clay, the 
existence q£ the pot, too, i s known from direct 
perception. Hence the activity of the agent, too, 
i s not useless. Here, i t cannot be said that as 
the pot already exists, like the lump of clay, the 
1 Vedaita-parijata-saurabha, 2.1.16 
2 Vedmta-p'^ijata-saurablia, 2.1.17 
ao 
activity of the agent has no meaning. Because, 
the pot which was xmmanifest hefore i s made 
maaifesft| hence the activity of the agent i s 
not ueeless* 2he names and formsj mentioned in 
the veda, are used just as they were before* 2?hus, 
according to Nimhaclca, the conventional usage of 
names and forms i s not unprecedented. On the 
other hand, Himh^ka says that the origin of a 
non-eidstent effect does not f i t in> since the 
origin of a barleysprout from f i r e i s never seen* 
It cannot be said that althQUsh f i r e has no power 
of producing such an a f fec t , i t has, nonetheless, 
the power of producing sparks-for, in aa e f f e c t , 
produced from gold and the rest of a known weight, 
a different weight i s never found* Likewise the 
sparks of f i r e , \i^ich are i t s evolutes and known 
through the evidence of direct perception, are 
perceived Tqy there being no evidence for 
the imaginary doctrine of a power producing 
unprecedented objects* Hence, the doctrine of a 
non-existent ef fect (Asatkacya-vaiia) i s unreason-
able* Himbarka states once more another reason 
1 Vedmt-kaustubha 2»1*17» ^ g l l s h Translation 
by Boma Bose* 
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for the existence of the e f f e c t , thusi '^aWiatar-
acca % Ihe other text i s the text aptly teaching 
the pre-existence of the ef fect : Viz» "She 
existent eO-one, my dear, was this in the beginning", 
which i s other than the quoted text , visa., "She 
non-existent, verily, was the beginning," Because 
of this too, i t i s the (Pre-) existent effect 
alone that originates, - this i s the sense. 
®he above-mentioned doctrine of existent 
effect Csatlc^ya-vsda) i s explained the 
following illustrations. Such as: just as, a 
piece of rolled up cloth, although not laiom to be 
a piece of cloth, does not, for that reason, 
become non-existent, but i s indeed existent, 
existing in a different form, and when spread 
out once more, i s known to be a piece of cloth; ;just 
as the drawn forth limbs of a tortoise are not 
perceived, even though existent, but do not become 
non - existent there by and are known when stretched 
out again; Md just as the banyan tree, existent 
in the seed at all times indeed in a subtle form, 
1 Vedmt-kaustubha, 2.1«17, iihglish translation 




i s maniXested in a gross form. And just as 
the vital-teeath, liaving the prma, ^ ^ a and 
the rest , controlled tQr breath exercise etc* | 
remains in i t s r e ^ form^ md when the control 
removed, i s instantly Jtoom in those respective 
2 
forms. So indeed the prior to creation the 
universe remains existent indeed, though not 
knom to he a pniverse, having i t s name aad form 
mmmifeetj and i s clearly knom as the universe 
fSt the time of creation, having i t s name and forms 
3 
manifest. 2!hua, the cause and the ef fect are 
non-different. Because, the e f fect * which belongs 
to posterior time, i s present in the cause* 
Thus, i t i s estalsilished that the ef fect 
i s non-different from the cause* Similarly, the 
Jiva - the effect or transformation of Brahman, 
i s non - different from Brahmm - the cause* 
1 Vedanta - kaustubha, 2*1*18, Jaiglish translation 
ly Boma Bose# 
2 Vedaata-pari^ata-saurabha, 2*1*19* 
3 Vedaata - kaustubha, 2*1.18, Banish traaslatioa 
by Boma Bose* 
There i s non - difference tetween Jtva 
and Brstonaa as between the whole md the part* 
Jiva i s the part o£ Brahmaa; Braliman i s the 
whole, 3?he relation of a part atid the whole 
declares} Shat there i s difference between 
Jiva and Srahman, as well as non - difference^ 
Jiva i s non •-different from Brahman, on account 
of the desigaatioin of non-difference* And i t s 
existence and activity are under the control of 
the whole* The follovdng are desi^iation of 
aoR-differencet" 'Thou art that;' •This soul i s 
1 
Brahman *, ' I am Brahman'» and so on* 
The non-difference between Jiva and 
Brahman i s further supported and eapreseed by 
Hiobark^aixa in the verse of vedicit a-lcmadhanu 
that sfl.1 these three primary principles are 
*Brahmitmaka*« This statem^t (brahmatmaka) 
1 Tedinta^p^ijBia-saurabha and vendmt a-kaustubha 
2* 3* 42* 
2 Sarvam hi vi;}naaamato yatharthkam 
Isrutismrtibhyo nikhilasya vastunah/ 
brahmatmaktv^iti vedavinmatam 
trirupat%i "^utisutrasadhitV/ 
Vedrnta-kemadhanu » Verse 7* 
10-5 
Indioatee the non-dilferenoe of the three. Shree 
means there are three realit ies viz* Brahmaai Jiva 
md the world* So having Brahmati tor i t6 essence 
(lacahmatmaka), Jiva i s non*«different froa Brahman, 
as the e^-r iag i s different from the bracelet in 
name aid shape simply on acoount of kuadalattva 
and katakattvai Init i s also non-different, so far 
as, the gold is conoemed* 
Hevertheless| the authorities of 'feruti 
prove that Jiva i s non-different from Brahmsai* 
« •JBsdetence alone my dear, was this in the 
beginning one onlyj without a second', 'liiis 
one only was soul in the beginning', 'Ehou art 
that ' , 'This soul i s Brahman*, 'That I am Brahman', 
this i s , indeed, soul ' , ' i l l this i s BraliiaanJ, 
•I am you indeed, 0 revered de i ty , ' 'All this i s 
verily Brahman for three form does i t proceed, 
there in does i t merge, and there by i t i s maintained* 
lo prove this statement of non-difference 
another ground i s as follows. 3?here i s non-difference 
between Jiva and Brahman because the existence and 
activity of Jiva are depend on Brahman (taiiyattas-
thitipravrtilctavat) , As cleared from'sanati. 
1 Vedanta-ratna-manju^a, pp* 89. 
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"The lord abides, 0 Acjmat ia the heart - region 
of a l l , causing all teing to revolve by his ^ 
myaterioue power, as i f motinted on a machine"* 
Moreover, whatever i s depend on something else 
for i t s existence and activity, there i s non-
different from it« It i s to be said in the 
dialogue between the Yital-breath and the sense-
organs in the ch^dogyas '•verily,, they are not 
called speech, eyes, or mind, but c ^ l e d the v i ta l -
breath alone* " 
3?© make clear this statement of non-
difference final ground i s as follows: Jiva i s 
non-different from Brahman because i t i s pervaded 
Irjr Brahman (talvyapya)* %atever i s to be seen 
or to be beared in this world, internal or eternal, 
that all i s pervaded be Harayana. 
Baddha Jiva i s non-different from Brahman 
in essence, being His ef fect or transformation, on 
the otherhand Mukta Jiva i s entirely non-different 
from Brahmm, being existence-cognition-HLiss in 
1 Gat a, 18f61 
2 Chaadogyopansad, 5.1*ld* 
3 Vedanta-ratna-manjusa, pp. 89 
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essence Csaccidmaadsvarupa}* I^e feeed Jiva attains 
the nature and qualities ol the Brahman viz, the 
freedom from sine and so on. The freed Jiva 
2 
attains its-fathers and so on, through a mere will . 
It comes to have, in fact , the attributes of true 
* 3 4 
desires and so on, and becomes a sel'^f-ruler , 
in accordance with the scriptural text'JHe ibecomes 
a self -ruler", Ihus, freed Jiva i s ©itirely non-
different from Brahman, 
( ) i^ x^e doctrine of Hatur^ difference m& 
non^difference (Svalah^ika-tohedabhedayadajs 
Thus, according to Himtoarka, the relation 
of Jiva and Brahman i s just l ike that between a 
cause and i t s e f f e c t , a whole and i t s parts, a 
substance:^ and i t s attributes, a substratum of power 
and i t s powers, There i s a relation of difference 
aad non-difference between the cause and i t s e f fects 
as in ordinary l i f e . In ordinary l i f e , the pots, 
1 Ved ant a-p ari j at a- s aur alha, 4,4,7, 
2 Vedanta-parijata-sauraliia, 4,4,8» 
3 Vedant a-parijB;a-saurabha, 4, 4,9, 
4 Ibid, 
aieh.es and the resffc, having the lump of c l ^ as 
their materia causej toacelets, ear-rings and 
the rest , haying gold as their material oausej 
foams, waves and the rest , having the sea as their 
material causej and leaves, f ru i ts and the rest , 
having the tree as their material cause, are al l 
non - different from their causes ^ t there i s 
s t i l l a mutual difference amongst the particular 
e f fects themselves* fhus, there i s neither pure 
nan-difference (abed a) nor pure difference (Ijheda), 
•between the cause and i t s e f f e c t , but natursG. 
difference and non-difference# Again, just as 
pots, dishes and the rest are by nature non-different 
from the clay, as having no existence and activity 
^^t f rom the clay, bat they are by nature dif ferent, 
too, from the clay possessing as they do their own 
peculiar attributes which the clay lacks* And Just 
as the bracelets, ear-rings and the rest are by 
nature non-different from the gold, as halving no 
existence and activity apart from the gold, but 
they are by nature different, too, from the gold 
possessing as they do their om peculiar attributes 
which the gold lacks. Iiikewise, there i s a natural 
relation of difference and non-difference 
- - « I 
(svabhavika-bhedabheda) between Jiva aad Brahman. 
1 Vedanta-parijata-saurabha and vedmt a-kaustubha 
2«1«13. 
Again, i t msftr te said in tHe support 
q£ above, that just as in the passage wheti i t i s 
said; "Sarvam khalvidam torahma" this , 
indeed, i s Brahmaa), though it declares that 
the non-sentient i s non-different from Brahman, 
i s yet different from Br^aa as i t difference 
from Brahmaa i s admitted tsy the phrase 'emmating 
from Hiai» • So, in the case of Jiva €iso, when 
i t i s saids «tattvamasi" (Thou art that), 
though i t declares that the Jiva i s non - different 
from l^ ahmaa only as having no existence and 
activity independently of Brahman, but not li^ r nature, 
i s yet different from Him, on account of the stated 
scriptural teast designating difference, fhus, 
there i s difference between Jiva snd Brahma, in 
spite of there being a non • difference between 
1 
two. i'or example, stones lilce the diamond, 
the l ^ i s lazul i , the ruby and the rest viftiich 
are modification of the earth, though non - different 
from the earth as consisting in earth, are yet 
different from the earth, possessing, as they 
do their pecul-iar nature* Aid, just as the l ea f , 
1 Vedmta^Kaustulha, 2#1«21 
though non-difierent from the tree, i s yet not 
the tree; Just as the ray, though non-different 
from i t s substratum, i s yet different from i t , 
so It i s ^propriate to hold that the Jiva 1b by 
nature different from Bralimaa, thou^ it i s at 
the saraetime non-different from Him as having Him 
1 
for i t s soul. 
Shus, i t i s established that the Jlva 
i s neither absolutely different from Ecahman, 
nor absolutely non-different froa Him, but there 
i s a natural relation of difference aad non-difference 
between Jiva and Brahman as between the cause aad 
i t s e f fects . Again, the Jiva i s entirely different 
from Brahman as i t haS already been observed • 
But i t , too, i s non-different from Brahman in 
essence, being His effect or transformation. 
Ihe natural relation of difference and 
non-differric© "between Jiva and Brahman i s to be 
further eacplained by Himbarkac^ya in such a sutra 
of Brahmasutra as "am^o nmavy^ade^^anyatha 
2 _ 
capi da^akitav^itvamadhiyata eka." The Jiva 
1 Vediaita-pacijata-saurabha and veditit a-kaustubha 
2.1.22, ^ g l i ^ tran^ation by Soma Bose. 
2 Braiima-sutra, 2.3.42. 
Iltft 
i s neither absolutely different from the Brahman, 
nor absolutely non-difl'er®at from Him, but i t i s 
a part of Br^toaa, and the Brahman, i s the whole of 
the Jiva, Here, a'part' means a " p o w e r I t 
stiould not be understood here as a portion, l ike 
a portion of wealth and the rest , because i f i t 
be like a portion of wealth there will result an 
absolute difference between Jiva and Brahman and 
hence the texts likei "Thou art that" will be 
set aside* So, the true doctrine i s that there i s 
a natural relationof difference and non-difference 
between Jiva and Brahman. Ihus, the Jiva i s ty 
nature different from Brahman predicated to be 
the iihole, md the store of attributes like 
omniscience aad the rest-while i t i s predicated to 
be a part, as i s subject to bondage and salvation* 
But it i s yet non-differaat from Brahman, as i t s 
existence and activity are under control of the 
whole, "On account of the designation of variety 
aad otherwise" vis5» on account of the designation 
of difference and non-difference» The following 
are designations of differencej " 'who controls the 
individual self within', 'Haying entered within, 
the ruler of the people' , 'The soul, indeed i s 
in 
independent and possessed of more qualities, 
Jiva i s lees powerful| i s dependent and i s 
lowly'I 'The two unbom ones, the Icnower and 
tiie non-icnower, the lord and the non-lord' " 
and so on. 3?he following ar# designations of 
non-differences " 'Ihou art that ' , ' this atman 
i s Brahman} ' am Brahman ' " and so cait 
2he fact i s that the cause and i t s e f f e c t s , 
the part md the whole are neither absolutely 
different nor absolutely non' -di f fer^t , but the 
relation of difference and non-difference. Thus, 
the relation of Jiva aad Brahman i s a relation 
of nature difference and non-difference (Svabhavika-
bihedabheda). 
To concluelethe present doctrine the 
final evidence of the Brahma'" sutra i s present, 
2 
such as "unlsiiayaRryapade^ativahikundalanrat" viz» 
li Vedmt a-Jcaustubha 2#3,42 
2 Brahm a-sut ra, 3.2.27 • 
n a 
"But on aecount of tiie designation of l3ot]a| l ike 
the ca@e of serpent md i t s co i l » " In tiie present 
illustration *ah,ikuncl£a.vat', the serpent i s 
mscterisl cause of the coil* The serpent i s 
independent wrxile coi l i s dependent* On one haad, 
this shows the difference between the serpent and 
i t s coil* On the other, the esdsfcence and 
activity of coi l i s impossible in the absence of 
the serpent. It proves the non-difference between 
the serpent and i t s coil* Ihus, there i s natural 
relation of difference and non-difference between 
the serpent and i t s co i l as between the cause 
and i t s effects* likewise, this universe of 
matter and souls i s the effect or transformation of 
the Br^an* 'i^ he relation of Jiva - the effect 
or trmsformaction, with &:ahnian-the cause, i » 
natural difference md non-difference on account 
of the designation of both difference and non -
difference* Ihe other maLogy throu^ which the 
Nimbarka trye to eaplain the situation i s that 
of the sun and i t s regrs niaich means that i t i s 
true that there i s difference between sun and i t s 
1 Brahma-sutra 3*2*28 
m 
rays but there i s also non - difference 00 far 
ae the l l ^ t i s concerned. 
Thus, there i s a natural relafeion of 
difference and non-difference Ijetween j£va and 
Brahman in loondage* 
On the other hand, there i s natural 
relaticai of difference and non-difference between 
Jiva and Brahman| in salvation| too* fhus, the 
freed Jiva i s entirely non-different from the 
Brahmen I being existence - cognition - bl iss in 
essence (aaccidmaadsirarupa}. But the freed Jiva, 
» 
too, ife different from the Brahman in two respect8» 
In the f irst place, the freed Jiva i s atomic in size, 
while Brahman i s all-perva«Tsive, Aid in the second 
place, the freed Jiva , however, thou^ similar to 
the Brahman, yet cannot be possibLe be the lord of 
all the sentient and the non-sentient, their creator, 
their supporter, their desffcroyer, all-pervasive 
aid so on, which Brahman possessesfully end eternally, 
as it has alreaiy been observed above. 
iThe relation between the freed Jiva and 
the Braiiman i s to be further remarked by Nimb^ka-
c i ^ a , as followes - 'bhagavirodhibh^ena Jiva 
1 
atmmamanuMiavati' • 'Ihe freed Jiva experiences 
i t sell' as non-division» wiiicJi i s not opposed to 
division, or as Iseing t)otli different aad non -
different at the same time, from the Bxahmaa. Here 
again, i t i s to be eaiplained l3iy ^rinivasicarya, as 
follows, the freed Jiva, freed from all fectters, 
realizes i t se l f as non-divided or nott-distinct from 
the Hi^est se l f , the Hi^esbperson, "On account 
of laeing seen" that i s , because at the time (vi25 , 
during salvation) the Highest se l f , the soul of a l l , 
i s intuited by the freed Jiva. Tlirough the influenee 
of nescience, the individual soul comes to have a 
perveee Qotion about i t se l f . But, when through 
the influence of the repeated practice of hearing, 
thinldLng, and meditating , the Hi^est lord i s 
intuited, all the obstacles to the real Icnowledge 
regarding the real nature of i t s e l f as well as of 
the highest self aar^  immediately destroyed in 
accordance with the scriptui-al text, "The isnot of 
the heart i s broken, all doubts are cut o f f , and 
his works perish wdien he who i s h i ^ and low 
i s seen. Hence, there caa be no doubt what-so-ever 
1 VedSita-p^ijSba-eaurabha, 4»4.4» 
m 
tlia^ the freed Jiva apart of tiie Lord, having 
intuited the soul of a l l , the whole, r e s i z e s 
i t s e l f , all the more clearly, as non-distinct 
from Him. She individual soul, having Him for 
i t s essence, has no distinction from Him, and 
hence in spite of a distinction of nature "between 
the individual soul and Brahman, there i s s t i l l 
a non-distinction Isetween them, a non-distinction 
which i s compatilaLe with distinction - ;iust as 
there i s between eaa attritaite snd i t s substratum* 
Again, 'Srinivasaoarya says that we do not mean 
to say that there i s any non-distinction of 
nature between the soul md the Lord, otherwise 
in accordance with scriptural and emrti texts 
like: "The existent alone, my dear, was this 
in the beginning, one only and without a second," 
"All this , verily, i s Braiman", "Vasudeva i s 
everything", "Know everything k^^a, the movable 
said the immovable, souls aid the universe i s 
k r ^ a " , there must be a non-distinct ion of 
nacture between the non-sentient end the Lord too , 
or - because scripture i s found to refer to 
distinction and non-distinct ion. Hence, i t i s 
Jtljf 
estaM,ished that the i:reed Jiva realizes i t se l f 
as noa-distinct froia the l^ahmm which non -
1 
distinction i s compatiiae with distinction. 
Ihus, i t i s estalaished that there i s 
nature relation of difference and non • difference 
between Ji^ v-a and Brahman in si^vation* 
According to Himbaxka, therefore, there 
i s natural relation of difference and non-difference 
l3etween j fva and Brahssn in Iwndage as well as in 
salvation. It i s further supported ty '^"iaivas^^ya, 
the fact i s that even during the bondage (bhaddhiv-
astha) the Jiva, which i s atomic in size and 
possesses l i t t l e knowledge, though different from 
the Brahman, who i s all - pervading, non-straying 
in nature and omiscient, yet l ike the leaf i s 
non-different from the tree, the xa^ from the 
lamp, quality from the gu^i f ied , sense organs 
from the vital - air, i t s existence and activities 
being dependent upon the Brahman, i t i s non-different 
(a) Vedaita-kanstubha, 4*4.4, i i h ^ i ^ Translation 
iioma Bose* 
(b) !rattvaprakafeika_ of Ketoa Kaiamiri, 
Commentary on '^imjidbiiagavatagjta,- Hindi 
Iran Nation l^ r *Sri Kalika S in^ , Bardhaman, 
1935, pp. 101-102, 
nr 
from the Brahmaa* Lilcewise, thou^ in salvation 
(mulct avast ha) the Jiva i s non-different from 
Brahman, it having no eeparsfce independent 
existence and axitivity, ab the same time, i t i s 
undouTatedly different from Brahman, in accordance 
with the Wuti "Svena rupena sampadyate" - "It realizes 
i t s om nacture." Otherwise, the natiire^of both, 
the Jiva and the Brahmaa becomes loose^ 
But according to Hiaskara, there i s 
relation of difference and non-difference due to 
adjuncts (aup^hika-WiedalJhedavMa) between Jiva 
and Brahman* ilnd again, Jiva i s different aad 
non-different from Brahman in the state of bondage 
(baddhavastha). Jiva i s non-different from 
Bhahmm in salvation (muJctWaskha)* The difference 
(bheda) i s due to beginnin^ess adjuncts (aupadhika) 
and non-difference i s nature (Srabh^ika)* 
- - 2 
Devacarya cr i t i c ises this doctrine of 
Bhaskara with regard to the doctrine of natural 
difference and non-difference (evabhavika -
bhedabhedav^a) aad ssors that this doctrine i s 
1 Yedmta-kaustubha, 1.4«22 
2 Sidhmta-Jahnavi, 1«1.1, pp« 30r31, 
m 
untenable and i s exactly d i f f e r from the IhedaMieda-
vaia of Himbarka, for each of the following f ive 
possiHe alternatives leads to absurdities. !i?hus;-
1« It cannot be said that the Jiva 
i s a portion of Brahmaa actu^ly cut 
o f f from Him Igr the limiting ad;junct, 
since f i r s t , B r ^ a n can not be cut of f 
thus, and secondly the Jiva becomes 
non-etem^ on this view, 
2* It can not be said that the soul 
i s a part of Brahmaa (not actually cut 
o f f from Him but) connected with the 
- 1 
atomic upaihi, since f i r s t , in that 
case all the faults of the upadhi will 
pertain to Brahmaa, and secondly, motion 
of Brahman being not possible the motion 
of the upadhi, there will arise sudden 
bondage and salvation on the part of 
the Jiva. 
d» It cannot be said that the Jiva 
i s Brahman himself, connected vdth the 
1 "anurupop'^hisamyiLkt a-'brahma-pradesa^vilBesah** -
Sidhfflit*Jahanvi, 1 .1.1, p» 31. 
1 
limiting adjunct, for ±£ Brahraaa 
Ijecomes the soul ia His om nature, 
there «dll remain no t r arise end ©nt 
Brahmaii unconnected with upaiihie« 
4« It cannot be said that the Jiva, 
a conscious lieing and connected with 
upadhis, i s different from and other 
than Bcahman (who i s a conscious being, 
Imt not connected with up^his)» i f 
a second reality besides Brahman be 
admitted, the view that all difference i s 
due to upadhis only (aid i s not r e ^ ) 
fa l l s to the ground. 
6* i'inally, it caanot be said that the 
limiting adjunct i t se l f i s the jXva, 
for that will leal to the carv'^a view 
which identif ies the Jiva with the 
2 
body." 
1 "Upadhi-samyuktam brahma-svarupam eva Jivah" -
Sidhmt a-Jahanvi, pp. 31, 1*1.1. 
2 Bose, Eoma, "Vedant a-parijata-saurabha" pp. 111-112, 
Vol. I II . 
m 
!PhuS| the doctrine of natural difference 
aid non*difference i s real, and etem^* ito.d agsdn^ 
it estatlishes that in the doctrine of natural 
difference and non-difference (Sval^avilca -
Himbarkaoso^a, there i s no such 
contradiction as we find in some other's doctrines 
such ass the follower of the doctrine of only 
difference (Tiiedav^a), has to accept many texts 
l ike "All this indeed i s Brahman", as sulaordinate 
ones, and the followers of the doctrine of only 
non-difference (aldiedav^a) have to accept many tea^ fcs,^  
<nhich determine difference, as Bu'boa:rdinate ones* 
m m m 
m 
/ 
c H il g g E R 
H.AOIUHE OF J i n -^S. BRAimAIT AS COITCTMED WI^PH 
!!?HEIR gELATIOn 
®iere are three ultimate realit ies of two 
«|h 
kinds, In the philosophy of liabarkaj ladependent 
and Dependent* Brahman is the independent reality. 
dependent is of two kindSt Sentient and non-
sentientt 
(a) Sentient "being (oetgaia) is that where there 
i0 intelligence (caitanya) | knowledge, desire and 
action* It is the s p i r i t , considered as the 
essence of al l the heing and sources of a l l 
1 
sensation* 
H- ' joshi , Hsisika Viharii «A note on the doctrine of 
Hon-difference in Difference of lifljjibarka", 
»East and f es t » , Vol* 15, ITos. 1 -2 , January, 
1964, March - 1965, ISMEO, Rome (Italy) . 
m 
(t)) Non-sentient (Jafl^) is that where there 
is no know ledge, desire ena action*^ It is a 
pathetic or devoid of appreciation. 
1# ifature of the Jlvai 
Jlva is the only sentient reality, 
-^rlnlmbarkacirya has given the following character-
ist ics of the Jlira In his Tedanta-kisidhanus 
"jnaiasvairupam ca hareradhinam, 
B^ arlr as emyogaviyogayo^am/ 
^ma hi jivam pratidehabhianam, 
^n'atratvavantani yadaaantamahuh// (verse 1) 
(lEhe Jlva is knowledge "by nature, dependent 
on Hari and capable to be associated with and 
dissociated from a body; atomic, different in 
different bodies; and a knower and inf inite) . 
1 
(A) She j iva is knowledge by nature. It is 
a special quality of the j lva , which d e l i s t s the 
entire body, just as the odour of the flower. As 
1 Joshi, Basika Tihari, "A note on the doctrine 
of IJon-difference in Difference of Uimbarka", 
«East and West<, Vol. 15, Fos. 1-2 January 
1964, March-1965, ISM20, Home ( I ta ly ) . 
2 Vedanta-parijBia-Saurabha 2.3.26 sotid Vedaita-
k'^dhanu verse 1. 
proved from the '^rutij" He has entered here up to 
the hody-hair and f inger-«talls.« On account of 
this special quality of the j l va , it is different 
from the nonnaentient viz#» the body, the sense-
organs (eleven in number), the vitalbreath (with 
2 
its f ive modes), the mind and touddhi* 
Being the essence of the Jiva, toiowledge 
is present in erery state viz* the states of 
walking, dream, deep-sleep, swoon and death# It 
is present even in the state of deep-sleep and 
the rest# 
m objection may be raised herej where 
is i t present during the state of deep sleep, as 
i t is present during the state of walking? The 
answer to this question is as followst It is 
manifested during the walking state and is 5n 
its own possession (self«»possessed) during the 
state of deep sleep, just as the youthness is 
present even in childage, thoui^ it is not 
manifested in child-age, yet is manifested to 
3 
young-age. 
1 ?edarit a-parij at a-S aurabha 2» 3. 26 * 
2 Tedanta-ratna-mainjuea pp#4» 
3 Veditita-pari^ ata-Saurabha 2* S* 30. 
m 
1 
jflva being a knowledge, is knower 
as well* 
In objection may Is© raised here: the 
j lva cannot be both knowledge said knower* just 
2 
as one drop of the water Is identical with water, 
BO knowledge is identical with knower* Here, the 
j iva is not a knower, but pure knowledge. 
this the answer is as follows: there 
a 
is no contradiction between knowledge and knower, 
and is not identity with each other, in many 
cases, we find that the substratum (dharmln) and 
the attribute (dharma) are very similar, but that 
does not meen that they are identical, just as 
a gem and its rays are equally luminous, yet 
they are different and they stand in the relation 
4 
of substratum (dharmln) and attribute (dhama) • 
Similarly, though the j iva and its q.uality of 
knowledge are e(iually knowledge, yet they stand In 
1 Ved^ta-pari;Jata-Saurabha 1.S.12, 1*3*5, 2.3»l8 
2 Vedanta-ratna-fflajuga, pp. 4. 
3 Ibid. pp. 4 
4 Ibid. pp. 5 
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Illation of substratxan said attribute, so there 
is distittction from each other, but is no identity, 
as clear from scriptures "Seated on the body by 
1 
Imowledge*" fhus, there Is difference between 
on© drop of water mid wf^ter, for th«t drop of 
water, having a distinct foM^ must be different 
from other drop of the water. 
2!he tfiva being a kn<wer, i s sbi Ego or 
3 
•I* (ahain)» A knower always feels Imow', 
4 
' I w e n f , ' I do* etc» 'iiham-artha' is not 
conteraporary of the two factors, one intelligence 
and other non-intelligence. It is not unreal 
but the eseaice of the Ji^ ra,* 
It is objected here, that i f an Ego 
or is real or the essence of the ^Tiva, it 
must always exist along with i t . But the 
no longer exists in the state of deep sleep, 




5 '^dvayansatapi na ca bhati eetanehampratitlvisayeh-
amarthalce//'' 
Sarvigesa-3Jlrivi^e§a-kr?naetvara;Ja, Verse 21, 
6 Vedcmta-ratna-manjusa, pp,7 
m 
2!he answer to this question is as 
followss the is present even in deep 
sleep, as is proved from such meaory as "For 
such a long time I slept happily and did not 
!mow anything". It shows, the is present 
even In deep sleep as the substratum of knowledge 
and the feeling of happiness* Even the memory 
**For such a long time I have not even known 
myBelf", does not show the absence of during 
the state of deep sleep* But it means that it 
is present eveaa in deep sleep, what is absent, 
is the 'I* as it is during the walking state. 
Hence, the must persist even during the 
states of deep sleep, swoon and the rest* 
2 
15ie Jiva, being an Ego, is a doer* It 
is proved from al l spiritual in.lunctionsj for 
examplej "one who desires to go to svarg should 
perform sacrifices'*, or "one who desires 3 
salvation should worship the - Brahman*" On 
accotmt of the statement of i ts moving, i t is a 
1 VedSBita-ratnaHosaijusa, pp»8 
9 Vedanta-p^ijata-smirabha, 2*3*32*40 
3 Vedanta-parijata-saurabha, 2*3.32 
m 
!5he answer to this question is as 
follows: the is presmt even in deep 
sleep, as is proved from such memory as "For 
such a long time I slept happilj"- and did not 
know anything''^ It shows, the is present 
even in deep sleep as the substratum of knowledge 
and the feeling of happiness* Sven the memory 
'•for such a long time I have not even known 
myse l f , does not show the ahsenee of during 
the state of deep sleep, l^t it mearis that it 
is present even in deep sleep, what is absent, 
is the as it is during the walking state. 
Hence, the must persist even during the-
states of deep sleep, swoon and the rest, 
Jiva, "being an Ego, is a doer. It 
is proved from al l spiritual injunctionsj for 
examples •'one who desires to go to svarg should 
perform sacr i f i ces" , or "one who desires 
3 
salvation should worship the • Brahman." On 
account of the statement of i ts moving, It is a 
__ WW mm 
1 Vedanta-ratna-^aanjusa, pp#8 
2 Vedant a-parij at a-s aurabha, 2» 3# 32»40 
9 Ved ant a-par i j at a-s aurabha, 2# 3# 32 
m 
doer as declares by "s rut it "^he ^iTa moves, 
within the hoay at will"^ or "3!htis, moves 
talcing the vital breath, also proves 
that the «Tiva is a aoer» It means that the 
Jiva iB a material eause, being a knower and 
eiijoyer aS far as possible, of the vital breath, 
the sense organs said the buddhi etc. In this 
sentence that, **?i3nana performs sacr i f i ce" . 
SPhis also proves that the ^iva is doer» Here 
is a doubt that, 'Ti^n^a* means *buddhiS 5?o 
this we replys It is wrong, because buddhi is 
not doer i tsel f but is an impelling. 3?he fact 
is that the Jiva is only a doer. 
M objection may be raised here, i f the 
Jiva is only a doer, i t must always do only pure 
actions, from which it could get only pleasure, 
but why does it do impure actions? ®ie mswer 
to thdts question is as follows* Sphere is no 
any rule f or obtaining the fruits of the past 
deeds, The Jiva does its actions, being to be 
ruled by past deeds, at that time it does not 
fctiow about the pure or impure deeds^ So even 
1 Vedanta-p^ijata-saurabha, 2.3. 33* 
2 Vedrat a-parijata-saurabha, 2.3* 34« 
3 Vend'^t-parij at a-s aurabha, 2.3.35. 
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being a doer, the J'iva Is to be ruled by the 
X 
deeds. If we accept i t , that buddhi Is doer, 
what wil l be impelling powers which is necessary 
2 
for ffoer^ So, the Jiva is only doer. 
Sie Jiva does i ts actions as its desired, 
just as a carpenter does his works or does not do 
hia work, as his desired. 5his agreement is 
possible In the Jira, but is not possible in 
3 
the buddhi. So buddhi is not doer, the ^iva 
is only doer. 
fhe Jiva is a doer not only during the 
state of ratmdane existence, but also in its state 
of salyation* As clear from this , that, performing 
the Sajsadhi, It is a doer. 
« S 
!nhe 0"iva is an en j oyer or bhokta. It 
is proved from such memory of deep sleep? ^^ For 
such a long time I slept happily," and it envoys 
supreme bliss produced from its direct vision of 6 
Brahman during the salvaticsn-state. thus i t 
continues to be so during deep sleep and salvation. 
1 Vedaatarkaustubha, 2.3.36 
8 Ved^ta-pari3 at a-s aurabha, 2. 3.37 
3 Ved ant a - p ^ i j at a-S aurabha, 3.39 
4 V'edSrit a-pari3ata-Saurabha, 2.3.38 
5 Vedanta-pirijata-saurabha, 1 .3 .7 . , 3.2.13. 
6 Vedanta-ratnaHnan^ufS, pp. 12 
m 
E^ie Jlva, being, the knower, a doer, 
m en 3 oyer J it may be aelced, must be an tndepea-
dent like the Brahman* To this question, 
siddhanti replies that, it is not independent, 
but is dependent cmi Hari, and its activity, 
existence, knowledge, enjoyment everything is 
dependent on Brahman* 1*01 ejtamplet the earthem 
.Tar is .of the nature of clay, hence the existence 
and the activity of the Jar is dependent on clay. 
It is proved from ^rutis "Entered within, the 
2 
controller of meni,** which works are to be done 
by the Jiva, Lord himself makes i t do good deeds 
or bad deeds on account of f u t i l i t y of what is 3 
enjoined and what is prohibited* Bven when i t 
attains similarity to Brstoan during the state 
of salvation, i t remains under his control* 
5he Jiva is without birth and death » 
4 
eternal*, ftit, according to prima facia view 
that "Devadutta is bom and dead" so the Jiva is 
bom and dies* It is only figurative, there is 
1 Vedanta-k^adhanu Verse 1, 
2 Ved ant a-pari3at a«saurabha,2* 3* 40 
3 Vedanta-.parijata-Saurabha,Eng* Trans, by Roma Bose 
2*3*41, Calcutta, 1943* 
4 Ved^ta-parijata-Saurabha, 2*3*16-17* 
m 
no birth and death of the Jiva, and Imply only 
that the material body i s "bom or dies, "kx the 
presence of aa existence of body, it is ( i ts hirth 
and death) nattiral. So the ^iva does not bom 
or die I it is eternal (a,la3 As declared by 
scripture itself« * A ^ s e magi ia neither bom 
nor dies , Eternal smiong eternal^ Jka 'ogborn 
one, indeed, iJ^sJby en .joying*" It is also 
proved from smrti# "Unborn, eternal, constant 
and ancient he is not killed when the body is 
k i l led , " 
1 
ISie ^i-^ is a part of Brahman* Here, 
2 
the 'part* means 'power* , i t means Jiva is 
power of Rahman. "All the beings are a foot 
of Ijord** i t also proves that the Jiva is a 
part of Brahmaa. Also proved from srarti"* ^ust 
my part, the J'lva came in the world of mortals as 
4 
the etexnalt" 
Here, it may be askedt the Jiva is a part 
of Rahman, Brahman must experience pleasure and 
pain like the Jiva. 5?o this objection, the Jiva 
1 Vedanta-S^arijata-Saurabha, 2,3.42 
2 Vedrnta-^arijata-Saurabha, 2.3t42 
3 Ved^ta-iP^ij^ta-Saurabha, 2.3.43 
4 Vedrnta-P^ijlta-Saurabha, 2.3.44 
m 
experiences pleasure and pain under the influence 
of i ts paat deeds, tjut BraJiman does not experience 
any sucli feeling, ^ust as the defects of l ight , 
which is the part, do not ef fect the sun, who is 
1 
the whole* 
!Sius, in nature the Jiva is knowledge, 
a knower, a doer, and an en3oyer, under the 
control of Rahman and a part of the Brahman - a l l 
these heing true of the iTiva in bondage as well 
as in salvation. 
(B) 
IJie si2e of the Jiva is very minute 
(atomic or anuparimaha)* If we accept the medium 
siae, the Jiva wi l l also "be perishable like the 
3ar# ®h.e followers of this siddhsat accept the 
size of the Jiva nccoriSng to the size of the 
body* ©lus the sisse of the soul of an elephant 
wi l l be as huge as the body of the elephant* 
2Jhe size of the Intelligence of an ant wil l be 
as small as the body of an ant. IJhis wi l l create 
1 Ved^ta-Parijata-Saurabha, 2«3»4S» 
2 VedOTta-P^ijata-Saurabha, 2.3* 19, and 
Ved^ta-Kamadhanu Verse 1# 
in 
the following d i f f i cu l ty j when the intelligence 
of an elephant wil l oTJtata the hody of ^ sent 
or, when the intelligence of an ant wi l l obtain 
the hody of m elephant, it wi l l he rather 
impossible for both of than to « i ter into the body 
of one another^ Hence the outlook of the 
Maddhyaatparimanaradln omnot be accepted, 
!Phe all-pervading size of the is 
also defective* If we accept the all-pervading 
s ise , then the tytkrantiCgolng of the soul out 
of the body)I f a t i (going of the soul to the 
higher wo2?lds, like moon e tc . ) and agati, return 
of the soul from other worlds in this w o r l d o f 
the Jiva should not occur, because the a l l • 
pervading entity cannot move. Only supreme 
Brahman is of the nature of all-pervaeiveness# 
Hence the outlook of vibhuparim^avadin cannot 
be accepted. 
Consequently, we have to accept the size 
of the Jiva as the most minute one (anu)» 35iis is 
1 Vedemta-Kaustubha, 2»3.19 
2 ITedOTt a-Kaustubha, 3,19, - 2* 3.21 
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from the text* "This soul goes out throu^ 
the eye, or throti# the head, or throxi^ other 
parts of the Ijody*" "Whoever, go forth from 
this world al l go to the soon alrtwe*" "Betuming 
from other world in this world f or action", and 
so on* ^ i s is clearly aeclared hy seripttire 
as well which designates **fhe ^iva is as suWle 
as a hairpoint airidea and saMivided himdreds 
2 " 
of times," 
Here it may "be askeds the ^iva "being an 
atomic how can it esjperience the feelings of 
pleasure m& pain of the entire body? To this^ 
we reply* Jnst as a drop of sscndle wood'-paste 
in one part of the hody can saoth and enli^tens 
the entire "body, so , the Jiva occupies only a 
point in the hody, enl i^tens the entire "body 
and experience the feelings of pleasure and pate 
3 
of the entire body* 
Further, i t may "be ©"b^ectedi 35ie example 
of sandel wood-paste is not suitable, on account 
of speciality of residence. To this objection, 
1 Vedmta-»pari3ata»Saurabha, 
2 (a) Ted^ta-parijata-Saurabha, 2,3.22 
(b) Josh i« Has ^ a "yjhari* *A ITote on the doc^Tine 
ofT^oJ^-dirrerence in difference 
•^sst-md-^est", J--2,Janimr^ 1964, 
KarchJL965, ISMEO, Home, 
3 Vedanta-^pari^ata-Saurabha & VedSita-Kaustu'Wia, 
2* 3» 23* 
m 
we replys 3!he Jiva, t oo , dwells into viz* 
in one part of the bo^j does not dwell every-
where as a^consciousness, just as the sandel 
woodpaste, 
3!hus, the Jiva is atomic In size in 
Tsondage as well as In salvation* 
(C) 
She «?'lva is Innraierahle In nmnher* 25i€ 
Eka^i-vav^ln admits only cme Jrlva in the universe. 
Hone has, so far , attained f inal lilseration. 
Whenever that one Jlva wi l l Tse liberated, the 
whole world wil l disappear, 
3?o refute this doctrine, Himbarkacarya 
propounded that in each body the Jiva is separate 
3 
being limited by that body* It proves that in 
a l l the beings l^ ahamaa is one but ^ v a is 
separate and infinite. Both Brahman and Jlva are 
1 Ved^ta-JP^i^ata-Saurabha, 2*3.24 
2 (a) Ved^ta^Kaustubha, 4*4.IS,pp. 431* 
(b) 2attva-p3raika^i1ca"of Ke^ava-Ka^amiri, 
Commentary on GltiT, (Hindi Translation of 
Kalilca Singh) Bardhavana,1^35,pp*314-316. 
3 Pratldehabhlnnam/ Tedmta-»K^adhanu Verse 1* 
t s s 
possessed of mutual aistinguishlng marks* 3a 
case I we do not accept a separate J^iva ia each 
tsodjj then a l l the Individual soule should sleep 
after the sleeping of one^ and a l l anould l!© 
unconscious when one t^ ecomes unconscious. Similarly 
when one feels happy or unhappy a l l should fee l 
alike, % i s never happens. Hence the out look 
of Bkjivavadin cannot fee accepted* 
Nevertheless the scriptural Injunctions 
prove that the Jiva is not one (endless)» It is 
many while Birahman is one there is great difference 
"by nature between the Jiva said Srahmaa, 3h passage! 
'^ He who staying in the s e l f , intemally s e l f , 
eternal of al l the eteimals, animate of a l l 
animates, and being one without a second makes 
2 
many desires* In evidence, a l l the three, epithets 
i , e » , nityatiffln, cetanmSn, hsihuaSQ, prove that 
the self is endless* $he Srahmasutra states that 
the Brahman in Jiva, who is 'sarirahhlmski/ is 3 / different by natnre* It also establishes that 
1 Vedmta-ratna-manju^a, pp»l9 
S Ya atmani tisthan atminsaaantaro yamayati/ 
esa te atmanantaryamyamrtah// -
nityo nityanem cetanascetan'iailra/- • • 
Eko bahun^ yo vidadhati k m m / / kathaka 
ITpan is ad, IIS.lS 
3 Biedavyapadel^aoeffiiyah/ Brahmasutra. 
- 1 
Brafeiaan Is different from Jiva. Hhe onoilaelent 
and omnipotent ultimate reality is definitely 
superior to the Jiva« The ^agvatglta also 
remarlcst Ar^ una**, It is not true that I 
was presait Taeforei I| you, and a l l these jfklnge 
2 
are never present in present, past and futuret" 
3b this way the natural difference between Brahman 
and Jiva is strongly established. 
When we accept Infinite individual souls, 
the oLuestion is that by propitiation one by one 
each individual soul wil l attain the f inal 
liberation and a stage wil l come when a l l the 
individual souls wil l attain mulcti, and the 
creation will come to an end# ®ie answer of this 
(jaestioa is explicitely given by Nimb^kacarya in 
coarse of the definition of the Jlva imder the 
words Vs^snantainahuh* the Jiva is Innumerable 
and endless, wi l l never come to an-end« 5!he 
whole of the universe is f u l l of the beings who 
3 
have gross, subtle, and minute bodies, 
1 Mhikam tu bhedanirdefeat/ Brahmasutra, 
2 na tvevSham jatu nasam na tva» n&m/^an^hip^/ 
na caiva na bhavisyamal/ sarve vayafeatal/ paran// 
/ Git a 14 .2 / 
g (a) Vedsmta^ratna-manjuSa, pp»19 
<b) Joshi, Rasika Vihari, "A Hote on the doctrine 
of Uon-difference in difference of ITlmbarka", 
"East & West" jrol . l5, iros. l»2, Jan,1964, 
March 1966, ISMEO, ibme. 
m 
m 
E^here are broadly two kinds of th© 
1 
Jiva, Tis# Badflha and Mtikta* 
Ci) Baaahas 
5hat is one who is pointed oiat lay the 
term *tmhom one* (a,-5a), eternal by nature^ 
carried away 'by the current of "beginningless 
2 
deeds, and destitute of a true knowledge of 
the real nature of i t se l f or of the supreme 
heingf One who has identified i tse l f throu^ 
nescience with the body of a god, or of a man, 
or of any other being, who is the ewlution of 
prakrti, and is taking pleasure in sounds and 
the rest , the parts of prakrti, and is destitute 
of the supreme bl iss , i t is to be said baddha 
3 
or bound. Baddhao are of two kinds yiis,, 
Mumuksus and bubhuksus. Humuksus, again, are 
of two klndsj bhagavatabhavapatti and 
1 Muktam ca baddhaia kila baddhamuktaa/ 
Frabhedavahulyaiflath«iisu bodhyam// 
vediffita-kaiadhanu. Verse 2 
2 M^llaayapariyBktaxfupaiQ/ • 
tirenamvidurvai bha^vat-prasadat// 
Veaenta-^kSiiahaau, Verse 2 
3 Vedaat a^Iaust ubha, 1« 4» lO 
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aljarm^papatti i Tjutokgtis are of two ktadss 
viz* thavi'^reyaslcah and altyasamsari* 
( i i ) Muktas 
Shat i s , one who has attained fort'osnately 
the grace of the Iiord throng his poor and 
pitiable condition, and hae attained the supreme 
Klisa throu^ the practice of hearing , thtekteg 
and meditating of the vedanta hy attending upon 
the feet of his gxiru and who refuses prakrti, it 
2 
is to he sal^ mukta or liberated-
Muktas are of two kinds vi25» nityamuktas 
and muktaSf iJityamuktas, again, are of two kinds, 
via* Ansntaryya and p^sada; mnktas are of two 
3 
kinds hhagavatatjhaTapatti and nijasmnipapatti, 
<9 
?I?heir characteristics are very much the 
same* ISiat i s , like the Baddha-Jiva, the aukta-
Jiva also is knowledge hy nature and a knovfer^ a 
doer, an enjoyer, atomic and Infinite, Hence, 
tilthou^ the characteristics of a Baddha and a 
1 Vedmta-ratna-aan^aea, pp, 22 
2 Ved^ta-ikaustuhha 1»4»10 
3 Vedanta-ratna-ffiaajfba, pp* 22-23 
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mukta Jiva are apparently the same, really 
tlieee axe not so. It i s , undoubtedly true, 
that a mulcta-Jlva, too, is knowledge by nature, 
a knower, a doer, m enjoyer, atomic and infinite; 
yet It is entirely different from a Baddha-Jiva, 
"because i t is a l l the above in an entirely 
different sense* 
2. pf, 
la the philosophy of Himbarka, the 
absolute ultimate reality is ^rikrsna himself^ 
He is denoted by the tena "Brahman", who is 
2 
inherent nature, attributes, powers and so on* 
He is lord of sens-orgais, He is controller of 
3 
a l l , He is Lord of a l l . He is variously known 
as } tona, Hari, Hamakmta, Burusottam, KeSava, 
Madhava, Siagwan etc* , md on his l e f t s ide, the 
daughter of Vrs^ abhanu (Radhika) shines with a 
corresponding beauty, who is attended on by 
thousands of female friends and who is giver of 
1 Chaudhuri, Dr* (Mrs.) Eoma, *l?ljBbarka*s theory 
of se l f* , •Finite-self* Sd-. by . , Swaml B*H* 
Bonmaharaj, Vrindavan, 1963* 
2 %danta-pari;}ata-Saurabha, 1*1.1. , Vedinta-
Eamadhanu 4 
3 Srhad^anyaka-Upan is ad a, 4.4* 22* 




al l desired objects* concept of Bralimon 
has "been clearly explained Isy ^Srtetotjarkacarya 
in the following verse of the Vedanta-lc^adhanti 
(I)asa61ok3f)j 
Svaihavat opast asaiaast ad osaiaai^egkaly^ agmaikaras im/ 
'^ TUhlastnam brahma param vax^am dhyayeJ krsnam 
Icamaleks^aa harira// / 
-- /Vadsaata-kSnadl^Ti Verse 4» 
( I meditate on the Supreme Brahman viz, 
kysiia, Hari, who has eyes like the lotus, who 
naturally has destroyed al l the defects, is the 
store of al l auspicious attributes» His "body is 
represented by the vyuha and who is attended by 
a l l ) 
(A)t 
By nature, Brahman lias destroyed the 
al l defects viz, the f ive kinds of klesas such 
as ( avidya (nescience), asmita (egoism), 
raga (passion), dve^a (aversion) abhdnive^a (the 
will-to-lllKe)^ 3!hese kle^fe are denoted by the 
1 Vedanta-kamadhaaiu, verse 5» 
m 
the words, tama, moha, 
liat^lQra, tama (nescience) which covers the real 
nature of things, laoha is the confomding the 
hody to "be the soul raahamoha Is that which hankers 
after enjoyment, t ^ i s r a laaliee. aadhat^isra 
visi* death# He Is absolutely free from the six 
kinds of modifications Cvikaras) such ass birth, 
existence, growth, transformation, decay and 
death, is free from three gunas v iz , sattim, rajas, 
tainas. Nevertheless, the authorities of the 
irut i prove that He is free from a l l sins, without 
old age, without death, without gr ie f , without 
hunger, without th irs t , having true desires, 
having true volilwfcions, "H© is not effected 
with the (hindrmces), fruitions 
of karma/(vip^a5 ®d so on#" 
On the other hand. He is endowed with 
a l l the auspicious attributes and qualities like 
knowledge, power, strength^sovereignty. Energy, 
valour, saushilya, vatsalya, mardava, arjava, 
sauh^da etc* knowledge* • the direct perception 
of a l l space, time and objects, power, - the 
1 Vedmta-ratnaHnanji^, pp. 43 * 44, Vedanta-
p^ijata-Saurabih/, 3»2«11, 30» 
m 
capacity of making the impossible possit>le, 
strength the power of supporting the entire 
universe, sovereignty • the poiwer of controlling 
the everything, Energy - tireleesness in spite of 
continued and unliraited labour, valour - the 
capacity of defeating a l l without being ever 
defeated "by thems Siese six qualities of Brahman 
help him for creating the universe. Saushilya -
to be connected with al l without considering the 
lowliest and the most unworthy, in spite of His 
own greatness, vutsalya-never looking at the 
faults of His devotees, msa^avam-® on-endurance of 
the miseries of those who are dependent on Hla, 
arjava - the perf«ctness of mind and speech; 
sauharda - the diligence to protect others; 
Sarvashamya or somya- being the place of refuge 
of a l l ; kanmya * the nature of destroying the 
faults of others; sthiratya « remaining steady 
in wars; dhairya • maintaining promises; daya • 
feeling grieved at the grief of others without 
sffliy cause, md being desirous of removing their 
griefs; madhurya-havlng sweetness like the nectar 
etc» these qualities of Brahman help Him for 
1 
protectiraa of those who are dependent on Him, 
1 Vedfflita-ratna-manjusa pp« 4«"45, Vedinta-
Parijata-Saurabha I .2 .2 . 
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The lord is a l l 'blissful and is the 
_ 1 
soTxrce of Miss to a l l Jlvas, His bliss is 
2 
imHaited* ^hrou^ hie b l i ss , He desires to he 
3 
many and creates the tmiverse , as declared by 
^ratij^He desired: may 1 be many -and procreates. 
6 
He created a l l th is . " 
The lord has a physical body upon which 
^sjUrpus of salvation meditate* Meditation, too , 
is possible only i f the lord has a body* Sruti 
speaks also that the Iiord has physical bodyj 
" ^ e person who is seen with to the sisn, having 
6 
a golden board, having golden hair etc*" The 
7 
person who is seen in the eyes" and so on* 
1 Vedskta - pari^ata - Saurabha, 1*1,13,15 
2 Vedanta - parijata - Saurabha, 1.3*9 
3 VedOTta - pari^ata - saurabha with Ved'^ta-
Kaustubha, 1*1*17 
4 Taittiriyopanisada, 2*61 
5 Vedanta- Kaustubha, 1*1*21 
6 Chandogyopaaisada, 1*6*6 
7 Chandogyopanisada, 1*7*5 
m 
Bi^ fiihiBfizi Is denoted tgr the words such as, 
Ether, vital breath, l i ^ t , Gfayatrlaetre etc . 
2 . 
He lias spiritual Tsody, the'^r'utl spealcs, also, 
"Spiritual, having the vital-breath for the hody, 
of the torn of l i ^ t . having true volitions etc? 4 
He is eater of the movable and the inanovable. 
6 
He is great aid all-pervasive. He is the object 
6 
to be worshipped and the object to be known. 
Ihis lord is the Immortal, the fearless, this 
7 8 
is Brahman. He is a l l happiness • He is 
controller of a l l , is seer of a l l , is toner 
9 ' 10 
controller. He is invisible and omniscient* 
11 
He is Imperishable, is' a l l - pervading. His 
nature is everpresent and is the cause of the 
« 12 
appearance of the nature of Srahman is 
13 
the omniscient, omnipotent, i t is known by a l l 
creation viz. movable and Immovable. He is whole 
- 14 
of Jiva. He is the maker of a l l , which are seen 
1 Ved^ta-^parijata-SaurabhSi, 1,1.23-^1 
2 Vedanta-pirijata-saurabha, 1.2.2 
ix veaanta-p^i^ata-ssaurama, 1*2.23, i .3 . l0« 
12 Vedanta-parij^a-Saurabha, 1,3* 19« 
13 Ved^ta-parijata-Sauratjha, 1»4.14 
14 Vedanta-poxi^Sfca-Saurabha, 2*3.42. 
m 
In dream said are indicative of pure and Impure 
1 
fruit at ions* ^Hirough his desire the 
bondage and salvation arise, as declared by 
ferutiJ cause of the world, bondage, 
abiding and salvation*" SraJunaa is not en^oyer. 
(Siou^ He Is abiding within all-sentient and non-
sentient, yet He ia not touched by their defects, 
is endowed with his a l l auspicious attributes, 
Just as$ the sun, reflected on different water-
houses, does not touch by the defects of their 
Increase and decrease. As ^ruti speakst "He is 
4 
not snM a^red with the misery of the world*" ftrahman 
is unman i f est , "He is not perceivable through the 
5 
eyes nor V speech, and so on^ ' but He becomes 
manifest throu^i the lovittg devotion and medita-
t ion, ,5ust as there is manifestation of the sun, 
f i re and like throu^ the repetition of the means 
resorted to by those who long for them, as declared 
by ^ruti and smrtit" He, with his nature purified 
through the clarif ication of the knowledge of 
Brahman, perceives, meditating him who is without 
1 Ved^ta-p'^ljata-sauralha, 3#S,4,7 
2 Ved^ta-parijata-sauraT^a, 3.2»5. 
3 Vedanta-pariJata-sauralDha, 3#9,l3 
4 VedSita-parlJata-saurabha, 3.2»ll,20,30i 
6 Vedaata-parij ata-saurabha, 3# 2. 23. 
parts'*, ana "0 Ai'jmia, I may "be known throu^ 
exclusive devotion, and, 0 paramatapat perceived ^ 
In truth, and entered through exclusive devotion*" 
Srahman is ml la i t ed , but He becomes limited f or 
those devotees who meditate Him, .lust as the 
2 
lustre of the sun through a window, ^^ ahman 
alone is the giver of fruits of a l l deeds in 
accordance with particular duties to which they 
3 
are entitledt 
S^hus, hy nature l^ ahman has destroyed 
the a l l defects and is endowed with the al l 
attritnites and qualities* 
(B) 
4 
Srahman is the cause of the universe. 
Brahmen alone is the cause of the creation and 
destruction of the universe. All names and forms 5 
arise from HJm and return to Him, 
Brahman is the hoth material cause and 
ef f i c ient cause (up^ana and nlmitta karana) of 
1 Vedanta-parijata-saurabha, 3,2»24-25» 
2 Vedahta-psTrijata-saurahha, 3.2.32,34. 
3 Vedanta-p^i^^fca-saurahha, 3.2.38 
4 Ved^ta-parija^ta-saurahha, I» l . l0» l2 , l9 ,2#l»35, 
2.3^8, 13^ 
5 Vedanta-parijata-Saurahha 1.3»42 
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1 , 
the imiverse* As declared srutis "Brahman 
v?as fhe foldest, Braiktasca, the tree from "^Moh 
they cut off the heaven, said the earth, 0 learned 
man, ask their mind whereon Is stood possessing 
2 
the worlds*" It is the material cause in the 
sense that i t enables i ts natural salctis 
(capacities), vi55# c i t and the acit in their 
subtle'forms) to be manifested in gross formSj 
and it is the e f f i c ient cause in the sense that 
i t unites the individual souls with their 
respective fruits of actions and means of enjoy-
3 
ments . Thus, the ereatlm of the universe is 
nothing but a manifestation in a gross form of 
what was subtle before and is thus a sort of 
modification or parinama, 
Parlnsfflaa means modification or trans-
formation or actual change, resulting in a e f fect 
having equal reality with the material cause, or, 
production of sw ef fect that has the same kind of 
(either real or unreal) existence as that of i ts 
1 Vedanta*-pa^rijata<-saurabha, 1,4.23-27 
2 Te^imta-parijSta-saurabha, 1,4,25 
3 Tedanta-Kaustubha 1#1.2, and Vedanta-ratna-
man^sa, pp#63 _ 
4 (feate, T*S,, »»!Che Vedaata", pp, 28,
m 
material cause* The example of the transformation 
of milk into curds is often quoted* Iji this 
sohool of thou^t , there is entire modification 
of the su'bstance, name, smd fo3?m of the cause* 
The change of the oause is real® 2he relation 
between the cause and the e f fect is that of 
difference and non-difference* 3?he cause i tse l f 
assumes the shape of the effect* In real i ty , 
both are real* ®ie milk i tsel f changes into 
curds, the e f fect in the cause in the form of the 
cause or the ^alcti is accepted* It established 
the relaticsn of difference and non^ifferenee 
1 
between the cause and the effect* 
2 
Parinama has been divided into two kindst 
Ci) Svarupa-pariri^a as of the sMlchya system 
( i i ) ^aktiviksepa-laksana-par3i& Himb^klcarya 
admits the Brahmakaraimvada or the Brahmasa3d;i&'a« ( 
navada* According to Hjim the universe exists In 
the Brahman In unman if est form or identical foim 
or in the form of potency Csakti) because i t 
becomes manifested as before* 3h this view the 
1 Joshi, Easika Vlhari, "The role of Indian 
Ito^ic in the Doctrine of causality" 
"Melangs I)*3hdiaaisrae" a la m^moire De I«ouis 
Henou", Paris* 1968* 
2 Ved^ta-icaustubha, 2*1*26, pp*169 
3 Vedmt a-par i j at a-saurabha, 1* 4* 26 
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relation "between the •universe and BrahinfiHi Is that 
of difference nan-difference such as the cause of 
I 
gold and ornaments* 
Several objections may t)e raised against 
the eausallty of Brahman* 3lie most important 
and very natural one is$ why should Brahman create 
this universe? Because, who is eternally f u l f i l l e d 
with al l desires, can not , be an agent and the 
2 
activity of an agent have a need. 
this question, Nambarka replies: Ihe 
creation of Brahman is the mere sport, just l i k e , 
the mere sport of kings* Ih ordinary l i f e , the 
play of an emperor, who has attained sovereignty, 
with various kinds of dice , wooden balls etc*, is 
a mere sport without any desire indeed for f r u i t . 
So Brahmsn creates the world in mere sport without 
3 
any His need* 
Hhe second objection, which leads to above, 
no less natural* I f the lord creates this universe 
in mere sport, which has unequality, as one is rich 
1 JoshitJSasika Vihari, role of Indian l«ogic 
in tlieSbctrine of Causality" • "Melanges 13» 
Indian lame'•a la m^moire* De Iiouls Benou", 
Paris,. 1968* 
2 Vedmta-parijata-saurabha, 2*1*31 
3 Vedinta^parijata-sauraTSia, and KaustutSia 2*1*32 
im 
and other is poor, on© is happy and other is 
•unhappy €tc» , why is it so? It means the lord 
is not a l l merdiftil, hit is a cruel* 
Hence ITimharka, repliesj inequality and 
cruelty of imenual creation and destruction etc* 
are depend on the deeds of the JiVa. Just as the 
cioud In producing different kinds of shoots, 
depends on their respective seeds. So the ^rutis 
••Qne heeomes good hy good deeds, had "by had deeds,** 
®ius, l^ ahman is not responsible f or the miseries 
and various lots of Ji-^, Jiva is i t se l f responsi-
ble throng their own deeds. 
It may be objected; Brahman gi-c^s the 
fruits of deeds in accordance with the deeds of 
Jiva, it is not suitable. Because, there was no 
difference between SI'^b. and Brahman prior to 
creation. As declared by i r u t i , "^ Phe existent 
alone, my dear, was this in the beginntng". So , 
unequality and cruelty of unequal creation are 2 
depend on the lord. 
It is not So because the creation is 
beglnnIngless. He creates the universe in accordance 
mm mm 
1 Vedanta-parijata-saurabha, 2#1#33 
2 Vcdaata-pirijata-saurabha, 2,1,34 
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With tlie deeds of «ll!va, which has been done by 
the individuals souls in previous creation. -A 
subBequent creatim cannot arise a l l of a sudden, 
so i t is depend on a prior creation^ It is clear 
from 'sruti: "©le creator foraed the sun and the 
1 
moon as he did before'*^ and so on* 
One or two objections wi l l be considered 
against this doctrine that Brahman is the creator 
of the world* It is to be objected; Br^mm is 
not material cause, of the universe, because, 
there is difference between Brahman and the 
world. Brahman possesses the attributes of 
sentience, while the world possesses just the 
opposite attributes of non-sentience and i t is 
the rule, whatever is different from something 
has not that for i ts material cause, just as the 
pot, which is different from the eather has not 
) 
the creator as its material cause* 
9 
Bat Nlffibarka points out, there is no 
rule that there wi l l be a similarity between a 
material cause and i ts e f fect in every respect* 
So .it cannot be said that the world, being 
1 ?ed«nta-parijata-saurabha, 2* 1.34 
2 Ved^ta-kaustubha, 2*1.4 
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different from Brahman, cannot arise from Hija» 
As "^ruti.' E^here is the origin of hairs on the 
head and so on from a persoji from whcaa they are 
di f ferent, said of scorpions from the cowdting 
from which they are dif ferent." 
M objection io raised. Brahman is not 
material cause of the world In dissolution, because, 
Brahman, the cause, like the ef fect viz. the 
2 
world, w i l l be n on-sent lent, 
the answer to this question is as followss 
Just as the evolutes like the pot, when dissolved, 
donot def i le the lump of clay with their own 
attributes, so this world, consisting of non -
sentient, when dissolved into Brahman, does not 
defi le Brahman, possessing the non-sentient as 
3 
His powers. 
It may be objectedJ Brahman is material 
cause of the universe, then He himself wi l l experi-
ence the pleasures and pains in the form of Jiva, 
1 Vediat a-par 1 j at a»s aurabha, 2* 1,6 
2 Vedanta-parijata-saurabha, 2,1#8 
3 Ved^ta-pari.lata-saurabha, 2»1»9 
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SO that there wil l he no aifference Tsetween the 
enoyer (via* the Jiya) and the Controller. 
Hlhe answer to this is as followss 
Just as, in ordinary l i f e , though foams, waves 
and the rest , having the sea as their material 
cause, are a l l ncsn-different from their respective 
causes, there is s t i l l a mutual d i f fermce amongst 
the particular ef fects themselves, 3h the same 
manner there may he a mutual difference "between 
the enjoyer and the controller, although they are 
n on-different from Brahman, having Brahman as 
their material cause* "She fa c t , however i s , 
according to f^imharka, that there is difference 
and non-difference between Jiva and Brahman* 
!Chus, according to JTimharlca Brahman is 
I 
hoth the material cause and the e f f i c ient cause of 
the universe and its soul. And, Iflmbarka, like 
that of the S^idiya, is the upholder of Satkarya-
x ^ a . this view, the relation between the 
universe and the Brahman is that of dif ference-
non-difference such as the cause of clay and pots* 
This Bedabheda doctrine is called the SvSbhavika-
thedatiied a-vada* 
1 Vedant a-parijat a-s aurabha, S*1.13 
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But, like Haiy%ilcas, to establish the 
doctrine of difference, In the pure dualistie 
interpretation of the Vedanta the Brahraan is not 
to l3e regarded as the material cause of the 
imiverse, but He is to be regarded only as 
e f f i c ient cause of the universe. n!hey hold 
•^ '^ Hhe exist ait alone, my dear, was this in the 
beginning, one, without a second*, 'He thou^t , 
May I be many, may I procreate' , ' I t became 
manifest name and form', 'All th is , veri ly, 
is Br^iman, emanating from Him, disappearing into 
Him sand Breathing in H^m', 'Ihis soul is Brahman', 
'All that has this for its sou l ' , and so on"; 
"(Brahman is) the material cause, and (the 
e f f i c ient cause), on account of the absence of 
confl ict with regard to the in i t ia l proposition 
and the i l lustration", "on accoimt of creating 
Himself, on account of transjrfformation", "(There 
is ) n on-difference (of the e f f ec t ) from that (viz, 
the cause), on account of (the texts) beginning 
with the word 'beginning* and the rest" , and so 
on"; And, " ' I am creator of a l l and a l l are moved 
bjt me', *A11 this is threaded in me like the rows 
of pearls In a str ing ' , '3h the last birth of 
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many biirfclis, a wise-man meditates tapon me, having 
eucli feeling as 'All is Vasufieva% He, the 
supreme • spirit Is very d i f f i cu l t to be attained? 
and so on^i above-mentioned a l l texts of 'Srutl, 
Sutras, and Smrtl; and the exponents of the 
Brahman as the material cause or of the ultimate 
identity of the spirits with the Brahman are, 
merely, rejected* 
Moreover, in the pure dualistic inter-
p^tation of Vedmta^the Brahman is to be regarded 
only as the ef f ic ient cause and as such claims of 
a l l texts that speak of the Brahman as the material 
cause or of the ultimate identity of the spirits 
with Brahman are to be disregarded* Because j n ^ 
the Niinb^ka*s philosophy 33rahman is material cause 
as well as ef f ic ient cause on account of the absence 
of confl ict with regard to the init ial proposition 
and illustration* fhe ini t ia l proposition to 
begin with, is as followsi "Did you ask for that 
instruction whereby the unheared becomes heared, 
the unthou^t thou#t , the unknown Imown?" It is 
known from the init ial proposition that Brahman, 
is the material cause. 2he illustration\sgiven 
1 Vedmta- p ^ i j a t a - saurabha, 1»4*23. 
1S« 
as follows; " 'JuBt afi my deari through a lump 
of clay, all ob;|ect8 made of clay may be Imown*, 
«3ust as, throu^^ a iron-ball, a l l objects made 
of iron may be known It is toown from these 
illustrations the Brahman Jn material cause. Hence, 
it cannot be said that produced - e f fects are to be 
known throu^ only the ef f ic ient ^ cause or 
A potter has not been cited in the 
illustrationj and through a potter being known, a 
pot cannot be known. But a lump of clay being 
known, al l objects made of clay, like pots and 
the rest , may, indeed, be known* So, according to 
Himbarka the 'Bvaimm is both the material c««ise and 
the ef f ic ient cause. And again, just as the pots, 
dishes e t c , , having the lump of clay as their 
material cause, bracelets, ear-'-rings e t c , , having 
gold as their material cause, are al l non-different 
from their causes; So, the imiverse, having the 
Brahman as its material cause, is non-different from 
the Brahman. Hence, the identity of the universe 
1 
with the Brahman i s , too, not to be avoided, 
!Hius, it is established, according to 
Nimbarka, the Brahman is material cause as well as 
1 VedSata-tattva-bodha of Mantar^ Sastri, 
pp# 3-6, Benares, 1908, 
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ef f i c ient cause of the universe. In this view 
the relaticai between the universe and the 
Brahman is that of difference and non-difference 
(Bhedahheda). (This toedatheda doctrine is called 
the Svabhavlka • ohedabheda vada« 
t i t 
t 
0 H A P !I! £ H J 
J^  COMPAEAflVE Sf033Y OW JHE BEL AT ION OP jlVA AND 
BHAHMAH ON 3?liE BASIS 0¥ VARIOUS SCHOOL OF VEDMTA. 
( i ) Sankara and Ifiinb^ka 
Slie doctrine o£ Sankara is called "Kevala-
dvaita"or *absolute monism According to 
Sankara, there is no natural difference between 
Jiva and Brahman* Braiunaa is the onl j real ity, 
and pervades al l l^eings which have only apparent 
existence* Ihe plurality of individuals is false* 
He emphasissee this point again and again^ He 
accepts, therefore, Jiva and Brahman are absolutely 
identical, that is repeated taught in the upanisads* 
aSie saying, "Tat tvam asi««, means that Jiva is 
non-different from Brahman, or Jiva and Bralman 
1S9 
are absolutely Meatical* lEtiis is the establisiiing 
sentence of identity of j lva and Brahman, but 
this meaning is not reasonable, because there are 
many contradictory attributes in Jiva and Brahman. 
Jiva is atomic, has l i t t l e kaowledge, while 
Brahman ia omniscient and all«-pervading and so 
on. in this sense, there omnot be an identity 
between the Jiva and Brahman. What is the exact 
meaning of this MahavScya? in iamkarite philosophy, 
this mahaY^caya is to be interpreted by "ihagavrti-
lakst^^" An identity judgment liice "lilhis is that 
Bevadatta" makes clear the above point. «Siie 
is that Bevadatta" refers to identity of the 
individual in spite of differences in respect of 
time, place and circumat^ce. An iiidividual who 
was seen previously at a certain place is seen 
today at a different place under different 
circumstance. When we say that he is the ssane man 
we overlook the unessential differences and 
emphasize the essential identity. Similar is 
the case with the identity tau^t between the 
Jiva and Brahman. Jiva and Brahman, in spite of 
the difference M their adjuncts, are identical 
in so far as their real self is concerned* 2!hus, 
Jiva, is absolutely identi#41 with Brahman. 
m 
Here I ^Sankara £mdamentally d i f fers from 
NlfflbarJca* According to Hlml^ arka philosophy, 
in the interpretation of the Mahavakya "Tat tvam 
as i " , Jiva is non-difference from Brahman, which 
non-difference is compatilsle with a difference 
1 
between them. 
Thus, Himbarka*s doctrine is completely 
different from ^ankara's doctrine. In '^anfcarite 
philosophy, non-difference means "absolute 
identity", while an the philosophy of Nimbarka, 
non-difference is compatible with difference. 
And again, ^ankara^s doctrine has no place f o r 
diiference, which is only 'yy^Vah^ika•, but, 
f or Himbarka, both difference and non-difference 
are on the same level , real and compatible. 
( i i ) JBaca^uja md limbarka 
MM * 
fiamanuja explains the relation of Jiva and 
Brahman on the analogy of the substance <- attribute 
(Vj^esyavisesana), or soul-body relation (tarii^Q 
^arira sambeoidha). 
1 Vedanta « ratna - manju^a, pp. 91 
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In the f i rs t place Hamaau^ a has described 
the relation o£ Jiva and Brahman as similar to 
1 
the relation between a substance and its attribute* 
Brahman is only independent reality, j lva is 
dependent on i t . Jiva and Brahman do not e*ist 
separately I but| like substance (vi^e§ya), and 
the Jiva to attribute (vi^esana) - aB colouri 
dimension, etc#» are attributes o£ paper, f o r 
instance. As attribute, j lva is really different 
from Brahman - the substances but as it always 
remain united v/ith Brahman, the doctrine of 
•Mvaita* is established and the Jiva - attribute, 
CS81 in this sense of inseparable union be 
2 
regarded as non • different from Brahman. Here 
it can be said that from the practical point of 
view, the relation of Jiva and Brahman is difference 
and non - difference (bhedabheda). 
In the second place HaEaanuja has also 
interpreted the relation of Jiva and Brahman as 
3 _ 
similar to the relation of soul - body. Jiva is 
1 ISribhasya, l . l . l 
2 tril^asya, 3. 2* 28 
3 tribhasya, 1.1*1 
i n 
declared to be the body (^arira) of Brahman, 
which is i a r i r l . The 'earIra does not exist 
without Hariri, nor 'Hariri without iarira. 
j iva is not non-different from Brahmm on any 
account as aimilar to the relation of soul-body 
C^arlri-4arira-aambandha). Jiva is really 
diSferent from Brahman. Jiva is entirely f u l l 
of troubles or griefs. At this stage, how can 
be possible "non-difference" of Jiva with 
Brahman? Jiva is different from Brahman as 
^ruti says : " * He who dwells in the soul and 
within the soul} whom the soul does not know, 
of whom the soul is the body, who rules the 
soul within, he is thy soul, the ruler within, 
immortal,* *He is the cause, the Lord of the 
2 
lords of the organs*, *there are two, Imower-
3 
non-knower, bom - unborn, ruler-non-ruler 
1 *Ya atmani tisthannatmanontaro yamatma na 
veda yasyatma sariram, ya atminamantro 
yanayati sa ta atmantaryamyamratah*. 
- Bri. upa, III.7.22 
2 'sa karanam karanadhipadhipah.' - Svet, up VI* 9 
3 'jn^nau dvavajavisanisau? - Bvet, up. l .g 
When Bralunan is uninterrupted $ at this stage, 
how can you say that the Jiva is the part of 
the Brahman? Hanaauja says that Jiva is the 
part o£ Brahman or hody is the part o£ the 
soul, like the case of sparks are the parts 
1 
of fire* Jh this sense, then, a l l sentient 
and non-sentient "beings together constitute 
the hody of the supreme person, for they are 
completely controlled and supported "by hin for 2 
his own ends, and absolutely subordinate to him* 
Jii this manner, there is relatioh of non-difference 
between Jiva and Brahman* Here it can be said 
that from the practical point of view the 
relation of Jiva and Brahman is difference and 
non-difference (bhedabheda)* But the feeling 
of non-difference is always due to inseparable 
union between Jiva and Brahman* Thus, there is 
relation between Jiva and Brahman as between the 
Soul-body. 
Here, the teim body Ctlarira) is not used 
to denote bodies, such as human bodies, but to 
1 Sribhit^a, 2.3*45 E^a,  
2 'Saeribh^^, 2#1.9., Eng. translation of 
Ge or ge '''t h ibaut * 
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denote attributes, the substance being soul 
( iarixr) . Body (^arira) means Aprithakeidha, 
i .e# , Inseparable union, or coimection which 
has for ever existed, which is not brou^t 
about at any intermediate period, and which cm 
X 
never cease. !Ehus, there is an indissoluble 
union between Jiva and Brahman. 
Hence, I t o^u ja calls his "visist&vaitavada" 
or the doctrine that the non-duality, or non -
reality - Bpariman - which is united with Jiva and 
acit as its attributes, 
'ShuBf Ha3i€n,uja explains the relation oi' 
Jiva and Brahman on the analogy o£ the substance-
attribute (vii^esya-vliesana), or sould-body 
relation' ( iariri-4arira sambandha). But 
jSrimbarkacarya explains his doctrine, as it has 
already been observed, on the analogy of the cause-
effect relation. And again, "Ihe doctrine 
of Nimbarka has very much is common with that 
of Eanaiau a^; both regard the difference as well 
as the non-difference as real. But for Nimbarka, 
1 Bhashyacarya, H., I ' . I .S , , 
••A catechism of the vi^ishtadvaita philosophy" 
Madras, 1887, Q.No. 69 
difference and noa-difXerence are on the same 
level , they co-exist and have the same importance; 
while for iSaaauJa, non-difference is the princi-
pal; it is qualified difference, which is 
thus subordinate to I t . " 
Another technical diBtinction between the 
two doctrines is that according to E^anu^a, the 
Jiva is the attribute of Brahman, and Brahman 
thus, qualified by the Jiva, is a unity, omnis-
cient, omnipotent• But though Jiva is attribute 
of B r ^ a n , yet is different from Hija, otherwise 
the defect of the latter wi l l pertain to the 
3 
former. Bit the school of Simbarka refuses to 
admit this view for the following reason* 
very task of an attribute or ati adjective is 
to differentiate the particular object which 
possesses that particular attribute from other 3 
objects which do not possess it e . g . , the red 
colour of a red ball differentiates it from a 
blue ball and the rest. Now, in the very same 
1 ®xate, t . S . , »The Vedanta* , Pooaa, I960, 
PP* 30. 
2 Siddhanta- Kusumai4a3.i of Harivya^deva, pp.27 
3 Siddhanta-J'Stmavy of Devacarya, pp. 43, 1.1.3» 
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maaner, If Jiva attribute of Brahmaa, the 
question at once arisess from whom or from 
what object do it differentiate Brahman? It 
cannot be said that it differentiate Brahoian? 
It cannot be said that i t differentiate Brahman 
from i tse l f ( i»€#, the Jiva), for that which 
differentiates can never be i tsel f the ob;ject 
from which the original object (i^e*, the ob;ject 
of which it is an attribute) is differentiated, 
e . g . , i t iB absurd to say that the red colour 
of a red ball differentiates the ball from red 
colour• But nor caa it be said that the Jiva 
"differentiates Brahman from any other ob;|ect. 
Hence the Jiva cannot be attribute of Brahman. 
Moreover, the vi^ist^vaita view also - admits 
of a svabhavika bheda between Brahman on the 
one hand md the j lva on the other* Hence 
Instead of admitting difference and non-difference 
in this round - about fashion, it is far better 
and reasonable to admit svabhavika - bhedabheda 
1 
al l at once. 
1 Bose, Dr# loma, "Vedanta-p^ijata-saurabha" 
Vol. I l l , pp. 112-113, also, Vedeuita-
tattvabodha of Aaantar^a, pp. 27-32. 
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( i i i ) Eiaakara and Hiialjibka 
Bbiaskara explains tJie relation of Jlva 
and Brahman on the basis of upadhivada* his 
theory ma;/ r i ^ t l y be called "AsipMhika • 
BiedabhedaVada" a@ distinguished from the 
doctrine of natural difference and n on-difference 
(Svabhavikabhedabhedaveda) of Kiiab^ka. 
As it has already been obserwd that 
Brahman is the cause and Jiva is its e f f ec t . 
Brahman being the cause, «Tiva must be Brahman 
in nature and essence* IJuring salvation Jlva 
is completely identical with Brs^ iman. Also, 
during effected state of Brahman, during 
Baddliavastha, as ;just shovna Brahman * the cause, 
Jiva - thi^ffect are identical in nature and 
essence* Hence non'*difference of jlira and Brahman 
i& natural^eternal, real. But the difference 
of Jiva and Bratiman is neither natural nor 
etemalj yet i t is real# It is not natural 
because prior to creation, as shown above. 
Brahman and Jiva are absolutely identical, again 
as well as during salvation, Brahman and Jiva 
are absolutely identical. Jiva is different 
168 
from Bcahmm only during the effected state o£ 
EDaiiman and BuddJaavastha of Jiva* So this 
difference (tiJieda) is neither natural nor 
eternal Isut it is aupadhilca, because, at the 
"beginning of creation the Jivaifeomes to lae 
associated" with its up^his^ so it is different 
from Brahman* 
Ihus, according to Bhiaslcara, the non -
difference (abheda) is natural, eternal and 
real, but difference (bheda) is only real, it 
Is neither natural nor eternal. 
!Shus, according to Bhaskara Jiva is 
different and non-different from Brahman in 
bondage, and in salvation Jiva is absolutely 
identical with Brahman. But, for Niiabarka, 
Jiva is different and non-different from Brahman 
in bondage, as well as in salvation* And again, 
the doctrine of Himbarka has very much in common 
with that of Bh^kara^ both regard the difference 
as well as non difference as real. But, for 
Himb'^ka, difference and noninference are on • / 
the same level , they have same importance and 
both are equally natural, while for Bi^kara, 
difference is due to upadhis or limiting adjuncts, 
169 
non • difference is natural* in this manner, 
Bi^kara fundamentally di f fers from Himbarka# 
(iT) MadfavaQarya and Hjmbaraka 
Madhva explains the relation of Jfva 
and Brahman in the symbolism of "Blmbapratibimba-
lahava" (the ob;ject « image concept). 
«a3ie term «Bjtot>apratibimbabhava" is 
derived by Madhva from the s i^i i f iceat passage 
an the Bgveda^ 
rupam prathirupo babhuva/ 
tadasya xilpam pratioaksen'^^/ 
(vi* 47, 18) 
(Ehe underlying idea in a l l these expressions 
is the same, viz*, that Brahman is the me 
independent source of a l l real ity , consciousness 
. and activity found in the Individual selves and 
which cannot therefore be explained without 
reference to their dependence on Brahman for 
their being. As no creation of Jivas is admitted 
the figure of pratibimba should be l i teral ly 
constracted in the sense of the Jivas, being the 
actual reflections pro;iected by Brahman like 
that a concrete substance on a mirror. 
Madiiava warns his readers against taking the 
scriptural descriptions o£ the Jiva as a 
pratiMmba of the Brahman in its gross physical 
sense of an actual reflection. aJhat is why he 
is so careful and particular to insist that 
there is no medium of reflection (up^hi) In 
this case. This would at once bring out the 
difference Madhava's md ^anlcara's conception 
of the j lva as a pratibimba of Brahman* According 
to the latter, the Jiva is false appearance or 
pro;)ection of the Brahman <m the screen of Avidya. 
!Ehis relation can be transcended. "Jivatiram ca 
mrasa n^eyam rajvSa sarpagraho yath^" 
(AparoksSaubhuti, 43) 
But$ to Madhvai the relation of Blmbaprati* 
bimbalDhava between God and the souls is a sacred 
and inviolable relation, which is true for a l l 
time and goes to the very core of the jIva and 
constitutes his very essence and could never be 
annulled* Its f u l l s i ^ i f i c a n c e , missed in 
Sams^a, is realiized in Molina* Moksa, in fact , 
is the complete realization of this intrinsic 
relation of metaphysical dependence and similarity 
w 
(in some respects) with the supreme. Pratibimbatva, 
according to Madhava, is aot a £alse relation, 
of which the jlyas are to be ashemed and should 
try to shake o£i, as in Mvaita» It Ib thets 
truest and most laeautii'ul permanent bond with the 
Supreme being and the purpose of philosophy is 
its progressing realization, by the Jiva two 
dootriae are thus diametrically opposed'. " 
Madhva in his Bhasya on Brahmaeutra 
2-
"Abhajsa eTa ca" discusses the theoxy of "Blmbap-
ratibtobabhava", Jlva is the reflection 
(pratiblmba) of the Brahman. According to hi® 
a pratibimba is of two kinds;-
'•Sopadhiranupadhiica pratibimbo dvidheyate/ 
Jivais asyaaupadh irindrac apoya tharaverit ipen gisrut eh// " 
One is sop^hika, i . e . , which is dependent 
on external media, and the other is Hirupadhika, 
i . e . , the one which is not so dependent. Madhvacarya 
'*'^r-'-'[-iriiirTriiiiii-t-iiimii«»iiirwi<.ii»w*»MM»riiiiir'.iitiiiii-Trfi- nUTTft-arwr-nwimi ruMfm nnr TBrtinnirimnfniirinft rr—ri -n-rrrTft——p——^Pi 
1 Sharma, Dr. B.N.K. "philosophy of'Sri-Madhvacaryji" 
pp. 818-219, Bombay, 1962* 
2 Hadhva^Brahmasutraldiasya, 2.3.50, pp«93 
3 Madhva-Brahmasutrabhasya, pp. 93* 
3 
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Cites a illustration o£ tiie rainbow as an instance 
Of a Nirupa^iiika rei'l^ction of the sun's rays, 
to elucidate iiis conception of the Jiva a& a 
Uirup^iiiJta reileetioa of ^wara* 
"!Bie illustration of rainlsow aa the nirupa-
dhika reflection of sun may at the f i r s t ?sigiit 
appear incongroous becauae i t is incompatible 
with the sc ienti f ic truth, that tlie phenomenon 
of rainbow in the slcy ie due to the reflection 
of eun*s rays in tiie cloud or the atmospheric and 
anup^hika or nirupadhika reflections would bring 
out the sense iti which Madhva asserts the 
anupadhika character of rainbow and would specify 
the distinction between these two forms of 
1 
pratibimba (ref lect ion)" . Again, Madhva quotes 
an malogy of a man and his shadow from the 
-^ruti, to make clear the relation of meteph/sical 
dependence between Jiva md Braimmm As ^ruti 
sayss "Yathaisa puruee chaya etasminnetadatatam" 
(Prasno upa. I1X.3)» 
1 Karain, I>r# K, "An outline of Madhva Philosophy" 
Allahabad, 1962, pp# 143-144. 
2 Madhva - Brahmasutrabhaeya, pp» 93. 
(In some respects) with the supreme, Pratibimbatva, 
according to Madhava, is not a false relation, 
oi' which the jivas are to be ashemed and should 
try to shake o f i , as in Mvaita* It is the« 
truest and most laeautiful permanent bond with the 
Supreme being aad the purpose of idiilosophy is 
its progressing realization, by the j lva two 
X 
doctrine are thus diametrically opposed 1 " 
Madhva in his Ih^ya on Brahmasutra 
2 
"Abhasa eva ca" discusses the theory of "Bimbap-
ratibitsbabhava", -Jiva is the reflection 
(pratiblmba) of the Brahman* According to him 
a pratibimba is of two kindss-
"SopMhiraaupidhi^ca pratibimbo dvidheyate/ 
JivaisasyaaupadhirJndracapoya th^averitipengisruteh//" 
Ctte is sopadhiJka, i «e« , which is dependent 
on external media, and the other is Hirupadhikai 
i»e*, the one which is not so dependent. Madhvacarya 
1 Shaima, Br* B.N.Z. "Philosophy of i r t Madhvac^yji« 
pp. 218^219, Bombay, 1962* 
2 Madhya*BrahmasutraMiasya, 2*3*50, pp*93 
3 Madhva-Bralamasutrabhasya, pp* 93* 
3 
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cites a illustration of the rainbow ae an instance 
of a Kirupa^liika re£l6ction of the sun's rays, 
to elucidate iiis conception of the Jiva as a 
Nirup^hika reflection of l^wara. 
"IBie illustration of rainbow as the njucupa-
dhika reflection of sun may at the f i r s t £Jight 
appear incongruous because i t is ineompatlble 
with the scienti f ic truth, that the phenomenon 
of rainbow in the sky i© due to the reflection 
of sun*s rays In the cloud or the atmospheric and 
aaupadhika or nirup^hika reflections would bring 
out the sense in which Madhva asserts the 
anup^hika character of rainbow and would specify 
the distinction between these two forms of 
1 
pratibimba (reflection)" . Agaiti, Madhva quotes 
an analogy of a man and hia shadow from the 
^ruti , to make clear the relation of metephysical 
dependence between Jiva end BrahiQan# As i rut i „ 2 
sayBj "Yathaisa puruse chaya etasminnetadatatam" 
(Prasno upa. I i l »3 ) . 
1 Narain, Dr, K, "An outline of Madhva Philosophy" 
Allahabad, 1962, pp. 143-144. 
2 Madhva « Brahmasutrabhasya, pp. 93. 
tr^ 
"The analogy of "Chayapurusa" conveys 
the idea that God is immeasurably more than and 
superior to the souls, as the substance is 
greater than its shadow. !l!he shadow is there 
because of the substance^ It is bound to the 
substance; but not vice-versa. The dependence 
is thus unilateral and not reciprocal* She shadow 
is' outwardly siiailar to the substance, in fornit 
The souls have the same form of reality* Conscious-
ness and bl iss , resembling Brahman's* It should 
always be remembered that analogies should not 
be stretched indefinitely. The point of the 
analogy is str ict ly confined to the ideas of^ 
dependence and similarity and nothing more*" 
The relation of part and whole (am^amsibhava), 
also conveys the same truth of dependence and 
similaritys "Jivasya parameswaramsatvam tu, 
tataadrasyam tadadhinasattadiaiattvam cetyarthah/" 
(Nyiya-Stidha II , pp. 453b) Jiva is part (mda,) 
of the Brahman, it is clearly apparent that Madhva 
1 Sharma, Br. B.N.K., "Philosophy of ^ri-Madhva-
c^ya" , Bombay, 1962, pp. 219-220. 
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always tried to establislj the nature and existence 
of Jiva as separate from that of Brahman. Brahman 
is the cause of the nature and existence of «rlva 
1 
just as father is cause, of the existence of his 
son» Madhva does not accept the relation of 
difference and non-difierence (bhedahheda) between 
Jiva and Brahman, but he accepts fundaiBent,a3. 
difference and substitutes am^atva for "JSTaa -
2 
difference". Madhva distinguishes two kinds 
• 3 
of iUnsas Savrupsk^a eoid bh Annans a* Matsya md 
toirma aire svarupamsa of the Brahman. Jivas are 
bhinn^ias of Brahman* 
Thus, in the words of Jayatirth the 
4 
difference (bheda) is not absolute but eternal. 
1 "m^ raksatu vibhumityam putroham paramBsmanah"/ 
Madhva-Brahmasutra-bhasya, pp# 90* 
2 "atascamsatvamuddlstam bhedabhedaona mukhyatah'V/ 
Madhva-Brahmasutra-l^asya, pp. 91 
3 "svaa^ascatho vibhinnsmsa i t i dvedhanisa isyate/" 
Madhva-Brahiaasutra-bhasya, pp» 92, 2»3«47» 
4 "Jivatmanah paramatmana atyantikabhedah samarthyate 
(Hyiya-sudh^g pp. 435}, parantu, na j ivo 
brahmano ghat a iva patatatyantabhinnah/ 
(Ujiaya-sudha, 453 b)" . 
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Thus, the doctrine of Nimbarka is completely 
different from the doctrine of Madhvicarya, 
because according to Nimbarka both difference and 
non-difference are equally real, while in the 
doctrine of Madhvacarya the difference (liieda) % 
alone that is real, and non-diiference has no 
any place in his doctrine* It is the main 
diffe2?ence between the doctrines of Himbarka and 
Madhvacarya* 
And again, it establishes that in the 
doctrine of natural difference and non-*difference 
(svabhavikabhedabhedavada) of Nimbarka there 
is no such contradiction as in the Madhva doctrine 
viz, Midhva doctrine of only difference (bhedavada), 
has to accept many texts like "All this indeed is 
Brahman", as subordinate ones» 
(v) Yallabhacarya and Nijmbarka» 
The doctrine of vallabha is called 
"Suddhadvaita", i . e » , "pure non-duality"* The 
compound *tuddhadvaita* cen be dissolved in 
two waysj *^ uddham ca tadadvaitam •, or, the 
n on-duality of Brahman that is pure, without aay 
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conne ct ion w ith mayi^  and, ' Suddhayoli • advait m ' » 
or, the n on-duality of the universe and the 
Brahm^ that is pure, without any connection with 
According to vallabha, the Jiva and 
the unanimate world are essentially the eata© as 
Brahman, so there is non-duality between Jl'Va, 
Jagat and the Brahman. 
ifii this manner> according to vallabha, the 
relation of Jiva and Rcahman is "pure non-duality", 
jIva is the part of Brahman^  As the sparks of the 
f i re are not different fro® their original the 
f i r e , the j iva also is not different from Brahman, 
viz#, Jiva is identical with Brahman* Vallabha-
carya admits the <Parinamav^a' (transformation). 
In his doctrine the Jiva is transformation of 
the Brahman, but he admits "liamutable transfor-
mation" (aviicrtapar,lnamavada>, i#e«,, that which 
^uddhadvaitapade jneyah samasah karmadharayah/ 
ad vait am ^ suddhyayoh prahuh sasthitatpurusam budhah// 
(127) 
f 
M%a-sambandha-rahitam '^uddhamityacyate budhaih/ 
karya-k^ap,a-rupam hi u^ddham Brahmana mayikam// 
> « « ^ (128) — Suddhadvaitamartanda. 
2 -Anubhasya, 2* 3.43. 
m 
does not undergoes ohaage# Juat as goldf even 
wlien moulded into ornaments of different shapes 
and sizes and comes to be laiown as 'braedlets', 
•rings» e t c . , remains unaffected by these changes 
pertaining to those ornaments and does not lose 
its essence, in the same way, the Lord manifests 
His qualities of sat, cit md Unanda in the 
Jiva» the Jagat and the Antar-yamia forms of 
His, without himself undergoing any change 
whatever. aJhis ijs also supported by Siatras 
like "Atmakytah parin^at" and so on« 33a.e 
relation between Jiva and Brahman is thus that of 
identity (advaita), which is pure (^uddhairvaita). 
Thus, the doctrine of Nimb^ka is completely 
different from the doctrine of vallabh^arya, 
because, according to Uimbarka both difference 
and non-difference are equally real , while in 
the doctrine of vallabhacarya the non-difference 
(abheda) alone that is real, and difference has 
no any place in his doctrine. It is the main 
T a ) : ^ ^ :: ^ ^ , 
1 Yatha suvamam sukratam pursastat pascascca^t/ 
sarvasya hir^mayasya/ tadeva madhye vyavah^ya-
mmam naoaapadesairahamasya tadv^^t// 
Srioaadbhagavat, 
(b) Mrudula^I^ Marfatia, "aSie philosophy of 
Vallabhacarya^', pp. 66-56, Delhi, 1967 
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difference Ijetween the doctrines of IJimbarka 
and Vallabhacaxya, Dr. V.S* GSiate, says, 
" for vailabiia, it ia non-difference (abheda) 
alone that ia real (v^tavika) , which a l l difference 
is saiaply for. the sake of sport, in opposition to 
both EHuaau;ja and Niab^ka. According to these 
latter , though both difference and non*«difference 
are theoretically equally real CVastavika)t It 
is difference only that is real , while the non • 
difference is accounted for by the similarity of 
nature between Brahman and Jiva or by the relation 
1 
of dependence bet?/een the twoCniyamya-aaiyaatrtva*) 
(VI) hsM^ms^t tmm m^ Hi»abark,^  
^rikpsnacaitanya explains the relation of 
Jiva and 33rahman exactly life© Nimbarka, According 
to him, the mutual difference in nature amd 
concept of Brahman and Jiva is obvious, as 
already observed, that Brahman is a l l knowing, 
a l l - powerful and omniscient, while the Jiva 
is knowing l i t t l e and has limited power. Brahman 
is absolute, while Jiva is atomic* Bttahman is 
— 
1 C&ate, V.S, «33ie Ved^ta«, Poona, i960, pp,35. 
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creatort supporter, destroyer, while Jiva is 
created, supported and controlled by Brahman. 
Itt reality, there is mutual n on-difference, 
la the three aspects of taiowledge, existence and 
"bliss v i z . , sat, c i t and ananda of Brahman, these 
two Brahman and Jiva are identical* 
Thus, like Himbirka, there is relation of 
both difference and non-difference between Jiva 
and Brahman, 
On the other hand, like Nimbarka, thJ^ 
relation of difference and non-difference between 
Jiva and Brahman is in bondage as well as in 
salvation. 5Che mukta Jiv^appeais to be entirely 
identical with Brahmm, being knowledge, existence 
and bliss viz. sat, c i t and ^anda of Brahmans 
but, the mukta Jiva, too , is different from the 
Bacahman in two respects, Thus, f i r s t , even a 
mukta Jiva is atomic while Brahman is a l l -
pervading; and even the Mukta Jiva no doubt 
1 Qovinda-bh^ya, English Translation, Ed. by 
Basu B.X)., Allahabad, 1912, 4.4.20. 
creates the Pltriloka and Matriloka, e t c . , as 
we leam from the cha. upa,, but his creation 
has this limitation, that it is a local creation 
only, different from the creation of the Supreme 
Brahman, who create© the whole universe, consisting 
of spirit and matter, sustains it and dissolves 
it back into Himself, This power belongs to 
Brahman alone and to no Miikta Jlva, in this 
sense Mukta j lva is different from Brahiaaa» Eae 
lukta Jlva is eq.ual to God in matters of enjoyment 
only; not essentially and absolutely equal to 
2 
the lord* 
Bius, like limb^ka in the philosophy of 
^rikrsnacaitanya both difference and non-difference 
are true* He accepts both difference and non -
difference as incompatible and inconceiveable, 
theory true, KJmbarka accepts both difference 
and non - difference to be eq^ually true and compa-
tible as well as. The doctrine of ^Srikrsnacaitanya 
may, therefore, be called "acintya-bhedabhedavada", 
which may be translated as «inconceiveable relation 
1 Govanda-bhasya, English Translation, M* by 
Basu Allahabad, I9l2, 4#4,17, PP. 765» 
2 Govinda-bhasya, 4,4.21* 
of simultaneous difference and non-difference 
between Jiva and Brahman", as which is 
distinguished from the doctrine of natural 
difference and non-difference (Svabhavika-
tmedabhedav^a) of Hifflui^ -ka* 
(v i i ) "^rljcantha and Nimb^ka 
iBi the f i r s t place, according to 
Srikentha, like Nimbarka there is an essential 
difference between Jlva and Brahmani Brahman 
is by nature a store of a l l auspicious qualities, 
independent and ever • frfee from a l l defects, 
does not become subject to the faults of the 
Jiva, while the Jiva is depfendent, becomes 
deluded and grieves' , i , e » , remains merged in 
the ocean of sorrows, brou^t about by the great 
delusion. Ihere is a difference between Jiva 
and Brahman in respect of their qualities, v i z . , 
knowledge and igaorance, Independent and dependent 
2 
md so on. ^gain, Brahman is the ob;ject to be 
1 ^rikantha-Wiasya, Sng. Translation by Dr. (Mrs.) 
Eoma Chaudhri, Calcutta, 19S9, 1.2.11, pp. 96 
2 ^rikantha-bhasya, 1.2.11, pp. 96 
m 
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worshipped, while Jiva is the worshipper* 
Jiva and 3Brahman are 2*elated as the 'directed* 
2 
and the 'director*, as the body and the soul» 
Hence the mutual difference between Jiva and 33 
Brahman is obvious. Brahman Is the director, 
while Jiva Jjs the directed* Brahman is the 
Lord of the ifrorld and never the Jiva* Hence. 
3 _ 
Jiva is different from Brahman* !Ehus, Jiva 4 
is different in nature from' Brahman* 
But, i f , on the one hand, Jiva is different 
from Brahman, on the other, Jiva is also non -
different from Brahman* Jlva as e f fect aid part 
of Brahman, is different from Brahman, the 
cause and the whole, but as e f fect and part, 
again, Jiva is also non-different from Brahman* 
SChere is non-difference between j l v a and Brahman, 
as they stand in a relation of the pervaded and 
the pervader* Here also irikantha perfectly 
agrees with Nimbarka* 
1 ^rikantha-bhasya, 1*2*2, pp* 84 
2 '^rlkantha-bhSsya, 1.2*12, pp* 96 
3 irikantha-bhasya, 1*3*44, pp*142 
4 ^rikantha-bhasya, 2*3*45, pp* 241 
5 ^rlkantha-bhisya, 2.3*42, pp. 240 
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5?hus, according to '^rlkantha, i t is 
established that there is both difference and 
non-difference (Hiedabheda) Tsetween Jiva and 
Brahman* But '^rlkantha says difference and 
noa«difference (Hiedabhedavada) is not tenable. 
He replies that no such difference and non -
difference is to be apprehended here, for we 
only establish the doctrine of Non-difference 
as qtualified by difference (Vi^i^tadvaita)* We 
do not maSnt'aan that there is ah absolute 
difference between Braiiiaan and the universe, 
as between a pot and a piece of cloth, Jfor, that 
would be oppossed to the scriptural texts maintain-
ing the non-difference between the two* Again we 
do not maintain that there is an absolute 
difference (between the two) as between the 
nacre and the silver* For, i f one of these two 
be fa lse , then that would contradict the scriptural 
texts maintaining the difference between them in 
respect of natural qualities* Further, we do not 
also, maintain that there is both difference and 
non-difference (between the two), for that would 
1 '^ Bhedabhedakalpanam visistadvaitam s^hay^ah" 
- "irlk^tha-bhasya, 2.1.22 
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lae self contradictory. But we malntato that 
(the relation between Brahman and the world 
is that non-dtffierence (or Brahman) is qualified 
Inr difference (or the world), as the embodied 
being is tiy its body, as the subBtance is by 
X 
its attribute. 
Ihus, ^rlkantha explains the relation of 
JTiva and Brahman on the analogy of the soul - body 
(4ariri-^arira), substance-attribute (vi^esya-
viiesana)» and the cause-effect relation (karya-
kar an a s ambandh a) • 
TtiQ non-difference between the Jiva and 
Brahman simply means that the Jlva - the e f fect 
and the Brahman its cause, the Jiva - the attribute 
and the Brahman i ts substance, the Jiva - the body 
and the Braiman its soul, none can exist to the 
absence of the other, as in the case of a pot and 
clay. A pot is never found without blueness. in 
1 ( i ) "na ca bhedabkiedavadinah, vastuvirodhat/ 
kintu ^arirasaririnoriva ca vi^istadvaita-
vadlnah/»» ^rlkantha-bhasya, 2«1.22» 
( i i ) ^Srlkantha-bhaeya, Eng. translation by 
Drt (Mrs.) Koma Chaudhuri, 2.1.22, pp. I8l» 
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the same manner the power (sakti) viz. the Jlva 
can never exist without Brahman, while, Brahman, 
too , is never toiown to lae without His power viz*, 
the Jiva, just as f i re is never without heat» If 
a thing cannot toe known without another thing 
then the f i rst i® qualifietl Toe the second. The 
second thing (the attrilaute) is the f i r s t thing 
(the substance) in essence. Hence, it is said that 
Brahman i^ non-separable from and necessarily 
connected with the Jivo. On the other hand the 
difference (between the two), too, is natural. 
Hence, the Brahmm i s , indeed, superior to the 
Jiva. Just as the soul is non-different from 
the body In nature and superior to i t , just as the 
substance is n on-different fr«Ma attribute in 
nature and superior to i t ; just as the cause is 
non-different from the ef fect in nature and 
1 
superior to i t . 
Hence, ^rikantha calls his doctrine "vi^iQta-
l^ivadvaita", v iz . , ; the doctrine that ^iva possessing 
the universe consisting of the sentient and the 
non-sentient, as his body, is one without a second, 
and he is both the cause and the e f f e c t , 
1 "^rikantha-bh^ya, 2.1.22, pp. 181-182 
2 ^rikantha-bhasya, 2.1*14, 2.1.22, pp. 174-181 
Thus, the doctrine of Nimbarka has very 
much in common with that o£ ^rikaatha (aa with 
Bammuja)^ both regard the difference as well 
as the n on-difference as real| in the same 
sense* But for HJtob^ka, difference and non-
difference (Bhedabheda) are on the same level , 
they co-exist , and have the same importance; 
while for ^rllcantha (as for E^muja) non-
difference is the priticiplej it is qualified 
by difference, which is thus subordinate to i t . 
Another technical distinction aay be 
possible between the doctrines of 'Srikantha said 
JSrimb^ka, like the another technical distinction 
between the doctrines of K^aauja and Sfimbarka, 
as it has already, been observed above. 
Thus, the main difference between 'Srikantha 
aad Himbarka consists in their doctrines with 
regard to the relation between difference and 
non-difference, Brahman on the one hand, Jiva 
on the other. 
( v i i i ) "Sripati and Uimbarka 
As it has already been observed that, like 
Nimbarka, 'Sripati calls his doctrine Bhedabheda 
md dvaitadvaita. There is difference between 
Jiva and Brahman in bondage* Brahman is the 
object of worship, all-pervasive and omniscient, 
while Jiva is worshipper, has spatial limitation 
and possesses limited knowledge. But at the 
salvation Jiva ia identical with Brahman. Ihis 
identity is natural as well as of f om. And again, 
like Himbarka, '^ripati t e l l s us that both difference 
and non-difference are natural* 
Thus, the doctrine of Nimbarka has veajy 
much in common with that of "Sripati, both regard 
the difference as well as the non-difference as 
natural. But for Nimbarka, identity is not of 
form unlike difference where as for ^ripati 
identity is not only natural but also of foim 
like difference. And again according to ^ripati^ 
difference holds only in bondage and identity in 
mukti; So that identity and difference are not 
to be found simultaneously but at different times* 
But for Nimbarka, there is the relation of both 
difference and non-difference between the Jiva and 
the Brahman in bondage as well as in salvationj so 
that difference aad non-difference are to be found 
aimult ane oualy• 
C O I G I i U S l O N MCSsaiEetaasisisssedtSi 
!IIi3ie above views of different philosophers 
shows that the proTaleia of the relation of Jiva 
and Brahman cannot be easily brought under any 
well known logical category, such as identity, 
difference and difference end non-difference. 
On one hand there are absolute non-
dualist ic doctrines, such as the Advaitavida of 
4an]cara, and the "^uddhadvaita of vallabha", in 
which j lva is completely identical with Brahman; 
gaid on the other hand, there are absolute dualist ic 
doctrines, such as Dvaita-v^a of Madhva, in 
which Jiva is completely different from the 
Brahman# 
itod again, there are the doctrines of 
Niiflbarka, Hiasicara, '^rikrsnacaitanya, 
'^rikantha and tripati» All of them accept the 
relation of both difference and non-diffea:ence 
between Jiva and Brahman, to be equally real; 
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Taxt a l l ot tiiem try to reconcile them in 
diXfereat vfays, Hiabarka accepts the relation 
of "both difference and non-difference between 
j lva and Brahmanj which is to be equally 
natural (syabhavika} and completely compatible. 
Ramatiuja and "^rikaatha explains the relation of 
Jiva and Brahmm on the analogy of soul and body 
(Sariri-^arira)! in which non - difference is 
the principali it is (qualified by diffea?ence, 
which is thus subordinate to i t . Bhaskara 
regards the difference and non-difference to be 
equally real but he takes difference to be aupa-
dhika and non-difference to be natural and realt 
'Srjucrfiiacaitanaya regards the difference and 
iion-4ifference as in conceive able (aclntya)# 
'^ripati regards the difference md non-difference 
to be equally natural, but he takes that identity 
is not only natural but also of foim. 
But considering the above doctrines, 
Himbarka*s main contribution seems to be very 
reasonable, both from the philosophical and 
theological points of view* Kimbarka elucidates 
his point about the relation of j iva and Brahman, 
ido 
by the analo©^ of the cause and tHe e f fect (or 
the part and the whole relation), as it has heen 
oliserved* ef fect (or the paii;) is different 
from its cause (or the whole) in attributes and 
powers, £oxm& end fiinctions» A clay jar, 
for example, is different from a lump of clay, 
In this sense that the lump has a round shape; 
The Jar m oblong onej the lump is blackj the 
jar , brown, the lump is soft j the jar hard; we 
can besmear the f l oor with the lump, but cannot 
fetch water by it^ and so on. But on the other 
hand, the ef fect iB non-different from the cause, 
In essence, being but its transformation; for 
example, a clay jar , m e f f e c t , io non-different 
from the lump of clay - the cause, essence, 
both being equally clay» 
Hence, the relation between the cause and 
i ts ef fects (or the part and the whole) to neither 
one of pure non-difference (abheda) nor one of pure 
difference (bheda) but one of natural difference 
and non-difference (Svabhavika-Biedabheda), both 
of which are equally real, 
She very same is the case with j iva and 
Brahman. Ttie Jiva is the effect (or the part) 
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of tbje Brahmstti, and the Bcahman ie the cause 
(or the whole) of the Jlva. 5?he mutual 
difference between Jlva and Brahman is obvious. 
As it has already been observed that Brahman is 
of the nature of a l l - perversive^ omniscient 
and independent^ while Jlva is knowing l i t t l e 
and dependent on Brahman, and so on* But on 
the other hand, Jiva is n on-different from the 
Brahman, because it is after al l nothing but 
Brahman. To concluifeethis present note, it may 
be illustrated by well Jmown example of Brahma-
Sutra, which is «Ahlkundalavat"# Sa this present 
illustration *ahikundalvat * the serpent is the 
cause of the coH and the co i l is the e f fec t of 
the serpent. • 0]lhe serpent is independent, while 
the co i l is dependent. On the one hand, it 
shows the difference between the serpent and 
its co i l . On the other hand, the existence and 
activity of co i l is impossible in the absence of 
the serpent. It shows the n on-difference of the 
serpent and its c o i l . Likewise, the relation of 
Jiva - the ef fect (or the partj, transformation), 
with the Brahman - the cause (or the whole),is 
natural difference and non-difference (Svabhavika-
tt.edaTiieda). !Hiis relation of both difference 
and non-diflerence between j iva and Brahman is 
in bondage as well as in salvation* Mukta j lva 
is aon-different from Brahman, being icnowledse, 
existence and bliss in assence (Saccidmandasvarupa)j 
but, it too, is different f»om Brahman in two 
respects, ia the f i r s t place, MuJcta j lva is 
atomic while Brahman is a l l • pervading and 
in the second place a Mukta Jiva laclcs the power 
of creation on which Brahman possesses ful ly and 
eternally* 
Thus, there is relation of both difference 
and non-difference between Jiva and Brahman in 
bondage as well ae in salvation, which is to be 
equally real and compatible. lEhe testimony of 
various scriptures proves the natural difference 
and .non-difference of jIva with Brahman. 2here 
is no such contradiction, in the doctrine of 
Natural difference and non-difference (Svabhavika-
bhedabheda-vada) of '^r'^aimbarkacarya, as we 
find in some vedaatic systems, such as t the 
follower of *dvaitavada', has to accept many 
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texts like *Saxvm Bialvldani Jarahma*, as 
subordinate oaesi and the followers of 
»Mvaitav^a' j have to accept many texts, which 
detearmine difference, as subordinate ones. 
However, Himb^ica's very special contribu.-* 
tion seems, as regards the relation of j lva and 
Bralmaa, to be rexy reasonable. So even-now 
HSmbarfca-school has a best place and a great 
importance in indiaa - devotees, in the words of 
Br* (Mrs.) Eoma Chauduri, fac t , »Ilieda' and 
*AMieda» have both been admitted by a l l the 
Monitheistic School of Vedinta (except, of 
coursef that of Madhva)s Bat none has been able 
to put the two, exactly ©n the same level , same 
status, like ]fimbarka. What a great and glorious 
con ^ ome ret ion J. iin infinite nuiaber of Gods in 
essencef etejaially worshipping the one, universal 
God, from within, like the rays in the sun, like 
the ripples, in a river, like the flowers in a 
tree, manifesting His l ight , singing His praise, 
spireoding His Fragrance, What a superb, sublime, 
X 
sweet conception.'" 
1 Chaudhuri, Dr* (Mrs,) £oma "Nimbark^' Theory 
of Self,« " f in i te -Se l f " , by Swami B.H.Bon 
Maharaj, Vrindaban, 1963. 
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In words of Pt. inantaram Shastri, 
''Tasmadakamairapi cldaeidlBvarm^ avaljiiavikaliheda" 
hhedmeva sambaadham mglkratya pmar^i^iistatvmgi' 
karo gauravavaiiopyaaupapazinapi svasaapradiyasya 
svatantfyasiddhyartha i t i sMdaaza/ 
- Vedfflita-tattva-'boaha, pp»32 
f m m 
m 
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The pmomt WQrk coneiate di* Xiv© chsptersi 
wiiieii to present t'm natutaX x^lntion 
of diliercsnee md ftoa-^ifiorcaco (SvaMiavika-
Uitmm md iietsimm^ 
accQX^in^ ta llimlmka pMXosoplyr* 
raaiataln tHat uelatioa ie por«eiv«a» 
la the BadfiMet - piiiloaopiiyi i-eXatioau aro contlaaeiit 
reailltyi tliat i s ta no ultimate ideality ot all* 
Iiik« Mimm a^Kaii maiataia ti^at relation 
i s perceived* la "Sesilrite Mvaita Fhilosopisy, a l l 
relation© ojce purely ooaceptwal aaa supertaposefi* 
According to th& iaivm^ relation i o notliiug laat a 
apeoial category Imaad on the ismeratl » 
unity in multiplicity • iavolvlBg two e!«teraQl 
realitiGSf Acoordiag to Biaakara, aisisbuja) Sisit^km 
« t c » , a l l relatioaa ar© real* Siiere io m iadejtiait© 
nmtor o£ relation in Indian * piiilosopliy* According 
to Haiyi^ikast principal relatione arc conjunotion 
and in^ermoe (Saayoga md Sai&aviya)« In the place 
of samawai tlie Bn^tae uxmmBtac&Q end Advaitins 
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r©co0aiS0 the relation oi' dlffweac© - c m * Identity 
(tSaatoya)* la th® phlloaopiyr o£ IJint^lca^ the 
relation preoijpposes diffei-mce m& aoa • 
SiiXarence ( • HoaWtifxer^oe £iere mome 
msmtiea depeaftence not absolute identity* whioh 
mt incm^Iict vith ljut 1& oomp^ime 
Wit21 Andy ffiedcaa aifiermcQ 
of nature* fJiti0| diiiertmoo sad aon-diiiermce 
reXatlan io equally rtsal aad compatiiae 
witii ©acli otlicr# if our types of relation of dii'ierenco 
ena fion«4iXlermce (ttiedaHiGda) suro laention^d ty 
Sure^ar^^ya in Me 
tikmt fiiesf} are followino 
( i ) Smmyo. aa4 t l t e s b 
( i i ) Avasthirat and oveet^i^ 
( i l l ) K^ya 
( iv ) Biigft m& l&'^n* 
PrakS^itikaa maintain f ive typ&s of relation 
of diii«r«)no€^ and non-dif ier^co (lahedatilieaa) in his 
Panbi^adllcavivaraaata inntaad of theea at)ove fo\ir 
typ«e« ara follonrin^ 
U ) Jati and Vyakti* 
( i i> Guna and gui^* 
( i i i ) toya md l^ana* 
Civ) Vik«|ta»varupa, 
Cv) Aaaa md amain* 
dootrine o£ Slf^eienee m& ii£mwdifi«!renee 
(t^CNlaliieaa) lias a long hi&torjt It took 
to tfie ?eeic tim®m IMie thiakere l ike 
Aemai'athyai Audulooirii KaeMona oflored; the doctrine 
oX diiiereac^ and aoa-^iflercjioo (laliedateeaa), who 
are reierred to ae fiucli in Bvea in 
lator aiie lialmlfla. 
riaafapralsSeh were tiie oupforters ax' tMe doctriac* 
m& after tliet tlie doctrine oi di££ermcc md non* 
differmc© (tehedatiiieda) i s elalaorated in the pMloeo-
play oi Miml^kai ^rikr^acaltm/a md ^ripati* 
la t m phiioiSophF Hiiabarlcai tlie relation 
o i jIV^ md iratom i& ^uat liko the^ a 
OQiiee md Its a whole end it® parts, a 
m'bBtmGm and it© attriteste©| a eubotratuia o i power 
md it0 pcmero* 
The fflutual diiierence in thm aature and 
oonoept o i Jiva md S^ Bhmm i s otviouo* Brahaaa 
i s the oau0e and Jiva hia eiieot or traasioraoction* 
3oy there es&fsitially diiitreace tietween Jiva 
md BxeSmm aa letwe^ the ole^ end the pot0| dishes 
etc* I bet«ee» the gold oad the bracelet 8| ear-rint^ 
etc* I between the txree aad the leaveoi fruits etc*} 
between the sea and the o^actiai waves ete#| md 
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tetweca t M &m aad ltd ro^o* fhere la a diiTiercnce 
botw^oi aXva^  csid 1%'ahami ae tetv/eost tlxc part and ti^e 
tUe pw^ ot Bralmezi aa 
whole* "Sins imleibxm oX Md whoXe doolajrect 
thoii there i0 dlifercac^ laetwem JXva end IrahBcoi 
on accomt oj: the d^tsi^atioa of di^iermce* fho 
Jiva iSf natuxGi a £»axt| ^ d the iub^eot to ^ondago 
m& »aXiratloa| while Brahmoa nature whole md 
the oceaa d£ a eo^a oX ^^ttributea ossii&oleAoe 
sad the rest* Again | Bri^sai 10 the otjject to 
oMalaed the j l va i e the oM©in©r| the © M ^ e r 
cfKUiOfe te the ot>ject to be otJfcaiaed# fhur© io 
dli'ferenc© between the Jiva, which has l i t t l e 
iaiowledgei and ie subject to bondage end seavation 
through the lord*e a^K cwisietin^; qX the three 
guaas md the Srahisiei » who ie omiecient lord* It 
eetabliehee that there ie diiference betyiteen Jiva 
and Brabstea as the Jcnower and the objeot to be teona* 
Brahman i e the object to be worshipped, while Jiva 
i e worehipper* the autual diiierence i s obvioue 
between them* 
?urther| iksimm X& different froa the 
iadiiriduail eoule o i the eua end the rcet, within 
which He dwells on account of the deei^ation o£ 
diiiemace* 4gein i t mesne that BraiMan in «riva| 
wilo i o 'aaxlx^tshimskiai t& diiiorfmt aatui^e* 
Othor eeoentia}. (llxXermcea Utween j£Va ma 
our© tUs^ Bra^ imm 1& jlzmcx*controIXe]r wjbtiXe 
Jiva i e not inttear-caatroller* Jiva i e aloae that i e 
siite^eote to fieea© aa^ partieipate© in 4iap©i?feotlcaa6, 
tut Brabmm •^ ha i0 not eubjeot to decdo* JXva i s m 
aa^ojrer oa oecouat of i t s Ixjperiectioasj wMle 
Bs^mm i s not towsheO^ ovaa lay m odour of imperfec-
tioa^i aad Ig not tho enjoyer of the aassco md tiio 
foasss to b© ©reated hy iamsolf^ Bafidlia Jiva 
i e entirely ditierent Smm Braiuaon, lieing iiaperfeoti 
aiafuly impui*©! md so on* 
hvm l^ ulcta Jiva ia dllxei?cat from l^altom) 
in two »#ap©cte» la f i r s t place, t&© freed-
jTva is atomic ia elze, wiUlo Braumaa i@ oll^^erva* 
diag* Atomic Jiva oanaot beoomc all«»portra@ive in 
ealvatioa* In the aacoad place ^  tht fareed^^vay 
however I tiiou#i aiailar to tlio Hii^cat Brahman | yat 
oaanot po&oitlo be the lord of alX thc^  amtiaat and 
the aoa^aoatieat) their ooatrolleri their auppoxteT^ 
all»pexvaaiire aad 00 ohf md h6ac«| i t s lordahip i e 
exoluaive of the aotivitiea in oonaeotion with the 
uaiverae* 
2ho mutual diifareace faetwaea j fva and Bcahmaa 
i o e(|u&lly at email natural ^  and uadmiatilei ia 
fcoadaa^ m well m in 
In roa l l t / i t&ere i s ©tttuol iton^difi'ereae© 
l)©twe©a j fva ana Srstoaa as betw©^ tiio cause aad 
til© efreqt* S?lie ©fleet t wiilcii teloa^so to a poeteisloir 
tlaei te ^reseat ta So t M eftcct l e 
nm^iiiexmt from the It xb explained 
the iXittatratlon titct 0i»i<i«ti0iits# flie ear-ring le 
tM Xn naae atm^e exmg^l^ 
m mQomt oX KunddXei^ tva md £&t&kattva, \sat i e 
@o Xox a& the ^ I d io ooncamed* fliers 
i e lietwem ilivoi cmd i^ atusfsi as laetween 
tlie md tiie jXva id part oi Brolmcsii 
Brnhmaa i e t2tf» whoie* arelatiaa oX a part md 
th€s vnoXe deolaree tJiat Jiva Xb non^dli'iormt Jtrom 
JB^atom on aoocniat ot the desi^aaticm oiT non^difiorenee* 
And it© «3ci0t6ac« and activity are wndeir tiio control 
o£ the whoie* 
Sttddlia jIv& Xb Aon«^i£iereiit £:gom Bteihsm in 
esseaoei lieing His «itect or traaaiToairQatioa* Qa. the 
other hand Makba JiVa X& entirely aon«di££Gr<mt £ro-m 
BcaJicifi®, being exist - co0ttitioa-tili»s in essence 
{ Saecideaeaadaevaxupa)* 
Oa the (me haQd» diiJtereaoe i e true^ on the 
othej^ i laoxiMdiiierexioe Xn no leee true* She otfA • aa 
til© ef fect ate 0i Brahmm le H^ii^xmt tmn 
Brahmaa «> tli& eauee md the «iioXe but m ttiQCt 
and pact I agaiei| JlTa i s ea^o Aon-^dilfereit ^roa 
Uraiasau* the ilsot i e tliat the e f l t c t mA tJie 
tb& pai^ and tli« wi^ aXe seit^iar 
diCiereat mx noa<-dii'fermt but tlie 
VGXBttm oi' theiB i e a mlG^lm of botli 
mid aoA'NSij^i'ereace* Tha&i t m iMsXatlaa o£ ^ v a md 
l^ di^ mm Xb a relation O£ natux-ca diJ^jtisreace and 
acm-^i^ermoo (STftbiiarilca1&edablicda)| ^uet life© 
tliJSfc betwecaa tlie sei^eat oad it© co i i qv between 
th® mm and i t s Just m eerpmt i© the cause 
oX ooiX md tHe «oiX X& the eifeet of the 
mvgmt* sex^eat ia ind^aadmt vihXX^ tlie eoiX 
i s dtpendeutf C^  th® oiiehmd^ i t sac^B the dijti:ermc<^ 
between the sei^eit and it© coil* Gtt the other ljead| 
til© exiflteaoe and activity of eoii i s ioposaiisiLe in 
the abeenoe oi" the aexpmt* It the non-
diiXeroioe oi the eerpent end i t s ooil« Likewise| 
the relation oi Jiva th& with the M^ aHmsea-
the oauee i s natural diiierence mA non-diiierenoe 
(Sva);&aTilca*)]^edabheda)« It i e true t h ^ there ift 
diiierence between mm and it& re^s but there ie also 
non*^iii'ereno« eo Xar aa the li^iht ia conoexned* 
Aiceording to Himliarlcai thereior^^ there ia 
natural relation oi diliermce and non^diiierence 
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between Jiva mH l^oimm in bondage as weJlX m in 
ssavatioa* 1% XB £ux!thisx 0upi>orted 
tlie Xoet i s ttiat even durin^^ ti^ o boadaj^ e (Mdhavast&a) 
the Jlvai whioa i s atosiio i£i l^E^ e md posetssoe^ 
l i t t l e ^owledgOf thou^ diXJ^ eJrcnt from tiie Breteaai 
mho i s in aatuac© sad 
oimieoimt, yi^ t l iko tti^ Xeco: itoii«di££erent 
the tjctiei the sr^ £xm tho laapi quality iTjroia the 
<Hiea.i4ried, ©eaee orsaas from the v i t ^ oir^ tk it© 
e^riatmoe emd heing depeadeat upon the 
Srahiaasti i t %& £wm Brtihsim* Iiikei^laei 
thou(^ in 0hlvja£t:ioii (lSa3£t®ra©tha> the Jiva is aoa* 
di^iermt £rm i^ahmisj, i t having no oeporcffce 
indepmdent exietence and aetivity^ at the aome tiaei 
i t ia ucidoulAedXy diifereat from B '^ahciaa, in aecordaaee 
With the ^ u t i *Svena rupeaa eampadyete" — i t 
jcealisee i t e nature* Qthexwiaei the nature oi 
hoth, the Jrira and the Brahman laeeomee loooe* 
!Chu0| there io relation of l^ oth di^xermce 
and non«diiierenoe hetwetm Jiva m& JBrahmm in bandage 
«» well ae in salvation | which ie to te equally real 
end compatiiae* Xhe teatimoney o^ various ecripturee 
pj^ xr^ CB die natural dilfer^oe and non-OifJTerenee of 
Jiva with Irahman* there is no such contradiction 
in the docrtrine of natural dixfermee m^ non«di££erenoe 
(8va)ihavika«l3hedaliheda»vi^ a) ae we find in some 
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Buch mt tlie Xolltm&r Q£ 'Dvaltav^a* i 
la,m to seoept umy tm%B liiie 'S^srvom Oidliridea firahcia' 
as eul»rd4iiat© ones, m6. tho Xollowoars of 'Mvaltavada'» 
have t0 accept many wMoii d^tasaifie dificircacet 
ae eutioirdiiiate oaes* 
a© of ireiafeiofi oi: Jiva aad Bcatom 
eazmot M eaai l j I^ D^ otiaJj^  ua^er my mXX kuma Xaeslcal 
msth m i^entit^i miA, d i f fermce 
CfXk one there are al^Xute non^dualietlo 
doctriacei suoii aa tlie Mvmitavada^  o£ Smkarai in 
which Jiva ia identleal mlth MBimmi sad 
on the otlier taes^ ab&olute dualistio 
ddotiriaeG euoli as DvaltaV^a pg Madhirs^ i in wiack 
JTiva le eoapIeteXy diiiereat irom 
Aad a^ salni tliere ax^  tiie dootjdnes 
• • / • • / 
Hananu^Ai Bianlcaray Sxlicrft;iao{iltmya| Srilce&ti&a 
end Sxlpatl* MX o£ thm aocept tii6 veXis^ ion of totb 
diffej?ence aad aon*dliiereac© betweea Jiva and 
BpaJmaa to equally real lut all of them txy to 
TeconclXe thm in dliXereat ways* Hlmbarka accepts 
the xeXatiwi of both dlffereace and non^ltiereac© 
between jTva and a^hi&m the aaaXogy of the oauee 
and the ©Xfeot (or the past and the wholewhich le 
to be equally natural (SvaMiavlka) and perfectly 
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Ci^patiUe* itomujft ma '^Iksat^a explala tike 
relatian of Jiva and Brahmm osx tho ot aouX 
md Itsodiy (SaKidT-lsarira) I in wMcii ncwiHam'ereac© 
l e tiie prinolpaXi It qu^if ied 
wiiic^ Xa thua to it« Biaskajra reg^s 
tH© difierei36c« and nott*^fier@ac© to Is© cqiually reeSl 
bat Im talcoQ to Ido aatp^ ghilsa ma ntm* 
to be nectiira}. m& l&rlkrmaoidtaaya 
x&QEiXf&B tho diXXermeo said aa 
lacoaeelvea^ a.® (auintya), tiTpatl iregarfis th© 
d3Lf£ereacc uoa-diiXOiWaic© to 'm o^uaily natural 
Imt lie that Mo^tlt/ lo mt only natuj^ al hxt 
Qiao o£ 
Hovev&Xy vory special ooQtrltution 
seottsi as x^gords tlie natural xrolatioa of dii^oj^caoe 
and aon»dm«rmce (Svatiiavilca • Ishedatiioda) Imtmeea 
Jiira md Btaliaaa in 1»nda^ as woll ae in ealvationy 
to te vexy r^ aeonaiae botii trm the pMloeophioal 
end theological points oi* view« SOf evea«no« Jfimlw^-
Sehool has a Iseet place end a gr^ at ifoportoiice ia 
Indian •• devotees* 
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